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Leningrad's Sobchak on Federation, Gorbachev, Other Issues

91UN1297A Leningrad 24 CHASA in Russian No 10, Mar 91 pp 10-11

[Interview with Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak, USSR people's deputy and chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, by O.S. Kuzin, editor in chief of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA: "The Times Demand Compromises"]

[Text] On 11 January 1991, O.S. Kuzin, editor in chief of LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, met with A.A. Sobchak, USSR people's deputy and Leningrad soviet chairman, who answered questions asked by that newspaper.

[Kuzin] You are a USSR people's deputy. As such, do you support those who claim that a Union Federation could be democratic and stable only with a center established on the basis of a representative basis (by the republics)? In that case, naturally, the USSR Supreme Soviet, not to mention the Congresses of People's Deputies would be eliminated from the governmental structure.

[Sobchak] One could and should accept the fact that the Union could be created on the basis of representative republics. However, I do not agree that this would eliminate the Supreme Soviet and the Congresses of People's Deputies from the state structures. Everything depends on what is meant by a representative republic in the Federation. For example, there are quite a large number of federative states in which federative organs function, as is the case with our Supreme Soviet, i.e., that they are elected by the population itself. Representation does not mean that the republic itself determines the specific individuals or a specific quota of its participation in federal affairs.

It is normal for the federative state to set up Union structures on the basis of the direct expression of the will of the population and its vote in favor of one deputy or another. In principle, I believe that the Congress of People's Deputies has exhausted its possibilities as a parliamentary form. From the onset it was too big to work efficiently. However, in the first stage it played a positive role. Now, obviously, we should address ourselves to the creation of a Union parliament of a Supreme Soviet type, with a limited number of members. For example, 400 deputies would be more than adequate even in its present body, for this is already a working organ which is carrying out its functions.

[Kuzin] Does this mean having yet another election?

[Sobchak] Well, willy-nilly, when we adopt the new Constitution we shall have to have new elections.

[Kuzin] Why does this question arise? We have now in our country a new formation, the Federation Council, headed by our country's president, and doubts have

appeared as to could this new structure replace or render unnecessary what you and I are talking about?

[Sobchak] I do not believe that one could eliminate or replace the other, for the Federation Council performs a separate function which has more to do with the executive area, whereas the Supreme Soviet is a legislative body which passes laws and formulates further development, although, in principle, I do not exclude the fact that the adoption of a new Constitution and the establishment of essentially new relations within the Union may not require different functions to be performed by the Supreme Soviet.

The Federation Council could be one of the chambers of the Supreme Soviet, while the other one could be the Council of the Union which would be elected on a country-wide basis, in proportion to the population. It would reflect the views of all population strata.

Saying this implies that, in principle, the Federation Council, only questions the existence of the Council of Nationalities, whereas the Council of the Union would continue to function and would remain, whatever the situation. The fact that I would support the representative principle in the implementation of cadre policy and the holding of positions within the Union organs is a different matter for, so far, appointments to such positions are based essentially on the nomenclatural principle or on some other basis. If at this point we were to adopt the principle applied in appointing personnel in the United Nations, a number of problems would be resolved.

How is this done? Every member of the United Nations, whenever there is a vacancy in any committee, council or apparatus, and even in the permanent secretariat of the United Nations, has the right to nominate his own candidate. For example, 60 countries may submit their candidates for a given position. This is followed by a competition among these candidates. Naturally, in such cases their qualities are taken into consideration but so are the quotas and the agreements among groups of countries which may agree, let us say, that this position shall be filled by the representative of thus and such a country, while the next opening would be filled by the representative of another country.

The same principle should apply in relations among Union republics in the establishment of Union organs. There would thus be fewer charges that Union organs are pitted against republics. We would have much greater representation of different ethnic groups and different republics. This would make our state more federal in nature, more federative.

[Kuzin] Do you agree with Shevardnadze, who has warned of the reality of a dictatorship? Do you agree with the idea that Gorbachev wishes to usurp the power? Do you see in the immediate future a situation in which you could firmly approve of presidential rule?

[Sobchak] I already expressed my attitude toward Shevardnadze's statement, in my speech at the Congress. I agree with him that a certain danger of dictatorship does exist but less for the considerations he mentioned than those related to the weakness of the democracy and the inability, the incompetence of democratically elected power organs, which are discrediting themselves by their activities.

Naturally, this creates mistrust on the part of the people in the very possibility of a democratic way of development. Therefore, immediately the attractiveness of a dictatorship increases. In general, the more anarchy and disorder are created by the fault of the democratic authorities, the more people aspire to have some order at any cost, including through dictatorship. For that reason I fully agree with Shevardnadze.

I cannot agree that Gorbachev would like to usurp the power. I know Mikhail Sergeyevich well enough to believe that he is not capable of assuming dictatorial rights. This is a person of an entirely different mentality, to use the current jargon. I do not think that he aspires to the usurping of power or dictatorship. It is precisely this that he does not wish. He tries to maintain a certain balance of power.

If the democratic forces could be strengthened, I assure you that they would meet with the president's support and understanding. He is a realist. He relies on the forces which are today real and able to move things forward. However, everything will depend on how far Gorbachev will go in making concessions to conservative circles. It could be that as a result of such concessions he would find himself a hostage and a toy in their hands.

If people begin to get killed and the democratic system is unable to protect them, in that case a presidential rule would be more democratic and more progressive than the so-called democratic power organs. For that reason I do not exclude the possibility of introducing presidential rule and, going even further, in the presence of certain conditions, I personally would support it.

[Kuzin] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, the situation in the Baltic area has currently become drastically aggravated, particularly in Lithuania. You know that in both Lithuania and Latvia meetings are being held at which demands are seriously voiced favoring the introduction of presidential rule in these republics. What can you tell us about this situation?

[Sobchak] You know that I oppose the introduction of presidential rule in the Baltic area, for I believe that that area has sufficiently well developed the power structures and democratic traditions to be able to cope with its own problems by itself. The fact that it would be necessary for the central power organs to hold talks, something for which these republics are insisting, and resolve all problems which arise between the republics and the Union on a sensible and just basis, is a different matter.

The point is that the position held by the republics is itself not impeccable. Therefore, it would be premature for them to proclaim their withdrawal from the Union and declare themselves sovereign republics, as was done by Lithuania, without having resolved territorial problems, such as, let us say, that of Kaliningrad and the access corridor through Lithuanian territory, or the problem of that part of East Prussia and Belorussia, which was added to Lithuania not by virtue of any kind of legitimate rights but simply because that is the way Stalin wanted it in his time.

All of this must be resolved. It is also necessary to resolve the humanitarian problems, such as the fate of the Russian-speaking population, as well as economic problems. All of this must be resolved and then we shall see.

That is what concerns me. In the Baltic area as well today we could have had an entirely different situation had there not been the occasionally deaf insistence of the center on its position instead of seeking a real way to an agreement.

When I now look at the Lithuanian parliament, I quite frequently draw a parallel with our own soviets. Unfortunately, there are very many people there who, on the basis of radical and democratic positions, speak out on all problems, undermining the adoption of any positive solution, and say a great deal while unable to accomplish anything real. There are more than enough of this sort of people in the Lithuanian and Latvian parliaments. It is precisely such people who could cause total failure, for they are unable properly to assess the situation. They cannot realize that the transitional period always demands compromises and coordinated decisions which do not result in an aggravated situation.

Yet today we see precisely that, on the one side, the so-called internationalists and, on the other, the left-wing separatists and nationalists, are aspiring to one and the same: to aggravate the situation, and to bring matters to the point of confrontation. Unfortunately, they are succeeding. However, the center is also contributing to this.

[Kuzin] What, in your view, explains the confrontation which remains between Soviet organs and the present party (CPSU) structures on all power levels? Is it the personal qualities of the party leaders? Is it ideological intolerance of the CPSU? Is it lack of faith in its influence on the people? Do you see here any possibility at all of interaction, all the more so in this critical situation?

[Sobchak] To begin with, I do not agree that a conflict exists. In any case, public opinion is wrong, for it is, once again, encouraged by the pseudodemocrats, people who have never been democrats. I believe that a situation exists in which party organs and party structures remain on all levels. All of us are perfectly well aware of the power of such organs, of their influence and of the experienced cadres they have.

Yet, in this most difficult situation, they have distanced themselves and are doing nothing truly to help, although they could help. This creates a negative attitude and the idea of a clash. I believe that today the leaders of any party, the CPSU above all, should aspire to gain a certain popularity among the people, among the population, through real actions. Such real actions could yield results.

As to the personal qualities of the party leaders, I believe that today the greatest trouble of the officials is that they are totally incapable of realizing that the situations have changed. They are totally unable to adapt to working in an atmosphere of pluralism, of a multi-party system and of an open and free democracy. In this area as well something must be done, either to replace such leaders or for them to reshape themselves radically.

I see the possibility of interacting with any party, and even more so with the CPSU. I believe that now is precisely the time when a party organization, should it wish to play a positive role, could accomplish this, the more so since we know that there are among the rank-and-file communists many people who are truly progressive and democratic and are ready to work for change.

[Kuzin] A great deal is being said today of the possibility of "overthrowing" Sobchak from his position as chairman of the Leningrad Soviet. Should this happen, would you abandon political activities or would you pursue the struggle in another direction?

[Sobchak] Should this happen, and I do not exclude that it could happen as a result of the processes which are taking place, I would have no problem whatsoever. I am a member of the Supreme Soviet Legislation Committee, and my present activities as chairman of the Leningrad Soviet is merely complicating this work. As a legal scientist, I am consulted on draft legislation. I participate in the work of the sessions of the Supreme Soviet.... I would simply abandon my previous activities and close this chapter in my political work.

[Kuzin] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, this is turning into a sad conversation. Nonetheless, do you see any light at the end of the tunnel, and what are your hopes for the immediate future?

[Sobchak] You know that there is light at the end of the tunnel, and I would describe it as quite bright. There is a solution. I joined the Leningrad Soviet not simply motivated by the wish to help it to resolve specific problems but with a specific program for action. Let me single out three points in that program.

The first is the creation of a free economic zone. This is an idea I have been developing since 1987, and I believe that in the case of Leningrad this would be an ideal choice in converting to a market economy, an ideal option for solving the crisis. The second idea is having privatization and destatification as soon as possible,

including a conversion to the development of private enterprise and the creation of stock-holding companies and people's enterprises.

Finally, the third, is along the social and not the governmental line: the creation of an international foundation for the rescuing of Petersburg-Leningrad. This too is my idea: to create such a public foundation. Once again, it was those same deputies who opposed the creation of such a foundation, delaying the decision by all possible means. In America we were able to create a branch of this foundation, whereas in Leningrad, for almost four months, we have been unable to approve the bylaws. However, we were able to create it, we held a telethon, and you saw the results.

I could also describe other existing projects. These three, however, I consider to be sufficient. This alone justifies my activities, and even if I were to be removed from my position tomorrow I, naturally, would leave the Leningrad soviet with sadness but also with a feeling of satisfaction.

[Kuzin] The main thing for which the soviets are blamed, and something which you mentioned today, is that quite frequently their actions do not match their words. In other words, the soviets are unable to implement the decisions they make. In the recent past, the CPSU had an organized mechanism, something which it brilliantly demonstrated. That was precisely why that powerful apparat imbued all power structures and reached the common man.

[Sobchak] This is true. The decisions issued on the higher levels reached every person. However, they totally ignored the interests of the individual, and the individual was not asked to participate in the making of such decisions. We restructured the system. Individuals directly elected by the people—the deputies—participate in the decision-making process. Unfortunately, the mechanism of implementing them, the mechanism of the executive branch and of the state organs, does not exist. The deputies could create such a mechanism through commissions, should they determine to do so.

Instead, the people engage in fantasizing, totally ignoring what is occurring around them. Unfortunately, that is what is happening and that constitutes the entire difficulty of the work.

[Kuzin] What would you wish to our readers, in conclusion?

[Sobchak] You know that I would wish for your newspaper, as all other newspapers, to act more as an information tool. In the past, and to this day, our entire press provides the readers with less information than instructions them, imposing upon them a given viewpoint.... Therefore, I would wish that this newspaper, for LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA is unique in this sense, as we, Leningraders, have become accustomed to obtain

from it a wide range of a great variety of urban information, precisely to be more of a newspaper as an information instrument than a tool for instructions and for instilling opinions. (16 January 1991)

Latsis Views Changing Republic, Center Options on Union Treaty

'Liberal Conditions' for Republics, Baltic Issues

91UN1280A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 15 Mar 91 p 6

[Interview with Otto Latsis, first deputy editor in chief of KOMMUNIST, by SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH correspondent Igor Pimenov; place and date not given: "The Achilles Heel of Perestroika"]

[Text] *There is every reason to call the Muscovite Otto Latsis, an essayist and economist who is known well in our country, a participant in Latvian perestroika. In Latvia, his own people are the ones who catch it the most from Latsis—the members of the party in whose theoretical and political organ, KOMMUNIST, he works as first deputy editor in chief.*

They say that Latsis is partial. I am prepared to agree that he is partial as only a man can be who is troubled and pained by political irresponsibility and stupidity in the party to which he belongs. A SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH correspondent met with Otto Latsis.

[Correspondent] Sometimes they say: Well, the Union treaty will be signed, everything will return to normal, and interethnic relations will be settled...

[Latsis] Everything has become horribly confused. After all, when the Lithuanians were the first to demand that a new treaty be adopted we could have proceeded from this. Everything else could have been postponed. I believe that we could have agreed even to a confederation and not insisted on a federation had this been the stumbling block because I do not see how the two could be essentially different in our reality. A distinction is found in the area of managing internal economic development. However, this is the distinction only under a planning and allocation system; under a market system, neither the republics nor the Union should manage the economy by means of direct economic influence.

Be that as it may, we should have made every concession to the republics on the most voluntary, liberal, and democratic terms in order to adopt a new Union treaty between one and a half to two years ago. Later, economic relations should have been built on this basis. This moment was lost.

[Correspondent] What you are proposing is in line with Lenin's imperative concerning the need to make concessions in the course of resolving the ethnic issue.

[Latsis] To make concessions to small nations, of course.

At present, the Union is extremely unattractive from an economic point of view. This means the daily round of the people. No talk of the advantages of the Union impresses a person going out to chase a carton of milk, a packet of salt, or a loaf of bread. I do not think that the Union may become attractive on the main point, that of economics, until a market period passes. The political aspect of the Union is likewise not very attractive because of the clashes that occur in the country and the sometimes not quite fortunate position of the organs of state coercion—let us look at Tbilisi, Baku, and Vilnius.

In addition to the fact that the center has a poor understanding of ethnic problems and those of mutual relations between the republics, the political ambitions of various political forces, which try to use social problems as subject matter in their struggle for political influence instead of attempting to solve them, are an obstacle.

The sectarianism of many Communists is also an obstacle.

[Correspondent] What do you call sectarianism in this case?

[Latsis] Rejection of all dissidence. It is even harsher with regard to one's fellow party members—their views should not be just correct, but correct my way, the same as I have, so that there is not a single speck of dust on their ideological mirror.

[Correspondent] You expressed your attitude toward the activities of the communist parties of the Baltic area, in particular the Communist Party of Latvia, in the article "Ricochet" in IZVESTIYA. What can you add now, one month after the events?

[Latsis] The events in Vilnius and Riga were less bloody but more alarming. In Tbilisi and Baku, the military acted in response to appeals by the authorities, whereas here repressive organs escaped the control of the legitimate authorities. In Vilnius, it was the Army. In Riga, it was the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments]. The political initiative to use them did not come from the elected authorities. There is the reason why the response in the country was condemnatory.

Unfortunately, the outcome of the events did not sober up the supporters of the Committees for Public Salvation. They believe that everything was correct, and that this is the only way to act. It did not work out then, but it will some other time.

The fact that the Committees for Public Salvation and the Citizens Committees lay a claim to the entirety of power in a nonparliamentary, unlawful way is very dangerous; this is a step in the direction of a civil war. They help each other, and give each other political sustenance and force, leaving no room for civil accord in our society.

[Correspondent] Still, when can the treaty be signed and the Union be re-created?

[Latsis] It could have been one and a half years ago. What we need at present is not to force the republics but through a purposeful policy let them understand that they are free, that they are making this decision in their interest. A market economy and making the economic aspect of the Union attractive is the first priority in order for them to gravitate toward it as a powerful economic center. At present, they are scattering, and nothing else.

[Correspondent] However, this calls for decades of adjustment!

[Latsis] It is not a short road, it is not. Perhaps, we need to adopt some temporary document...

[Correspondent] Would you agree that terms for joining the Union must differ for various republics?

[Latsis] Not necessarily, but they may. This is a Yugoslav idea. They call it an asymmetric federation: Different republics join on different terms.

I would even agree to this.

[Correspondent] What about the "Finlandization" of the Baltic area? What about the status that Finland had in the Tsarist empire?

[Latsis] Not the current Finlandization, but the previous one? Perhaps. However, the Baltic area should have no illusions. This is the scenario that is used in this case: We will join an economic union, we even want it very much; everyone understands that it is both disadvantageous and dangerous to separate and be economically isolated. This means that some get the meat and some get the bones. We will pick out the raisins from this pie, and leave the dough to someone else. This will not happen; this is unrealistic.

[Correspondent] Therefore, if the Union treaty is not signed soon, we will follow the 1977 Constitution for a long time; in this case, presidential rule will be introduced, and secession from the Union will occur under the law on secession from the USSR.

[Latsis] There should be no hurry. However, the supporters of secession should also understand that the Baltic area, especially Latvia and Estonia, and to a degree Lithuania, is looking at decades rather than years of economic difficulties if an abrupt severance from the Union occurs.

Adjusting to another market and another world takes decades. Once again, they will live for the sake of the coming generations, and the present-day generation will have no life—this is an eternal Bolshevik idea! And yet, this is not the most terrifying point. After all, cutting it off at present, even through a referendum, coercing a minority, a significant minority, by the will of the majority means an Ulster for decades.

[Correspondent] Do you support a referendum as a means to solve problems of this nature?

[Latsis] ...Concerning a referendum, it may be proven that a referendum solution is both impossible and undemocratic. It may also be proven that a solution without a referendum is impossible and undemocratic. As soon as we touch on ethnic issues, on the issues of a future union, we find ourselves in paradoxical situations in which both a point and a counterpoint are correct on very many utterly practical scores, without some very complex metaphysics.

A certain truth is found in this. This means that the notions themselves are obsolete, that this problem cannot be explained and solved in old categories at all. Life has been qualitatively transformed, whereas we are still thinking in the old categories. Walls and boundaries are coming down all over the world, whereas we are arguing about establishing these boundaries better. We are proceeding toward a Europe without borders, and beginning to fuss over borders within our own state. We are more prone to stereotypes derived from our past existence with regard to ethnic relations than to anything else, failing to understand that our past life is gone. Perhaps, there will be new, more complex problems and troubles in a future union, but the ones that have already happened will not recur.

[Correspondent] What do you expect of the Union referendum?

[Latsis] I do not quite understand why it is necessary. Its results are clear anyway. Russia is in favor of the Union anyway. The Baltic area is most likely against. The referendum will not result in anything new; it will not convince anybody of anything; it will not additionally clarify the positions of political forces. However, the referendum will provide an opportunity for using it in the future as a pretext, as a legal catch.

[Correspondent] In your opinion, how will Yeltsin's appearance on Central Television influence his own authority and that of the USSR president?

[Latsis] It is not ruled out that Yeltsin has shot himself in the foot.

Economic Policy Major Factor

91UN1280B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 28 Mar 91 p 6

[Interview with Otto Latsis, first deputy editor in chief of KOMMUNIST, by SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH correspondent Igor Pimenov; place and date not given: "Otto Latsis: 'The Peoples Should Become Convinced That They Are Indeed Free'"]

[Text] We continue to publish a conversation between our correspondent Igor Pimenov and the well-known essayist from Moscow, economist Otto Latsis, first deputy editor in chief of the CPSU theoretical and political journal KOMMUNIST.

In the interview, publication of which began on 15 March of this year under the headline "The Achilles Heel of

Perestroika" (see *SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH* No 30), the point was made that the center should have made concessions to the republics one and a half to two years ago and should have accepted the Union treaty on the most liberal terms. Now that the Union has become unattractive for various reasons, primarily economic, the treaty should not be forced through. Instead, it is necessary to let the republics understand by means of a purposeful policy that they are free to make a decision, that participation in the Union treaty is in their interest. Economics rather than politics and ideology should be made a priority in order for them to gravitate toward the Union as a powerful economic center.

Human Rights and the Rights of Nations Are Inseparable

[Correspondent] The nationalities issue has proved to be too tough to handle for quite a few generations of revolutionaries (and politicians in general) who considered it to be of secondary significance and neglected it. Do you believe that the nationalities issue is the stumbling block for the current generation of Soviet Communists as well?

[Latsis] I do. I think that this is the weakest point in the policy of our leadership. If we take the main avenues of perestroika, the situation is the worst precisely with regard to restructuring the Union. I am not aware of confident progress and a complete understanding of the situation, attendant dangers and complications, and ways out of the situation with regard to the issue of interethnic relations and the formation of the Union. At times, we act worse than we did five years ago.

[Correspondent] Party documents reveal inconsistency in resolving fundamental issues. In the political declaration of the 28th congress, the priority of human rights over the rights of nations was proclaimed, whereas a resolution on nationalities policy adopted by the same congress referred to a combination of these rights. The thesis concerning the priority of one set of rights over the other has crept into the first draft of the Union treaty as well. However, are general human interests and the interests of a nation not mutually predicated on each other?

[Latsis] They appear to be inseparable to me. If we are incapable of combining human rights in general and national human rights in particular, we are simply unable to approach this issue. The two cannot be opposed to each other.

[Correspondent] It appeared that the economic draft of the Shatalin group provided a real way out of the crisis in relations between the republics and the center by proposing to bring back the union of republics and unify them by means of mutual economic interests...

[Latsis] This corresponds to a broader idea. I am convinced that not a single republic, not even the largest ones, the Ukraine or Russia, to say nothing of Lithuania, Latvia, and Georgia, will be able to secede from the

Union without incurring losses on a scale which will offset all expected gains. The latter may or may not result from secession, but there will undoubtedly be losses. Even if the rosiest hopes for the advantages of an independent existence come true, the certain and unavoidable losses in the economic, cultural, and political spheres will exceed them. However, the peoples—specifically the peoples, a majority of those who voted in favor of the present authorities in the Baltic republics and in Georgia—are not in a position to grasp this at present.

The peoples strive to secede, and they fail to understand that they cannot secede—this is a very dangerous and difficult paradox. It is incomprehensible how it will be resolved. I do not rule out that it will be resolved in the worst possible manner, as everything has been resolved in Soviet history, that is by taking the path of the greatest losses rather than the smallest. There may be only one way to avoid this—voluntariness and confidence-building. The peoples should come to feel that they are indeed free, and that they are making this choice based on their own will.

We Acted Extremely Unfavorably

[Correspondent] To your mind, was the fact that the peoples developed an inclination to take actions running counter to their own interests unavoidable to a considerable degree?

[Latsis] This trend could not have been avoided following all the outrages of Stalin. However, it could have been overcome had the policy of perestroika on the issue of interethnic relations been thought out better from the very beginning, from 1985. This tendency prevailed because we acted extremely unfavorably. By "we" I mean the Union, the center, and the large nations.

Up until the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies, a majority of the NFL [People's Front of Latvia] leadership did not advocate seceding from the Union. It thought of sovereignty within the framework of the Union, even not a confederation, but a renewed federation.

However, there was a "No" in response to everything at the First Congress of Soviets, in response to everything. At the second congress, they voted down a resolution of the Yakovlev commission on the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact the first time. Even during the second attempt, 600 deputies—600 USSR people's deputies!—turned out to be incapable of denouncing 50 years later this collusion of two bandits invalidated as long ago as 22 June 1941. What were the Baltic peoples supposed to think?

However, the main event occurred at the first congress when—I remember this almost verbatim—a deputy from Russia addressed the Lithuanians: ...We have major, significant business to attend to here, and you are talking some nonsense, some nationality issues! All indications were: You will always account for one percent of the populace, but you will never be a people; they will

never understand you here. This was when a discussion of the issue of secession which flabbergasted everyone began.

[Correspondent] I will venture that the leaders of the People's Front, being aware of who they were dealing with, awaited this turn of events; moreover, they counted on it. This turn of events was advantageous for them.

[Latsis] I understand. You want to say that "crafty" politicians always had this plan. I am not discussing the issue of what the "crafty" politicians thought privately. However, the popular masses, hundreds of thousands of people, were never crafty. Meanwhile, it was precisely the masses that came around. To do this, they had to become convinced that sovereignty within the framework of the Union would not work. After all, the masses showed tremendous confidence in the initial steps of perestroika.

We Cannot Go Back to the Year 1940

[Correspondent] If Latvia refuses to sign the new Union treaty, this means that secession under "the law on secession" lies ahead. This means yet another poll, the third in a row for Latvia, to be sure, this time with a quite specific question: "In the USSR" or "outside the USSR?"

The Latvian leadership will categorically object to such a referendum, referring to the results of a poll held on 3 March. The leadership of the Communist Party and the supporters of a "renewed" federation will support it just as categorically.

In the process, they will discuss once again in Latvia who is entitled to vote and to be a citizen and who is not...

[Latsis] To be sure, the path of a referendum has considerable drawbacks. However, giving up the referendum weakens the position of secession proponents very much. Their only objection is no good at all. I believe there is just one: In 1940, there was no referendum. So what? After all, you denounce this, this was "occupation," "a collusion of the Fascists." Was there a referendum in 1920?

Why does the period between 1920 and 1940, and these particular ideas and truths become the period which is affirmed as if it were a law, a law of nature, out of the entire history of Latvia which is 1,000 years long? Why not the period before 1918—200 years of the Russian Empire? And why not the 50 years after 1940? Why are these 20 years legitimate—by the law of origin of this power? It was created without any free show of will. It was also created by foreign bayonets.

[Correspondent] A sovereign state existed de facto. This was the first successful step on a path toward self-determination. A nation state...

[Latsis] So what?

[Correspondent] ...recognized by Soviet Russia.

[Latsis] So what? Was not that which existed for 50 years recognized later? It was recognized by the entire populace—they lived! Besides, later years are much more important than previous years! That generation is already dead. At present, the fate of those living is being decided.

The 50 years weigh more than the 20 years because it is 50 rather than 20. Besides, these 50 years came later than those 20 years. Why do these 50 years weigh nothing?

Why do we try to convince ourselves that only the year 1920 was legitimate, or the time until 1940, until joining the Union? We cannot go back to 1940, and God forbid if we do, because 1940 was followed by 1941. Why do we take just one aspect of this tremendous legal, moral, and historic contradiction? Once again, there is this inescapable desire to pick out the raisins from a pie. The historic, national, and economic pie may only be eaten in its entirety. Nobody has the right to pick out just the raisins for himself.

Saving the Economy Means Saving the Union

[Correspondent] As far as a set of economic measures is concerned, the Shatalin program looked quite promising.

[Latsis] One could have hardly compiled a better program. However, the time when we could act in keeping with a program ended about two years ago. At present, we can only act as the situation warrants and maneuver on the move. I believe that the idea of a direction rather than the program was correct in principle. I would not like to say that what was finally adopted will definitely work. However, nothing else will.

[Correspondent] Are you referring to the program of the president?

[Latsis] The proposals of the president are not a program. Main directions have been adopted, and the sequence of deadlines is quite hazy.

[Correspondent] Otto Rudolfovich, as far as a choice of ways for switching to a market economy is concerned, you were a proponent of the Polish way of shock therapy.

[Latsis] The long way of transition is real shock therapy for you because, of course, we should not ignore the very factor of fatigue of the people when this unsettled condition lasts for years.

Doing it gradually does not necessarily mean doing it less painfully. This is what I call chopping off the tail of a dog piece by piece rather than straight away, in order to make it less painful. This is Ryzhkov's way. We need to soften and cushion this; however, gradual measures are not the way to cushion this. We should provide cushioning in an entirely different manner. I believe that it will be easier to switch all at once.

[Correspondent] As they did in Poland?

[Latsis] This is not the way they did it in Poland. In Poland, they spent 10 years deluding themselves. The reference point is December 1981. After all, this is when Jaruzelski began, the time of martial law, a price reform, and the Jaruzelski economic reform. They kept hacking away at their own tail for nine years, and later they came to the point of having to switch to the Balcerowicz plan, after all.

[Correspondent] What is your suggestion: Not to chop it off piece by piece, and not to wait for nine years?

[Latsis] I am aware of all difficulties. Political capital is needed, a credit of trust is needed which, in turn, will make us confident of the success of reforms.

[Correspondent] It appears that by now everyone understands that the economy will not be set aright without increasing retail prices. A wave of demands to provide full compensation for the growth of prices is now picking up.

[Latsis] Compensation cannot be complete by any means; it cannot be higher than two-thirds of the overall growth of prices. An inflationary cycle will start otherwise. It is not in the interest of the populace to have complete compensation. After all, in addition to sufficient incomes, the hard ruble, a saturated market, and a selection of goods are required. This is precisely why it is two-thirds.

It is another matter that we need to help the low-income brackets—the retirees, handicapped, students, and families with many children—to endure the price increases as much as possible.

Activities, Influence of Pavlov's Experimental Creative Center

Influence on Prime Minister

91UN12584 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Feb 91, p 1, 4

[Unattributed article: "Our Soviet Grigori Rasputin Takes the Stage: The Artistic Director of the 'On the Boards' Studio Theater and the Experimental Creative Center Established by Him Are Becoming a Source of Inspiration for the Prime Minister"]

[Text] From which sources is the new presidential team filling its political baggage? From whence is the prime minister getting information which has dumbfounded our country's people, who have seen plenty in their time?

The international bankers' conspiracy against Gorbachev, a mafia buy out of the Soviet press, fantastic figures on production declines, a blood-curdling depiction of "economic sabotage" and predictions of impending horrors. (One would get the impression that the present wielders of power spent the previous years in

prison or abroad and that some other malicious individuals struck the final blow at their homeland in their absence.)

The head of a cabinet which has at its disposal the million-strong KGB-MVD apparatus and hundreds of institutes plus state statistical agencies publicly quotes information regarding production dynamics generated out of thin air by "analysts" at the so-called Experimental Creative Center. Direct plagiarisms of "analyses" prepared by its "experts" are found scattered throughout documents and public speeches by state officials.

One gets the impression that it was for this reason that our rulers took aim in bulldozer-like fashion at Lithuania, where clearly the tug is up for them, and that the "experts" chose Lithuania in particular as a proving ground for their analytical exercises.

A craze for uncovering conspiracies, and on a global scale at that, is sweeping across our country. It thus comes as no surprise that borne on the crest of this wave experimental creative centers would emerge and that persons with a director's vivid imagination would design political reality to fit their own fantasies.

This is not the first time that the death agony of political institutions has had an unhealthy effect on the mental state of state officials and given rise to political shamans and "fear merchants" from the ranks of the art world. Grishka Rasputin was able to appoint and dismiss government ministers. The head of the Soviet Government is giving a private individual the right virtually to create a state within a state throughout the entire secret service.

All the world's a stage (or, at worst, an amateur drama club). And people are actors on that stage. For example, Soviet officials acting in director Kurginyan's theater, diligently studying the parts hastily written for them.

Pavlov Decree Grants Center Broad Rights

91UN12588 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Feb 91, p 4

[USSR Cabinet of Ministers Decree: "Regarding the Operations of the Experimental Creative Center Corporation"]

[Text] High-level party and state authorities have always been consumers of the "analytical" output of the Experimental Creative Center. Now the demand from this commodity from above has obviously grown, as has the remuneration. The document below was signed on 12 February 1991 by Prime Minister Pavlov without a single revision. Later it was "detained" by the Council of Ministers administrator of affairs and "cleaned up" somewhat after a letter was received from the State Commission on Economic Reform.

In accordance with USSR Council of Ministers Decree No 1096, 26 October 1990, "Matters Pertaining to the Experimental Creative Center" and in order to achieve the goals of the experiment and realize the projects and

programs of the Experimental Creative Center, a nongovernmental interbranch cultural, scientific and educational complex and corporation, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers hereby resolves:

1. to approve the Basic Terms of Operation proposed by the Experimental Creative Center, a nongovernmental interbranch cultural, scientific and educational complex and corporation (henceforth to be referred to as "the corporation"), with the corporation's administrative apparatus to be located in Moscow

2. to instruct state planning and material-technical supply organs to begin as of 1991 allocating to the corporation such centrally-distributed resources as are necessary for the conduct of its work and services based on state orders

3. to grant the corporation the right to make decisions regarding foreign travel by delegations and specialists on business trips and to obtain entry and exit visas from the USSR MFA Consular Division.

4. to approve the corporation's initiative to create the following components of its organization

—scientific research organizations dealing with issues of social and economic development, public safety and law enforcement;

—higher, secondary specialized and general educational institutions, including institutions in new fields of learning;

—cultural centers and organizations;

—youth athletic clubs and sections

The financing of expenditures for the aforementioned purposes is to be carried out from the corporation's own funds, outside funding and other sources

The USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the USSR KGB are hereby granted permission to assign groups of, respectively, six, eight or five officers or other administrative personnel to the corporation while they remain on active military service (or in the active reserve) according to procedures and terms stipulated in current USSR Government decisions.

In order to carry out special functions the corporation is permitted with the permission of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR KGB to include officers or other administrative personnel from those organs in its temporary working groups.

The USSR State Committee for Public Education, the USSR Ministry of Culture and the USSR State Committee for Sports and Physical Culture shall consider in conjunction with the corporation the latter's proposals

regarding establishment of appropriate organizations and take part in preparation of the necessary documentation

5. in order to involve the corporation in realization of the State Program for Military Industry Conversion to permit the USSR Ministry of Defense and other ministries and agencies participating in the conversion process to establish joint ventures and joint production facilities in conjunction with the corporation, using production capacities made available as a result of conversion

6. to approve the draft concept of a unified scientific and cultural zone to be called "Vspolnyy pereulok" [Revelation Alley]; to instruct the corporation to continue its efforts to realize this concept, to recommend that the Moscow Gorispolkom render assistance with implementation of the draft decisions which have been made.

7. that the corporation is the legal successor to the Experimental Creative Center under the Moscow Gorispolkom, including in its rights to own, use and dispose of all of the former's fixed capital and financial resources.

V. Pavlov, Prime Minister

M. Sokolovskiy, Administrator of Affairs

Official Expresses Reservations About Decree

91UN1258C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Feb 91 p.4

[Memorandum from S. Assekritov, State Commission on Economic Reform deputy chairman, to Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov, USSR Prime Minister: "Official Memorandum"]

[Text] Esteemed Valentin Sergeyevich,

In my opinion the USSR Cabinet of Ministers decree regarding the operations of the Experimental Creative Center Corporation signed by you sets an undesirable precedent with extremely negative consequences.

1. In essence the decree is overtly fiscal in nature yet does not contain any statements which would demonstrate the financial benefit of the aforementioned center's activities to the state.

2. A broad range of benefits have been granted to this organization despite the fact that those benefits are not in any way connected with its basic purposes and functions and are not economically justified.

Specifically:

—a. Point 2 makes provision for mandatory centralized state material-technical supply to this nongovernmental organization which sells its products at unrestricted prices.

—b. Point 3 permits the organization to obtain entry and exit visas directly from the MFA, i.e. under procedures established for international, governmental and a number of other organizations.

- c. Point 4 exempts goods produced by the corporation or imported by it from export and import taxes without defining or restricting the nature of such goods (due to its stated purpose the corporation is not a charitable organization).
- d. Point 5 in essence permits the corporation to establish organizations pertaining to public safety and law enforcement as well as higher educational institutions, bypassing established regulations governing the formation of such institutions and licensing of their operation.
- e. Point 6 exempts the corporation and its members from paying turnover taxes, something which is completely outside the authority of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers (turnover tax is a source of republic budget revenue).
- f. Point 7 gives permission not to establish maximum profitability levels in connection with the levying of taxes, not to mention unrestricted price formation, which is economically unjustified.
- g. Point 9 permits the corporation to independently determine which expenditures comprise its overhead, thus putting in doubt the entire system of accounting and control.

3. The Basic Terms of Operations which were attached to the decree also contain a large number of illegal and economically unjustified standards.

4. A document of this nature will inevitably be seized upon by various "entrepreneurs" and will be used in the struggle against the Cabinet. I am absolutely convinced that USSR deputy M. A. Bocharov (president of the BUTEK firm), who has seen more modest claims rejected, will launch a campaign accusing the Government of personal favoritism toward Comrade Kurginyan, the head of the center.

I feel that it is my duty to bring these points to your attention and to call into question the official competence of the individuals who approved this draft.

*S. Assekritov, deputy chairman,
State Commission on Economic Reform*

Creation of Center Linked to Prokofyev

91UN1258D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Feb 91 p 4

[Unattributed article: "From the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Dossier: Who's Who"]

[Text] Sergey Kurginyan, president of the nongovernmental Experimental Creative Center Corporation. By training a geophysical engineer and candidate of physical and mathematical sciences. He organized and headed an amateur drama group, which he in 1987 transformed into the "Na doskakh" [On the Boards] Studio Theater.

Received training as a director. Has been a CPSU member since 1987. Introduces himself as a "mathematical political scientist."

Shifts on the Political Field

In 1988, with the support of Yuriy Prokofyev, Moscow Gorispolkom secretary, a creative center was established using the theater's facilities. In 1989 this was transformed into the Moscow Gorispolkom Experimental Creative Center—with the support of Yuriy Prokofyev, Moscow CPSU Gorkom second secretary. The first "analytical reports" from the "experts" at the Experimental Creative Center were addressed to V. Vorotnikov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman; they were transmitted via his assistant, G. Pirogov. However, the attempt to lend republic status to the Experimental Creative Center in this way ended in failure.

In the fall of 1988 Yuriy Prokofyev became the Moscow CPSU Gorkom second secretary and simultaneously a consumer of "analytical reports," and Sergey Kurginyan became his proxy in an unsuccessful bid in the USSR people's deputy elections.

By means of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus the "experts" at the Experimental Creative Center prepared analytical reports on interethnic conflicts in the Transcaucasian region.

Failed attempt made to contact Politburo member Vadim Medvedev.

The turning point in the emergence of "political scientist" Kurginyan was his contact with the "renovated" editorial staff of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA and publication of his series of articles entitled "On the Mechanism of Slippage." This in turn led to a candidacy in the RSFSR people's deputy elections on the patriotic bloc ballot, a candidacy which was unsuccessful.

At the same time close contacts were established with the intermovements and the OEF [United Labor Front]; a trip was made to Lithuania and "analytical reports" were presented to all authoritative organs via the channels of Yuriy Prokofyev, now Moscow CPSU Gorkom first secretary. There was a clear influence on the CPSU Central Committee document on Lithuania issued in August 1990 (see NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, No. 12). At the end of 1990 Politizdat published a book entitled "Post-Perestroika" written by Experimental Creative Center "experts" (S. Kurginyan, P. Goncharov, V. Ovchinskii et al.)

The fall of 1990 saw the beginning of access to the Union government against a backdrop of massive demands for its resignation and struggle against programs to bring about transition to a market economy. A speech at a Council of Ministers brainstorming session in September 1990. The basic themes of that speech:

—mafia turnover in the USSR: 900 billion rubles;

—Shatalin and Yavlinsky: "agents of international capitalism";

—Experimental Creative Center "experts" have information regarding a plan to commit terrorist acts—preventive arrests must be made.

Between November 1990 and February 1991 documents were drawn up making the Experimental Creative Center a nongovernmental corporation.

In January and February 1991 close contacts were maintained with the head of the Cabinet of Ministers under President Valentin Pavlov. Direct quotes made by the prime minister from "analytical reports" prepared by Experimental Creative Center "experts."

From an affidavit given by B.B. Bagaryatskiy, former executive director of the Experimental Creative Center, to M. V. Orshanskiy, an investigator in the Moscow Gospolkom Main Investigative Administration:

"In the summer, at the end of July, P. Goncharov and I once again discussed the 'oddities' about Kurginyan which disturbed us. At that time Goncharov also termed Kurginyan's strategy and tactics as 'an extreme degree' of political cynicism.

"I am in agreement with that description to this day. However, I feel that one should refer to 'an extreme degree of cynicism' overall. This cynicism manifests itself in regard to people, to individuals, who to Kurginyan have always been and still are a means rather than an end, as well as in his attitude toward the Experimental Creative Center, which, despite all the goals that it proclaims openly, has also always been regarded by Kurginyan in part as a source of funding for his political ambitions, and eventually for shifts in the political field... His outline is simple: he lacks the professionalism to 'play' on the same side as the left. The extreme right has always and in all places had a shortage of intellectuals. So that is where it might be possible to attempt to realize his passion to be a leader, to be 'the savior of the fatherland,' all the things toward which Kurginyan is being driven not by a thirst for power, as is sometimes suspected of him, but rather by the most banal—though extremely hypertrophic—megalomania."

Center's President Interviewed on Political Views

91UN1258E Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with Sergey Kurginyan, Experimental Creative Center president, conducted by Mikhail Lantsman, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent: "From the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Dossier": "It Is Purely a Crisis of Administration: The Leaders' New Secret Advisor on the Country's Situation"]

[Text] "Mathematical political scientist" Sergey Kurginyan was interviewed by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent Mikhail Lantsman in the corridors outside the 4th USSR Congress of People's Deputies

Recently the Cabinet of Ministers signed a document creating a nongovernmental state corporation called the Experimental Creative Center, of which Kurginyan is president

[Kurginyan] Can you imagine what the CPSU was like back when it managed everything? All other structures were fictitious. It was about a million-and-a-half rooms, and in each of them a telephone and some functionary. They were all linked together by wires. And every signal that went out from the General Secretary reached every single point. That is what is called totalitarianism. If I were to look at the system by addresses, there would be about 250,000 party committees which I would call in the course of the day; they would pass the information along to 18 million Communists, which is about 20 percent of the work force. And then the wheels of the machine would begin to turn. Now all those wires have been cut. With what does he want to replace them? There is only one thing he can do: put his own commissar on every party committee or, as president, operate via the general secretary and reestablish the old structure.

In actuality there were two structures: the party and the state. As soon as the party disappeared Ryzhkov was already sunk automatically; there was nothing through which he could administrate. He managed to accomplish some things as long as the party structure was still intact; now he is having a heart attack. Yet he is four times as good an economic manager as the people who are taking over now.

[Correspondent] Do you have an alternative plan for normalizing the situation in our country?

[Kurginyan] Of course. Swiftly and efficiently restore order within two weeks, but only in a situation in which a state of emergency is declared.

[Correspondent] How will that state of emergency be manifested?

[Kurginyan] In just one way: that all economic commands issued by a unified center will be complied with absolutely for a period of four months.

[Correspondent] What power is capable of forcing people to do that?

[Kurginyan] Direct discipline, punishment, dismissals, prosecution—that is all.

[Correspondent] But how do you force the worker to work at his lathe?

[Kurginyan] That will not be necessary; the worker at his lathe is working just fine already.

[Correspondent] So the state of emergency would only apply to administrators?

[Kurginyan] Of course. What do the workers have to do with this? They need not even be deprived of their right

to strike. We need only sweep anyone who violates the unified command structure out of the way.

[Correspondent] And for the republics?

[Kurginyan] The same thing. For everyone: republics, krays and oblasts.

[Correspondent] Well, let us suppose that the Union procurator called for someone's removal, but the republic procurator refused to carry out that order?

[Kurginyan] That means that that republic's Supreme Soviet would have to be dissolved.

[Correspondent] Would military force be needed to accomplish that?

[Kurginyan] What military force? Just go in there now and say: "Time for a changing of the guard." They would all leave and go home. If right now some firm hand were to sway the Russian Supreme Soviet in the opposite direction, then tomorrow it would be in someone else's pocket. This is like a casino: the croupier deals, and everyone else plays.

As long as they played political games everything was fine. They could set Ligachev against Gorbachev, the CPSU against the SSPK (Union in Solidarity With the Promotion of Capitalism). Of course, where did all the rottenness come from? From the highest echelons of the same party, and it progressed, anti-Soviet and anti-communist, there are no illusions on that score. But that is not the main issue. The main thing is that as long as they played at the same old rotten game everything was normal. But when they started playing with the economy, I realized that that was the end of everything. They are all idealists. Every amendment which they make is a horror, every correction terrible. The upper power structures no longer jibe with the lower ones. This is a complex administrative system, and they have started tampering with it. The crisis which presently exists is purely a crisis of administration.

[Correspondent] Do you feel that we should utilize the party structures after placing a new person in charge of them?

[Kurginyan] The party is a separate issue. But the party apparatus has one characteristic: it is economic. It never was a party structure. It is a state structure, a totalitarian one, but there is no other. To me this is not a moral judgment.

[Correspondent] Yet if we restore the old structure and force it to work, then those in charge will lose all interest in making changes.

[Kurginyan] That depends on the political doctrine assumed by those in charge.

The thing I do not like about today's so-called rightists is that they are constantly shouting: "Your Majesty! You are a genius! But just introduce a state of emergency and

let us do a little shooting." Yet before we introduce any state we must state one simple thing: perestroika has failed. Why? Were the goals wrong or the means, the doctrine or the strategy? After that is determined there will be a basis for using a political fist. Then it will be possible to achieve what is realistically possible. But the lie about consolidation—that was a shameless lie. No consolidation. You only find that in caviar and fine sausage. There can be civil tranquility, and in order to achieve it what is needed is a strong group which wants to bring it about.

Yet under cries of "consolidation!" the mechanism of civil war is being set in motion. Those who came up with this game do not care whether we have a Red idiot or a liberal windbag. The important thing is not to let the country disintegrate. From the very start false goals were put forward, commotion was introduced into the channels of information.

[Correspondent] Intentionally?

[Kurginyan] Someone did it intentionally. I think that a portion of our Sovietologists, those who swore to take revenge on this country as they were leaving it, are doing it intentionally. They emigrated and are now working for the State Department. That is their job: to destabilize this country in order to perform some kind of global tasks. I realize that they are in no way connected with the military confrontation; they want something else. That is their right, but my right in this country is to defend the interests of the state, no matter what kind of state it may be, capitalist, socialist, whatever they decide.

What I cannot understand is people here who are mad at the party and are holding a grudge, and now are taking it out on themselves, i.e. fighting against their own state. I get the feeling that the gene of nobility has been eradicated in this country. A nobleman cannot behave like that. What is worse than the party-ocracy? Those who licked its ass. That was a special estate. Ass-licking was a lofty profession. Asses *per se* may be disdained and hated. Yet among them were various sorts of men. There were those who, to put it simply, took care of business and plowed the fields. That is terribly difficult labor. But the ass-lickers were always do-nothings, always garbage. Now it is that garbage which is calling the tune. They always had to maintain their critical paradigm. That means that they do not care whom they criticize, the main thing is to be among those doing the criticizing: bourgeois theories, socialism, anything you like. That is like their bread, their method of survival.

Now there is only one thing we can do: reanimate a strict administrative structure in the economy, or at least the whole infrastructure for supplying basic needs. There is presently a threat to commodity-money relations, not just to the market, but to money circulation itself. Another two months and we will have military communism. It may seem to them that they will accomplish something by that means. They will accomplish nothing. There will be no military putsch. After two or three

months the commanders will despair because they have nothing to feed their soldiers, and people will be shooting at them instead of just spitting, and in some areas they will begin seizing power and will begin taking trucks and supplying themselves, just like in an occupied country. After that the regime will crumble. Then there will begin a reshuffling, and Yeltsin may be able to last about four months. Then they will send him on his merry way. New people will come to power. Not just one, there will be several of them. They will disintegrate down to the atomic level. It will be a pretty picture.

[Correspondent] Do you present this as the only possible future?

[Kurginyan] No. I think that above all we must acknowledge mistakes. We must admit that the strategy for implementing perestroika was wrong.

[Correspondent] Not return to the previous course?

[Kurginyan] No. Absolutely not. We must return to the multi-sectored administrative structure which is always introduced in emergency situations. We must change the industrial contours of our country, i.e. modernize industry. For achieving that there is no other system in the world except an economic committee with extensive powers. We have Gosplan for that. We should return to Gosplan's Kuybyshev system in all things pertaining to structural modernization. But hands off of small-scale enterprise! We should establish a committee to protect small-scale enterprises, like in Spain, grant exemptions and make loans. Protect entrepreneurial activity. Intensify modernized industry through the command-administrative system.

[Correspondent] What is your attitude toward the letter from "the 53"?

[Kurginyan] I absolutely do not like it. There are some good fellows among the signatories; I almost cried when I read it.

[Correspondent] There were rumors that you were one of the ones who wrote it.

[Kurginyan] No. I can show you what I have written. I will never sign a document which refers to Gorbachev in that tone.

If he does not admit his mistakes, then everything is pointless and hopeless; one could say that perestroika is finished. If he does not state this, then we cannot go on living and working. They still have time to repent. I can quote from my letter: "The country is in danger. At this moment it is becoming clear who is who. Some officials are fleeing like rats from a sinking ship. At this moment we are throwing away all ideological contradictions, all the things which divide us, all for the sake of a single goal: to save the state as at least a system for ensuring the vital functions of society under difficult conditions. Above all reject the flawed thesis that you are going to construct something akin to a new bourgeois class out of criminal elements. That class will never save the state. In

our country it is anti-state by nature; it can only debase, steal and make decadent by gathering around itself [obscene term deleted from original] and their hired ideological lackeys. You cannot depend on that class and consolidate everyone one after another! But you can unite all of society's healthy forces in struggle against this dismal anti-state. That is your task. Secondly, even Stalin introduced dictatorship under a specific ideology. They are not telling the people anything, they are not admitting their mistakes, they are not presenting the people with any model for the future. What is the main flaw of perestroika? That they mystified everything from the very start. Today we can no longer speak in the language of 'socialism vs. capitalism.'"

But that language is very simple: "nationwide catastrophe, salvation, survival, developmental goals." What do we really need? I would like for once in my life to hear something besides ideological goals discussed from a lofty podium. Because the market is also an ideological goal. Well, will I hear it from Afanasyev? He is just as much an ideologue, they are all ideologues, there is not a single person there who sets normal goals, not a one. Our country finds itself in a horrible situation. For 70 years it has been headed somewhere, no one knew where. Now it exists in a some capacity. What do they propose in this situation? Forget about capitalism. Firstly, it does not exist even over there. Secondly, the "big seven" have already united, and it is foolish to think that they will admit us as an eighth. Furthermore, even if they wanted to build normal capitalism, who is going to play the role of the third world? Capitalism is inefficient without a third world. Who will give us a piece of the third world? Where is the third world, can they show it to me? If not, then capitalism in that form is not going to exist, anyway. Then what is left? Sub-colonial existence.

They are all the time saying that the West will help us. I want to ask you: what interest does the West have in developing us? The West wants to have Africa all around it. They cannot develop India, where everything is simpler. They have halted development. They need a Libya or a Sudan here. Estonia will be South Africa. Armenia will be Southern Rhodesia. And in between there will be huge expanses which they will attempt not to develop, but instead to transform into preserves. In order to keep that from happening we only need do one thing. Let it be known that the standard of living will be lower than in the West, introduce our own development programs and set goals. The day could be saved by a group of honest intellectuals who have sworn loyalty to the state.

Center's Analytical Reports Excerpted

91UN1258F Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Feb 91 p 4

[Documents: "Examples of Analytical Output by Kurginyan's Organization"]

[Text] Regarding the So-Called "Secret Protocol" to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

Expert assessments by political scientists from the USSR, the GDR, the Polish People's Republic and France permit us to construct a possible scenario of events following admission by the USSR of the existence of this "secret protocol."

First Stage of Destruction

Closure of the "Western bulge" of social and psychological tensions within the territory of the USSR. Incitement of the situation in the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. An even more active Uniate movement. Escalation of the problem of the UBL (Ukraine-Belorussia-Lithuania—the "Lithuanian interest"). Response to the escalation of "spontaneous" anti-Russian movements and their expansion into the entire territory of the Ukraine and Belorussia.

Second Stage of Destruction

Under conditions of a sense of futility and apathy seizure by large segments of the Polish population upon the slogan of "Great Poland." Escalation of Polish claims against the USSR, playing of the "nationalist card" by Solidarity in order to "improve the morale of the Polish people." Vatican support. Possible visit by Brzeziński.

Third Stage of Destruction

Crumbling of the Warsaw Pact according to the "domino principle" under conditions of a "buffer zone" of social and political tensions inside the USSR and the "Polish impetus."

Fourth Stage of Destruction

Unification of the two German states and lodging of territorial claims by a united Germany in Eastern Europe.

Fifth Stage of Destruction

"Soft annexation" of territory in proportion to the growing economic and political crisis in the USSR.

Similar scenarios have been described in a number of political science conceptual works. Analogous scenarios also exist for the southern and eastern regions of the USSR.

Confirmation of the above is concern above all on the part of certain French circles regarding possible acknowledgement of the "secret protocol." The dynamics by which events are developing in Poland are quite transparent. A major role is being played by pro-German elements in the informal movements in the northern Baltic region.

Political Model of a Speech by V. T. Saykin (Former Moscow Gorispolkom Chairman)

1. Shock opening (reference to the extreme situation) to rouse audience from normal calm state. Attention gained.

2. Political formulation of the issue. Crucial moment. Explanation why unable to take action sooner. Appeal for the Government to adopt new strategy—immediately. The **Leader** is a strategist and an organizer of the struggle to save the ecology.

3. Definitely one more explanation, eagerly and in detail, of why he "has just now awakened."

4. Moscow sovereignty. "Drive in the nail."

5. The **Leader** is competent and master of the information situation and offers alluring prospects for the intelligentsia, including financial prospects. Naturally, in exchange for political support. At this point just a slight reference to a scientific strategy, but it is already clear that you cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear.

6. Slogan of "join forces" above and below. Naturally, around those who proclaim the slogan. Direct reference to financial possibilities open to scientists. The **Leader** is a provider.

7. The **Leader** is a scientific strategist. Perhaps he does not know science in detail, but is a past master at science policy.

8. The **Leader** is a man of glasnost. Is not afraid of "shock figures" and demands them of agencies.

9. Now the **Leader** can let the mood change just a bit, can calm people down just a bit; people will believe him, since everyone wants to believe that the situation is not really so terrible, and they will be grateful to him.

10. Once again possible to say that things are bad. Point to "culprit" who is acceptable to society. Seduce with specificity. The **Leader** is struggling against the government agencies, and hence is an ally of society. However, the agencies are also grateful, because he does not name names. Families do not like to hear them on TV. Everyone else is fairly indifferent.

11. The city's ecological picture: "everyone has children."

12. The **Leader** speaks little of action; it turns out that he saved us and we were not even aware of it. The **Leader** is the author of the saving strategy. Everyone understands what the economic strategy is. The specific proposals are understandable to the common man and are attractive. The **Leader** is a manager. Until now he has been prevented from demonstrating this.

13. The **Leader** is a personal savior, and is personally responsible for rescue from a number of irreparable disasters (the Garden Ring). If it were not for him everything would go to rack and ruin. The **Leader** is a leader in time of disaster. ("Here we need a strong individual," "in the army mold")

14. However, the **Leader** is a cultured individual and knows the aesthetics and psychology of perception (of children, of nature). The previous bit has now been

smoothed over and become pleasant. The **Leader** is opposed to secrecy in the apparatus. He is an economic manager, not an apparatchik. "Not a Stalinist." However, a sober individual. **Protector** against calamities. (Definitely mention this once again.) As a result there is room for any maneuver.

15. Political ending, harking back to political opening.

[Box, p 4]

Demand the Truth About Tbilisi!

According to data from United Nations experts comrades N. A. Loshadkin and A. D. Gorbovskiy and numerous commissions (Soviet and international):

NOT A SINGLE BODY

of those killed in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989

SHOWED STAB WOUNDS, SLASHES OR MULTIPLE WOUNDS!

The horrors stories about bloody shovels are fabrications.

CREATED BY WHOM AND FOR WHAT REASON?

The gunshot wounds inflicted on civilian population were made by firearms not of a military type.

Experts categorically reject the possibility that the people died as a result of the use of chemical substances!

They cite unverified evidence indicating that:

- specially trained fighters were trained for resistance;
- in a number of places the fighters overran the troops and began, in the words of the troops, "a bloodbath";

Thus, units of well-trained fighters were called innocent victims of the troops.

The people did not die at the hands of the military; they were crushed by the crowd of resisters.

DEMAND DATA. DEMAND THE TRUTH!

Not fairy tales and insinuations, but facts, arguments and exact figures!

Why is the chain of lies unbroken?

Why are some deputies lying?

Why and in whose interest should all the blame be pinned on the military?

Why have those who inspire nationalism and extremism become heroes?

Demand the showing of the Leningrad broadcast of 8 December 1989 on Central Television!

Demand objective data and overall glasnost about the investigations conducted by experts!

Demand the facts, not fabrications!

DEMAND THE TRUTH!

Let our readers themselves compare the above document, which was distributed by the Experimental Creative Center as early as the fall of 1989, with the excerpts from speeches by Experimental Creative Center experts S. Kurginyan and V. Ovchinskiy published in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA on 1 February.

From a Memorandum From S. Kurginyan to V. I. Vorotnikov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member and RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman

Esteemed Vitaliy Ivanovich!

Over the past year and a half the Moscow Experimental Creative Center headed by myself has conducted a comprehensive (sociological, economic, psychological and political science) analysis of the extreme conditions existing in a number of regions both within the RSFSR and throughout the country at large.

Our findings, combined with the events of the past one-and-a-half months, prompt me to turn to you and to share with you the findings of our analysis, as well as my personal impressions...

...Just as soon as Stalinism and fascism become synonymous in the public's mind and anti-Stalinism as a public movement is "subscribed to" (in its extreme manifestations) by an alliance of shadowy crooked operators and political speculators, any struggle against that alliance (in any manifestation) becomes discredited.

Regional cost accounting, economic democracy, the cooperative movement—all the elements of the new economic mechanism—do not exist in a vacuum. The ideological context plays a decisive role in this regard. In a healthy ideological atmosphere these innovations truly do lead to economic recovery. In an unhealthy atmosphere they may lead to even greater economic disintegration. In this case regional cost accounting is becoming essentially a mechanism of "economic incisions" removing the last "ribs of strictness" and facilitating the breaking away of already none-too-tightly bound territories.

Cooperatives which fall under the control of the mafia, the state's sole competitor with regard to concentration of start-up capital, serve as "laundries" for ill-gotten money.

Economic democracy without consideration for political priorities is, once again, democracy for the mafia. As a result of the inequity between the rights of cooperative and state enterprises this could help to destroy the economy as a whole.

The list of such "metamorphoses" is quite long.

The sole solution: while remaining in the stream of democracy permit an active INTELLECTUAL rebuff to ideological destruction. Time has already been wasted, and action must be taken immediately...

In view of this two key issues arise: firstly, WHO WILL SPEAK? And, secondly, WHO WILL LISTEN?

...And a second question presents itself: who will speak. No matter how much we improve our apparatus, no matter what kind of new people enter it, we still cannot do without an alternative structure in addition to it. We need social leaders capable of carrying on an ideological struggle under democratic conditions independently and with full responsibility, capable of competing intellectually with leaders of anti-socialist orientation...

On Mechanisms for Escalation of Interethnic Conflicts in the USSR

...A crisis of leadership... A national leader has always existed, and that leader was, naturally, the Russian ethos. This was especially clearly manifested during the postwar period, beginning with the famous toast to the Russian people... If we regard the Russian ethos as the leading ethos, then we should analyze all levels of losses of its leadership, losses which have become especially evident over the past few years. Speaking from a position of pure dominance, we should consider how the correlation between the two super-leaders—America and Russia—looks in the eyes of the smaller social organisms. In the public's mind there is a persistent image of Russia as a country which has lost definitively and fatally.

...In this regard the military aspect is of tremendous significance. In proportion to the degree to which in effect military confrontation is not so timely and since open conflict is highly improbable, so is the image of the armed forces in the people's mind an important integrating factor. Just 10 years ago Russian Ivan in his tank might have been hated, but he could not be disdained. Today he is becoming a semi-farce figure. In this sense, as paradoxical as it may seem, the more we strive toward complete elimination of all types of weapons in the real world, the more inviolable should be the army's image in the mind of society. Even if just as a force

...The next level is perception of a leader as a mass of will. For all the fanaticism of promised communism, for a long time the will which infected Russia was infectious to others as well. In this sense Russia had a right to claim the role of charismatic leader. Charisma is lacking in today's program. From the standpoint of the leadership spirit any utopia is better than uninspiring prose... In terms of the struggle for the mass mind there is nothing more dangerous than utilitarianization of programs for the development of the ethnic republics. Inasmuch as they are reduced to pragmatism, these programs are akin to the programs of homegrown ethnic republics in European and Asian countries and are in no way comparable to them. No matter what we propose to Estonia in utilitarian terms, it will still be "worse than Finland."

...An integrating symbol. This encompasses such concepts as a common destiny, a mission, blood spilled in common and the brotherhood resulting from that; in short, the factors which unite people into groups when there is a crisis of leadership and which permit them to stand fast even when at a given moment in time the inter-group purposes of remaining together are called into question... Blows struck at symbols, especially those intended to profane them, are perceived by groups with as much pain and sometimes more than the leadership crisis, and they reduce groups' stability immeasurably faster. Working on the symbolic level and even manipulating it is in essence a kind of social mathematics, just as real as economics.

...Ideology. The Soviet idea, regardless of how much it was mythological in psychological terms, was a reality. This reality united society on a conscious level just as strongly as symbols did on a subconscious level.

...The nobility of the Russian Empire, even after losing the last remnant of their messianic halo, still preserved their interethnic caste unity. The same thing has to a certain extent happened at the level of bureaucracy in the USSR. Party membership also to a certain extent played a role as a similar integrator. However, in proportion to the development of an estate which at the present time may be termed a criminal national bourgeoisie, and also in proportion to the devaluation of the standard of living, membership in the caste and along with it the increasing temptation to sell off power relationships, these integrating factors have lost much of their former influence...

Experimental Creative Center's Analysis of Vilnius Events

91UNI2591 Moscow MOSKOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 1 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by S. Kurginyan, Experimental Creative Center president and head of the center's group of experts, and V. Ovchinskiy, member of the group of experts and candidate of juridical sciences: "The Events in Vilnius Viewed by a Systems Analyst": "The Lithuanian Syndrome"]

[Text] The events in Vilnius demonstrated that we are on the verge of civil war. Of the civil war of which so much has been said of late. Now it has become a reality. A reality which can be combatted if one only acknowledges its inevitability. But doing that requires sobriety, a mercilessly analytical approach and—the whole truth about the nature of what happened. Not rumors, myths, legends or bits of the truth pasted together with lies to form a colorful collage.

Today, just like 10 years ago, society is "trusting, but not verifying." It believes but does not analyze. And that is perhaps the most terrible thing. The CPSU monopoly's heritage is that society is striving to hand the right to absolute truth over to someone

Formerly the newspaper PRAVDA had that right. Now the program "Viewpoint" has it, for example. So what has changed? Just the words?

The goal of our expert assessment is to destroy myths. Our report is aimed at the ordinary citizens of our country. If they do not learn to think independently, if they continue to believe on the basis of faith alone even the most honest and most progressive thinkers or their most authoritative sources, then catastrophe is inevitable.

The events of the past year indicate that life is much more complex than the black-and-white diagrams which have been drawn for us. In response to the question "Who is worse?"—the dissidents or the party apparatus, the left or the right, the center or the republics—there can be only one answer: "They are all worse!"

"Left, right, which side is which! Street, street, you know you must be drunk!"

Oh, how we all need the street to sober up! Otherwise...

"He dreamed of a disease, as if the whole world were condemned to fall victim to some terrible, unheard-of and unprecedented pestilence coming to Europe from the depths of Asia. Everyone would die except for a few, a very few chosen ones. Some kind of new trichina appeared, microscopic organisms which invaded the human body. But these organisms were spirits, with the gift of mind and will. People whom they entered immediately began to rage and went insane. But never, never had people considered themselves as intelligent and unshakable in their truth as did the infected individuals. Never had they felt so unmistakably sure of their sentences, their scientific conclusions, their moral convictions and beliefs. Whole villages, whole cities and peoples became infected and went insane. Everyone was alarmed and no one understood each other; each one thought that he alone knew the truth and was in torment as he looked at others, beating his chest, crying and smashing his hands. They did not know how to reason, they could not reach agreement on what to call good and what to call evil. They did not know whom to accuse, whom to exonerate. People killed one another in a kind of senseless malice. They gathered against each other in whole armies, but the armies on the march would suddenly begin to tear themselves apart, their ranks dissolving and the soldiers lunging at each other, stabbing and cutting, biting and devouring each other. In the cities the alarm sounded all day long; everyone was assembled, but no one knew who had called them together or why, and everyone was frightened. They abandoned the simplest trades, because each person presented his own ideas and his own corrections, and no one could agree; cultivation of the land ceased. In some places people gathered in crowds, agreed to something together, and swore never to part—but then immediately they started something completely different than they had just proposed and began accusing one another, fighting and slashing at each other."

The passage above is from the pen of Fedor Mikhailovich Dostoyevskiy. Raskolnikov's prophetic dream is, alas, much closer to our reality than Kabakov's anti-utopian sensation of six months ago entitled "Nevozvrashchenets" [The Man Who Did Not Return]. Ordinary citizens of our country, raise your heads and your hands! Do not let yourselves be deceived! Believe nothing on faith! Everything is much more complicated than the way it is being presented to you! And more terrible! And more vile! So, do you want to know the truth about Vilnius?

The Experimental Creative Center Corporation is aiming this report at you, and no one else. Because saving the drowning is a job for those who are drowning themselves. The analysis conducted by us permits us to state a number of postulates.

1. The Existence of a Plan To Introduce Direct Presidential Rule in Lithuania

We suppose that this plan existed (below we will reveal the serious grounds for drafting such a plan). And if that is so, then the attempt to conceal the existence of the plan is unjustified on the part of everyone, including our country's highest political leadership. Unless that is acknowledged, then it will have to be acknowledged that the military's behavior was criminal. Furthermore, it will have to be acknowledged that the behavior of the Lithuanian CP (CPSU Platform) leadership was equally criminal. It will have to be acknowledged that the President was not capable of controlling the actions of his own army, or the General Secretary of his own party. Since the cat is out of the bag and the truth is already coming to the surface (see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 30 January), this whole pyramid of lies discredits everyone who has wittingly or unwittingly participated in it. That is to say, the entire state. And if government officials for some reason do not wish to acknowledge that bitter truth, then we will take it upon ourselves to do so. Regard our assertion as one hypothesis made by independent specialists. Thus, we feel that there existed the intention to introduce direct presidential rule in Lithuania in the latter half of January 1991. **Most likely for a period of 15 days.**

2. About Our Opinion That the Scenario for Action Had Only One Version and Lacked Flexibility

And that it contained both strategic and operational-tactical errors. The most important strategic issue: was it possible to introduce direct presidential rule just in Lithuania while preserving an ordinary regime throughout the rest of the country? Attempting to understand the logic of those who came up with this scenario and look at it from their standpoint, we were sadly forced to state that this notion was doomed from the start. A special regime can be imposed today only throughout our country's entire territory, or else nowhere.

From strategy let us move on to the operational-tactical level. How was it that when setting up the Lithuanian Congress of Democratic Forces as an "independent"

organization the Lithuanian CP was simultaneously made part of its structure, and that moreover the party's first secretary was made its chairman, and the first secretary of the Vilnius Party Gorkom its deputy chairman? How could the Lithuanian Congress of Democratic Forces attempt to maintain its status as an "independent" organization after that?

Furthermore, when establishing the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee as a daughter organization of the Congress of Democratic Forces, who could have thought that any halfway literate person would not stumble upon its "helmsman" by simply following the telephone clues?

Above all, once a committee has been established, particularly a salvation committee, it is **essential** that the members of that committee be named. Otherwise they will all be called your opponents anyway and **anyone they like** can be written into it! That is self-evident! We understand all the complexity and danger of the situation in Lithuania and we pay tribute to the courage of the people who remain in the ranks of the Lithuanian CP today. And, naturally, we do not equate the responsibility for political and organizational failings on the part of the Lithuanian CP leadership with those of the leadership of the entire party. Furthermore, the so-called people's volunteer militias were involved in the operation. These are people who voluntarily took a deadly risk for the sake of an idea. After sending them out to take that risk how could they the next day dissociate themselves from them and betray them?! Deliver them up to reprisals along with their families? **A practical question:** after that, when according to much more professionally prepared scenarios Sajudis' fighters go on the offensive, who will defend all these congresses, committees and parties? Our answer is: no one will!

We could go on listing mistakes, but in order to save time and, in our opinion, to depict the situation from the other side, it is time to draw a conclusion and proceed to a description of the actions of those who, as we can now see, "were even worse." **The conclusion is that a fabricated 1956-style operation to render fraternal assistance to some committee is in essence archaic and absolutely fails to correspond to the spirit and quality of the political process. And its execution indicates... Let us just say that it indicates a great deal... Well, now about those who resisted "our center."**

3: On Whether the President of the USSR and Our Country's Supreme Political Leadership Had Grounds for Taking Harsh Measures

We feel that they did, since what had been prepared in Lithuania by Sajudis fighters since late December (immediately after the President was granted new powers) was strikingly reminiscent of the infamous 1948 U.S. National Security Council Directive No 28-1 with regard to political genocide with respect to communists to be carried out, according to a recommendation contained therein, "at the hands of the local populace." The plans of the Lithuanian radicals at the end of December

1990 had nothing in common with political struggle in any civilized sense, because (and we must call things as we see them!) **by any democratic means Sajudis and the forces which stand behind it lost the political struggle in Lithuania shamefully and within the briefest period of time, demonstrating all the flaws of our so-called democratic forces, i.e. incompetence, the inability to lead under democratic conditions, divisiveness and lack of intellectual foundations.** The readiness of Lithuanian radicals to undertake political terror (stated in a number of their documents, which include a list of "sources of political tension to be eliminated"—a CIA term which is a veiled way of referring to the outright murder of political opponents) was the "bared fangs of democracy" which we will face again in the near future, and not just in Lithuania. Landsbergis' time will soon be at an end. Prunskiene's time, as we have seen, was not long. A "cadre rotation" is underway. And not just in Lithuania. On the agenda is Raidomoinis' "people's liberation army" and the Independence Party headed by V. Čepaitis, to whom both Prunskiene and Landsbergis are traitors. Finally, there are openly terrorist pro-fascist organizations. That is the political Lithuania of today! That is who wants to put a stop to democracy, who needs to make the transition to terror, to a dictatorship under the leadership of a nationalistic administrative-command, Bolshevik-like (in structure) and pro-fascist (in ideology) party, as has been flatly stated by V. Čepaitis. A fascist shadow truly hangs over Lithuania. And just over it? There (and only there?) there truly could emerge (in view of the huge armed forces with party cards in their pockets, on the one hand, and the fascist units, on the other)... no, not Burokvavichyus' Soviet Lithuania, not Landsbergis' independent Lithuania... Nor Prunskiene's special economic zone... Simply a huge mass grave to be filled with both Lithuanians and Russians, communists and nationalists, and a couple of million others "just in case," as Kim sings. A couple of million people who are completely apart from politics, and in view of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant and terrorist groups of various orientations equally capable of anything, and this presently fashionable slogan in Lithuania—"All the energy of the nuclear power plant into the struggle against the CPSU"—this could lead to something which would affect us in the most fundamental way... Well, let us say, **just Northern Europe. A question:** why can all this not be stated plainly? And order established directly and honestly, on behalf of the President, with notification of the U.N., after giving a clear-cut explanation and without setting in motion any social or political organization which would continue to dream of a leading role, or people's militia, just those who get paid for this and whose professional and civic duty it is to ensure security and stop bedlam which is intolerable by any international standards. Why was this not done? People expected it and would have understood it. Or did we do this to protect the power of the President? Excuse us, but there could not have been anything worse for Gorbachev's authority than what happened in Lithuania. Whoever does not believe that should just take a look at the Lithuanian barricades.

which will be left standing there for a couple of months as an object for photographers and television cameramen from around the world (naturally, except for our "independent" Soviet television, including "Viewpoint," "Fifth Wheel," "600 Seconds," etc.) There the President is generally portrayed as Satan, a horned devil, a sinner burning in hell, a Judas. Yet essentially this decorative barricade exists mainly for the purpose of hanging out the greatest number of posters possible **for the world to see**. What is that doing, increasing his authority? Or does the fact that the Supreme Commander does not know what his armed forces are doing? Or does the fact that in such a scenario he finds himself forced to dissociate himself from them and thereby call down upon himself the legitimate hatred of those same forces, and in the long run a bloody overthrow and a real military dictatorship? Or what he is being called on those barricades... Incidentally, that is a matter which deserves separate consideration.

Conclusion. There were grounds for emergency measures in Lithuania, but the means employed were either incredibly crude or merely intended as a provocation.

4. (Final Conclusion) About the Fact That the Plan Drawn Up by the "Center" Regarding Emergency Measures in Lithuania Fell Into the Hands of Landsbergis and His Entourage, According to Our Data, No Later Than 3 January 1991

Specialists of the highest caliber were immediately dispatched to Lithuania from West German and U.S. intelligence agencies. We will mention just two names: Linas Kuojalis, who previously served on Reagan's National Security Council, and Eyve [as transliterated], who coordinated operations in Afghanistan by the Green Berets (U.S. special forces specializing in diversions, subversive actions and other similar acts requiring a "high" level of skill). The present composition of the group is much broader, and the number of instructors who are preparing the Lithuanian structures appears to us to now exceed one hundred. But the "big boys" have been called into a big game. Incidentally, all the while under the guise of humanitarian aid the latest weapons are being brought in, from Stinger missiles to high-penetration military rifles against which the titanium body armor worn by our airborne troops unfortunately provides little protection. If we are going to subject people to that it is time to start using ceramic fibers which can "hold off" sniper rounds and the Green Berets' special weapons. Thus, the CIA has begun its countermove in Lithuania.

Attention! We already have four stages. First, preparations for the launching of political terror by Lithuanian extremists, then what we shall call the inadequate responses by the center provoked by those preparations, then betrayal in a place where that betrayal carries an exceptionally high penalty for those betrayed, and the release of secret plans to intelligence services carrying on a struggle within Lithuania, and by no means in the interests of maintaining the USSR's territorial integrity,

and finally the countermove by those intelligence services, in which Landsbergis is just the political tenor singing an aria of someone's else's music accompanied by someone else's orchestra.

5. On the Countermove

The Lithuanian CP scheduled a 9 January meeting regarding introduction of the direct presidential form, and it was evidently at that time that Gorbachev's appeal to reconsider was to have been heard.

January 7 was Orthodox Christmas. No holiday was planned for that Christmas and people were advised to take a vacation day, even though **Catholic Christmas** had been cause for two days' holiday. This lay the groundwork for not only an ethnic conflict, but also a sectarian one (a question about the democrats among the Orthodox clergy: what, could they not stand up and protect the interest of their flock?) Generally speaking, the issue of psychological pressure on the Russian population in Lithuania is not at all as simple as it is portrayed either by the "Russian patriots" or the "Western-oriented democrats." For instance, the authors of this article were received cordially in Lithuania, even though they spoke Russian, and even our question about how to get to the Lithuanian CP Central Committee was answered in detail and very nicely. In restaurants, hotels and commercial centers there is no ethnic conflict, not even a hint of the cruder forms of ethnic insults. The people, incidentally, on the whole are beginning to ponder what is what. And the **ominous hour of schism in Lithuanian society** is not far off, oh, not far off at all (let all the Mr. Landsbergises and Mr. Chapaitises be forewarned!). And, we should note, it is immeasurably more ominous than all the USSR's armored might.

As for pressure on Lithuania's non-native population, in view of the underscored politeness of the "new authorities," it is unfortunately time to raise the issue of organized psychological warfare using very subtle methods. Methods amazingly similar to those recommended by CIA psychological warfare specialists. We would like to believe that that is a coincidence. For instance, bilingual signs (Lithuanian and Russian) are being replaced with signs in a single language (Lithuanian, of course). Yet that does not provoke anyone to rage.

But when a Russian text is written in black paint on a bilingual sign, then that is another matter. That is a direct and premeditated insult carried out by officials with money and resources accrued, among other things, from Russian speakers' contributions to Lithuania's budget. And those sinister black spots on signs oppress and weigh upon people and prompt a desire to somehow respond in kind. "Trivialities" of this sort are so numerous, they are so "systematic," that one unwittingly catches oneself thinking seditiously that there might be an "intellectual sponsor" organizing these trivial things into a psychological war. Let an international commission look into this issue on the spot as well. And tell us:

was it a coincidence that no holiday was permitted on 7 January, i.e. on Orthodox Christmas? And was it a coincidence that just a few days before Christmas the salary of the so-called budgetary workers, i.e. primarily Lithuanians, white-collar intellectuals, officials, etc., was raised sharply? Or was it a coincidence that only **after** this segment of the population was protected did the staggering price increase by factors of four and five take effect? And when did it begin? Precisely on 7 January, not before and not after; is that not a lot of coincidences all at once? Plant workers get notice that from now on their breakfast will cost R3.00-4.00 [rubles] and lunch R4.00-5.00, and that there will either be no salary bonuses or they will be handed out sometime in the distant future. Yet it is a well-known fact that a blue-collar worker thinks long and hard about whether to take the R1.20 lunch or the R1.35 lunch. That being the case, you can see with what the increase on 7 January, of all days, was fraught. We cannot believe in such a congruence of coincidences. We see this remarkable set of coincidences as a brilliant countermove excellently orchestrated by an expert. He achieved his objective, this highly-qualified specialist and Sovietologist from the Rand Corporation or Langley. He had everything calculated just right. And if hell exists, then that fellow will burn there until the Second Coming.

Thus, on 7 January—shock therapy; on 8 January—a riot, a real riot. The Lithuanian Supreme Council was mobbed by those plants which could never before be roused to political activism; an element was on the march which was, quite frankly, almost disenfranchised, which has long been kept down, in whose faces the black stains on signs and similar Jesuit-like tricks have spat. And it went to do what it could, and that was to shout "Down with them!" or "Shame" or "Bread," and sometimes worse things, especially when they were provoked into it, and they were provoked.

Scurrying through the crowd were individuals shoving megaphones at women, and quite frankly they knew at whom to shove, and the sound of vile curses came from them. All this was picked up by television studios around the world (how did they happen to be there, and why?). The role of Zubatov [prerevolutionary Moscow police chief] was played on that day by V. Ivanov, the famous leader of Yedinstvo. The very same Ivanov who a long time prior to that day had become renowned through his participation in the Globe Club, which did not become a Sajudis cadre school without help from the CIA. This brings up a fundamental issue which will have a very powerful effect on our political life for the next six months, and it is this: "Is it not the same structures which are giving order to both the left and the right? First raising prices, and then giving the order to the Ivanovs to rouse a mob and storm the Lithuanian Supreme Council?" For some reason on 8 January 1991 the militia was not at the entrance to the Lithuanian Supreme Council. Usually they would be. The crowd surged into the courtyard. It was not stopped. There they broke out windows, broke in doors and burst into the building,

these people driven to despair. To whose advantage was that? And why? So as to later get rid of an undesirable after lowering the prices? Prunskiene (or Ryzhkov)? Sobchak (or Popov)? And that will be necessary—and Gorbachev and Yeltsin, too! Anyone who is undesirable. It would be appropriate to recall at this point the strategy of tension unleashed in Italy, which in the 1970's had begun to turn "pink" too quickly (as in Lithuania as the result of Landsbergis' clumsy actions). At that time the CIA got involved in the so-called "strategy of tension" and planted its operatives in the radical wing of the Red movement. Terrorist organizations—the Red Brigades—were established, and they began to be used to carry out provocations in order to reduce the popularity of leftist socialist forces, consolidate the right and overthrow the center. (And if they resist too much they will be killed. Just recall the example of Aldo Moro!) But let us get back to Lithuania: windows were broken out, doors smashed in, boiling water poured on the workers, the prices changed, Prunskiene tossed out... That is all just a shell; the most important thing, the thing that was announced to the whole country and the whole world, and we quote, was this: "Drunk on their Orthodox Christmas, Russians attempted to overthrow the legitimate government of the Lithuanian people."

Thus, we see that this date was prepared in advance and everything possible "squeezed" out of it. And who is the vilest: an oppressed woman who has been living in barracks for years and uses foul language, or the polished intellectual who calculated all this so carefully?

On that same day, 8 January, the "Landsbergis television marathon" began. He shouted, raged, swore and appealed, like a talented actor, according to a previously prepared script. He spoke repeatedly. At the USSR Supreme Soviet M. S. Gorbachev spoke the truth. That time something extraordinary triumphed on the airwaves. The main pedal—nationalism—was pressed as far as it would go. A detailed description was given of the horror of the Soviet occupation and the people were urged to heroic self-sacrifice: "Whoever will not shed blood is not a Lithuanian." In the place of the ideas of democracy, a rational economic mechanism and entry into world civilization there suddenly appeared cast-off ideas nearer in spirit to classical national socialism: "One land, one blood, one Fuhrer!" People marched to this. People believed. People accepted this. Incidentally, we will not exaggerate the spontaneous nature of that acceptance. The march from Kaunas to Vilnius was organized, paid for and provided with both financial incentives and drugs and alcohol. Belonging to a classic clan, Landsbergis sought support in, so to speak, his own territory, calling upon his own people.

Everything was employed, from the republic shadow economy to violence and outright deception. According to eyewitness reports Lithuanian children were brought in vehicles to the scene of the impending catastrophe—from children's homes in Varene, Trakay and Ukmerge. Not wishing to be named (and having a right to do so, in contrast to the members of the Lithuanian National

Salvation Committee) an ordinary Lithuanian told us that his daughter went to a concert, and that afterwards she and other young people were lured to a discotheque with buses provided and prizes promised. Naturally it was promised that the discotheque would be free. They were taken to the area of the impending bloodshed (which was already planned) and shoved out into the crowd.

Let us pay our respects to human suffering. To all the innocent victims of all these political games! And ask ourselves: do we want to see our boys and girls throughout the country being lured into buses to the accompaniment of fine words and promises of discotheques, pushed out into a crowd and put in the way of bullets?

6. About Where the Lithuanian CP Leadership Was

Together with the people, though deceived and provoked, or shuttling between Moscow and Vilnius in special planes, or hanging around at the military garrison waiting for a command from higher up?

According to our data, on 8 January the Lithuanian CP leadership was not with the people. They did not want to organize a spontaneous uprising and turn it into a political action, or more likely were unable to. Why? Because a Lithuanian CP rally was planned for 9 January. Those apparatus reflexes were also part of the initial information which the CIA used to good advantage. And it was on 9 January at 4:00 pm that the people gathered in the square in accordance with a plan which was already (!) outdated at that moment. The slogans had also been written in advance, and they made no mention of the economy and had no reaction to the prices. Then appeals were made for the thing with which we started our analysis: a direct presidential form of rule. But that could no longer excite anyone. As the saying goes, I see what is given and I behave as I am told. Whereas the Lithuanian CP rally was planned for 4:00 pm, at 3:00 pm Landsbergis was beginning his rally on a nearby square. And when prepared speakers from the Lithuanian CP began to speak they could not be heard, because a group of chanters instigated by Landsbergis drowned them out, and on the rooftops people also placed there by Landsbergis beat on sheet metal.

7. On How Army Units Also Had Their Own Plan of Action in Preparation for Presidential Rule

On 11 January 1991, carrying out a USSR Presidential Ukase concerning protection of Union property, they took control of the party publishing house and the DOSAAF Central Committee building, where the Department for Protection of the Country was housed. Logically the television station should also have been taken under guard on 11 January. But it was not seized, since republic state security organs had received information—or rather disinformation—that there was a large unit of armed men from the Department for the Protection of the Country there (in fact the facility was

scarcely guarded at all that day). This allowed Landsbergis to maneuver and actually deploy fighters there.

8. Why on 11 January the Congress of Democratic Forces Headed by Lithuanian CP First Secretary Burokyavichyus Send the Republic Supreme Council an Ultimatum From Labor Collectives and Democratic Forces

After the expiration of the ultimatum, which contained a demand that the USSR President's appeal be met with agreement and that the constitutions of the Lithuanian SSR and the USSR immediately be made effective within the republic's territory, the formation of a Lithuanian National Salvation Committee was announced, i.e. a parallel power structure was created.

We repeat: from the moment the National Salvation Committee was formed its members were not disclosed, giving it the aura of an underground organization, unconstitutional by nature. We repeat: from the very start it was obvious that the Lithuanian CP was behind the National Salvation Committee. In any event, the confrontation played out according to the scenario "Supreme Council vs. the communists" instead of "Supreme Council vs. the people."

9. How on the Night of 12 January Organizational Measures Connected With Introduction of Presidential Rule in the Republic Were Nervously Taken at the Vilnius Gorkom Building

According to data obtained by us, workers' volunteer militias were hastily formed and communications cut off. When several tens of workers had gathered at the gorkom they were handed a previously prepared petition from the National Salvation Committee. It contained a demand for the republic Supreme Council's resignation.

When the petition was handed over on the steps of the Supreme Council the workers were in fact attacked by Sajudis fighters and men from the Department for the Protection of the Country and beaten.

10. How Those Beaten Workers Were Sent to the Television Station Upon Orders From the National Salvation Committee and How the Committee Simultaneously Sent an Appeal for Help to the Commander of the Vilnius Garrison

According to information in our possession, units of the garrison and republic state security officers did not take part in the seizure of the television station. Late in the evening they were ordered to withdraw. The operation was carried out by an airborne division under the command of the USSR KGB. Videos of the assault were not made by army units, therefore it is impossible to recreate the true picture of events. There is information to indicate that shots were fired not only at the airborne troops, but also at the civilian population, among which were (as we have already noted) many people who have been brought either through deception or by force. It is clear that the possibility of bloodshed had been previously projected by Landsbergis' supporters, since at the

moment of the assault on the television station autonomous radio stations were broadcasting previously prepared tapes in various languages declaring that "blood has been shed in Vilnius and a military coup carried out." But only an investigation can lend the status of absolute truth to that information, though it is unclear whether the Lithuanian authorities will permit such an investigation, and if they do then it will be after the victims of the tragedy have already been buried. What were they so afraid of? Why did they keep out "outsiders"? If everything did happen the way they say it did, then we are convinced they would have called in experts from every part of the country in a timely manner, before the funerals. That would have confirmed the "troops' misdeeds."

11. How on 11 January Informed Staff Members Ran to and Obviously Handed Over Documents to Landsbergis

The center was thus informed that the planned operation was known to Landsbergis. The center, in our opinion, reacted to this by hitting the "emergency brake." That is why the troops acted so "strangely." It remains only to be explained why they acted at all. There was (we believe, provocative!) information stating that the television station was preparing to call the Lithuanian people to arms. It was impressed upon the troops that this "facility" was supposed to sound the call for a "night of the long knives," attacks on political opponents. It was wrong, in our opinion, to attach so much significance to that sort of planted information. It is scarcely likely that Landsbergis would have done that, and we feel that it is absolutely out of the question that his CIA consultants would have sanctioned it. By doing that he would have lost everything that had been "earned" since 7 January.

12. How KGB Airborne Troops Happened To Appear (Instead of Troops From the Military District)

The airborne troops, hastily deployed with a single mission (to capture the "hostile" television station) were given their order without reconnaissance and planning: to fire only "inside the facility." The airborne troops carried out this order. Yes, after their commander was killed they bore little resemblance to elegant "bobbies." But we feel that sooner or later it will have to be admitted that nonetheless they conducted themselves in a more than worthy manner in a horrible situation. Much more intellectually (if that word is applicable at all) than, for example, the Green Berets in no less sovereign Panama. There is information indicating that there was firing from too great a height, judging by the type of wounds. There is information indicating that there was firing from points where there were no airborne troops. What if that information is confirmed? What will our democrats who were so hasty to condemn, so hasty to draw their conclusions, say then? "Politics" is as dirty today as are the sidewalks on Tverskoy Boulevard nowadays. And to that "lady" we could address these words said by Pierre Bezukhov to his wife Helene: "Wherever you are, there is corruption and evil!" Eyve, who trained the Green Berets, is a professional, not a dove of peace. He will

"produce" as many corpses as necessary. And wherever necessary. We do presume to reproach him, who works for another state, him who is indifferent both to Landsbergis, and to Gorbachev, and to Russians and Lithuanians, him to whom and to whose colleagues we are all equally foreigners, savages and barbarians. In contrast to our democrats, who claim to represent our common state.

In connection with this a word about the "titles" being bestowed upon our President, the legitimate head of our allegedly common state. No, we are not referring to "honor and dignity"... Nor about ukases. We are talking about more serious things. M. S. Gorbachev has been linked in this name-calling with Iraq's president. That is no trivial thing. That is a specific and very vile form of geopolitics. If Lithuania is Kuwait, the USSR is Iraq and Gorbachev is Hussein, then who are the "coalition forces"? On this point concessions could be made (territorial concessions above all) to our Eastern European neighbors, and everyone could be told that in the USSR the army is not an army, the party is not a party, and that all around there is nothing but lawlessness and terrorism, and that Gorbachev is not in control of the situation. Why? To unleash a new Time of Troubles!

Please permit our analogies in response to yours! Landsbergis is Minshek, the commander, Gorbachev is Czar Boris. But who is Grishka Otrepyev?

Remember: that ended with Minin and Pozharskiy. And the Kingdom of Poland as part of the Russian Empire. This is our question to genuinely democratic forces in Lithuanian society, our question to the genuine supporters of an independent Lithuanian State friendly to Russia: "Do you not sense in this 'Hussein' nonsense a threat to Lithuania's sovereignty no less great than in the tragic incident? Think about that!"

And, finally, a fundamental question to our society, the question for the sake of which this article was written: **Might it be that Mr. Eyve is right, and you and I are all indeed foreigners, from a single foreign land?**

Authority of Cabinet of Ministers Examined

91UN13701 Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 14, Apr 91 p 5

[Interview with M. Yukov, head of USSR Cabinet of Ministers Legal Department, by V. Lvov and V. Yurteyev; place and date not given: "Radius of Authority"]

[Text] **The Supreme Soviet of the country has passed a law on the USSR Cabinet of Ministers which defines its jurisdiction, order of activity, and relations with other state organs. At the request of the PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK editorial office, the basic provisions of this important document are commented upon by M. Yukov, head of the Legal Department of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.**

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] Mikhail Kuzmich! What are the main differences between the Cabinet of Ministers and the former Council of Ministers in the legal sense? Is there a difference in the scope of their authority?

[Yukov] The question is not as simple as it may seem at first glance. First, while the Council of Ministers was subordinate and responsible to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies, the Cabinet of Ministers is responsible directly to the USSR president. This is the basic and principal difference.

The second difference is that while previously the Council of Ministers was the sole executive and administrative organ, today the Cabinet of Ministers is only one of the structures of executive authority of the state and an element of presidential rule whose components are the USSR president, the Federation Council, and the Security Council.

Of course, the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers also could have been narrowed or broadened by the new Union treaty. But while previously all questions that did not fall within the jurisdiction of the USSR Supreme Soviet remained "under the wing" of the Council of Ministers, now the field of activity of the Cabinet of Ministers is determined by the scope of those tasks that are not within the jurisdiction of the parliament, the USSR president, and the USSR Federation Council.

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] It seems that the sphere of activity of the Cabinet of Ministers has apparently narrowed?

[Yukov] Yes, and not just somewhat, but noticeably. But it is impossible to place a wall between the Council of Ministers and the USSR Cabinet of Ministers which is replacing it. It is the inheritor of the former's many rights and duties. For example, there is both the signing of international treaties and the conclusion of intergovernmental agreements, and many other things. Thus, if you take the sum total of central organs of executive and administrative authority, the basic element here is, of course, the Cabinet of Ministers, which also is the Government of the USSR.

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] It is no secret that previously law-creating activity began within the walls of the Council of Ministers. Many draft laws were born here that were later polished and passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Council of Ministers, naturally, also possessed the right of legislative initiative.

[Yukov] The Cabinet of Ministers does not now have the right of legislative initiative. That is affirmed in the USSR Constitution. My purely personal opinion is that the Government of the USSR should not be deprived of the right of legislative initiative, and this is why.

If the government of a country does not have legislative initiative, it loses its authority in the international arena. This is one side of the matter, but there is also another

side. For example, the parliament urgently needs a draft law in connection with the miners' strikes. The question is so grave that it is not just each week but each day and each hour that is costly. The government is unable to come directly with its proposals to parliament. But, you see, this is a purely governmental question, although attempts are also being made to give it a kind of political coloration. Many such situations could arise. Nevertheless, I hope that the right of legislative initiative will be returned to the government in the new USSR Constitution.

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] Previously the USSR Council of Ministers was frequently reproached for an abundance of legally binding acts and efforts to replace laws with its own edicts. Will this situation change now?

[Yukov] The problem in this respect lay elsewhere. The Supreme Soviet, as you will recall, previously worked episodically, convening for several days twice a year. Of course, it could not let dozens and hundreds of laws pass through. Therefore the government was compelled to fill this vacuum with its own edicts. How good they were is another matter. But society needed administrative order in all its spheres, and it is impossible to achieve this without a normative basis. Now the lion's share of concerns about norm-creating activity has been assumed by the parliament, where this process, of course, is more democratic. But the Cabinet of Ministers will adopt legally binding acts that will not exceed the law by one iota.

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] But what is the legal force now of edicts and instructions of the Cabinet of Ministers?

[Yukov] Edicts and instructions of the Cabinet of Ministers have an obligatory force, and they operate on the entire territory of the Soviet Union with no time limits, if nothing else is stipulated, and for the entire range of legal and physical persons.

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] What then is the difference between an edict and instructions of the Cabinet of Ministers?

[Yukov] Edicts decide questions of a normative character or those that have important state significance. Instructions resolve a more local range of day-to-day tasks.

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] How will the adoption of a new Union treaty affect the jurisdiction of decisions of the government?

[Yukov] It is written in the draft treaty that on questions relating to the authority of the USSR, its normative acts are obligatory on everyone. If a question relates to the joint jurisdiction of the Union and a republic, then the decision of the Union organs, including the Cabinet of Ministers, must be ratified by higher organs of state authority or the administration of a republic. Without

this it will not go into effect. But on questions reserved for republic jurisdiction, Union organs in general do not have the right to adopt any kind of binding decisions. As you see, the administrative vertical line has turned 180 degrees, and the delegation of rights comes from below, from the republics to the center, and not the other way round.

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] Mikhail Kuzmich, the heads of the governments of the Union republics were part of the former USSR Council of Ministers by virtue of their position. But now?

[Yukov] Now the law puts it somewhat differently: The heads of government of all of the republics take part in the work of the Cabinet of Ministers, and, moreover, with the right of deciding vote. Thus, when the prime minister or chairman of the Council of Ministers of a particular republic personally participates in the work of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, it is as if he becomes its member. The portion of the permanent and, so to say, participating members of the cabinet, of course, can change every time. Accordingly the quorum for the adoption of decisions will be changeable, but in any case not less than half of the attending members of the cabinet and the heads of government of the republics must vote "for."

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] In its previous work the Government of the USSR was guided by a clear vertical line: The Councils of Ministers of the republics—kray-oblast executive committees—rayon executive committees. This cementing axis is now lacking. Where is the guarantee that decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers will be fulfilled?

[Yukov] In all times, the strength of the government has been concentrated in laws. They are also the basis for executive authority. The logic here is extremely simple: If the laws that are adopted by parliament are fulfilled locally, the Supreme Soviet has authority, but if the laws are not adhered to, then there is no authority. The same applies to the decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers.

But you asked a precise question, and is there a mechanism for the implementation of the will of the government? Yes, there is such a mechanism. Its elements are, first of all, the Union ministries and departments, which are supposed to subordinate themselves unconditionally to the decisions of the government. Now also, new market structures are appearing. Take just taxation inspection, because it is being established throughout the country. In addition, there is already a whole number of other Union inspections; for example, environmental protection, GAI [State Automobile Inspection], Gospromatnadzor [State Committee for Inspection of the Atomic Industry], and others. I do not exclude the possibility of the appearance in our country of a federal militia along with the municipal militia. Such a variant is also possible. On behalf of the USSR president, control

functions will be fulfilled by a USSR Control Chamber, whose task will be to ensure the fulfillment of Union legislation.

At present, all the difficulty lies in how to arrange cooperation with the oblsposkoms [oblast executive committees], since they are now subordinate to the decisions of the local soviets only. There is a way out: Before the conclusion of a new Union treaty all the organs of state authority and administration must subordinate themselves to the requirements of the USSR Constitution and the approved Law on the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. When the USSR Constitution is changed, all Union legislation will go into effect, and new tasks and functions will then appear for the Government of the USSR.

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] What articles in the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers caused the most argument in parliament?

[Yukov] There were several major clashes of opinions. One of them concerned the right of the Cabinet of Ministers to adopt temporary normative acts on questions bearing on the jurisdiction of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Actually, there are temporary breaks between sessions of the parliament and the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, at times quite substantial ones, and the passage of laws through all the parliamentary procedures at times takes more than just a week. But national economic problems have to be resolved promptly. That is why we asked the legislators to give the Cabinet of Ministers the right to adopt temporary acts, and, afterward, to ratify or amend them at a session. The parliament rejected this aggressively, but I believe that life will make it necessary to return to this question. We will run through just one not entirely improbable situation as an example. Let us say that a natural disaster suddenly occurs in some region of the USSR, or there was a major ecological catastrophe. The scale of decisions could be beyond the bounds of jurisdiction of the Cabinet of Ministers, but decisions have to be made in a few hours and minutes. Will we then afterward explain to the people that it was not easy enough to convene the Supreme Soviet in one day?

But, you see, we have already had a situation in which the Council of Ministers actually exceeded its authority, but the legislators pretended nothing happened. Recall the beginning of the year when the parliament actually did not ratify the state budget. But when there is none, there is nothing even with which to pay state employees. The USSR Council of Ministers then had to take the blame and approve a temporary state budget. There simply was no other way out.

Nothing terrible happened or will happen, if the Cabinet of Ministers will possess the right to ensure legislatively against any socioeconomic situation in our country. The right and the will of parliament to support or to amend a decision of the government in any case is immutable.

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] Sharp debates broke out in parliament on the question of the "immunity" of members of the government. They previously possessed such a right, being deputies. And now?

[Yukov] This is one more paradox of our time. Statesmen, who by the will of parliament are raised to the very top of the administrative hierarchy and in whose hands are placed the fates of tens of millions of people and hundreds of billions of rubles of the people's resources, found themselves less protected than, for example, assistants to USSR people's deputies. Without the consent of a member of parliament, law enforcement organs cannot apply any sanctions to him, but to ministers, certainly. Thus, before you can bat an eye you will find people who desire to "talk" with a minister through a militia summons.

Every civilized country has some kind of protective measures with respect to members of the government. For example, in Italy a minister is supposed to get protection. In England, ministers are members of parliament, and deputy immunity applies to them. In a number of other states members of the government are protected by the jurisdiction of the president; in a word, there is world practice, and it would not be bad to take it into account in our country as well.

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] Previously the term of authority of the Council of Ministers was determined by the election of a new USSR Supreme Soviet membership body; what is it now?

[Yukov] Now it will be associated with the time that the USSR president is in power, but the term of his legal authority might not coincide with the five-year cycle of the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] What will be the structure of the Cabinet of Ministers and its staff?

[Yukov] There will be about 55 ministers in the cabinet. The branch bureaus that now exist will be eliminated. Three permanent organs will remain in the government—a state commission for military-industrial questions, a state commission for extraordinary situations, and a state commission for the fuel and energy complex. For the preparation of analytical, informational, and other materials, the composition of draft edicts and instructions, and a systematic check on the implementation of decisions of the government, a USSR Cabinet of Ministers staff will operate that is headed by an administrator of affairs—a USSR minister—of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

Presidential Ukase on Development of Major Libraries

91UN13104 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 91 Union Edition p 1

[Ukase of the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: "On Urgent Measures To Develop the Major Libraries in the Country"]

[Text] Problems that need to be resolved urgently have arisen in the development of the country's library system. The status of the major library centers is extremely unsatisfactory, the quality of library services is deteriorating, and additions to library stocks are being cut back. Many books and manuscripts that are masterpieces and monuments of world and domestic culture and the national property of the peoples of the USSR and of all mankind are in critical condition. A number of decisions adopted by Union and republic organs on the State Public Library imeni V.I. Lenin, the State Public Library imeni M.Ye. Saltykov-Shchedrin, the Scientific Library of the Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov, the Library of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Russian Literature (Pushkin House) and others have not been implemented.

Giving due consideration to the very important role of library centers in the development of culture, science, and education, I decree as follows:

1. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers together with the republic governments will insure compliance with decisions adopted earlier pertaining to reconstruction and strengthening of the material-technical base for the major libraries on the Union and republic levels, clarifying the time periods for compliance with these decisions as necessary.

Ministries and other central organs of state management and the USSR Academy of Sciences will submit to the USSR Government proposals on the long-term development of major departmental libraries.

2. Recommend that the republic governments and the executive committees of kray and oblast soviets of people's deputies take additional steps to reconstruct and equip major departmental libraries. In addition to wage increases, to consider other matters associated with improving social and everyday support for library workers.

3. For the purpose of effecting cardinal improvements in the safekeeping of the national printed and manuscript legacy and insuring that it is readily accessible to the broad reading public, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the USSR Academy of Sciences together with the republic governments and other interested organizations will, during 1991, devise a state program to guarantee the safekeeping of book and manuscript stocks.

4. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers will review proposals from the USSR Ministry of Culture on producing within the country and purchasing from abroad the technical facilities, equipment, and materials needed to supply the libraries. They will offer incentives for this kind of production activity, including tax advantages.

5. In connection with the considerable increases in the cost of Soviet and foreign publications and the increased cost of forwarding and insuring the safekeeping of book stocks, and also with the introduction of the sales tax, the

USSR Cabinet of Ministers will allocate funding in rubles and hard currency to provide compensation for the additional costs of the major library centers financed from the Union budget. It is recommended that the republic governments take similar steps to provide economic safeguards for major libraries financed from republic and local budgets.

6. For the purpose of finding additional funding to develop the library system, to establish that hard currency earnings from providing information services to foreign organizations and citizens, and the provision of other services on the basis of using library stocks, remain at the disposal of the libraries.

7. The USSR Ministry of Culture and the USSR Academy of Sciences will draw up proposals on improving the organizational and economic conditions in which the country's libraries carry out their functions during the transition to a market economy.

M. Gorbachev,

President of the USSR

Moscow, the Kremlin, 13 April 1991.

Policy of 'Imperial Liberalism' Touted

91UN1366A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by I. Yermolayev and Ye. Mikhaylov under the rubric: "Opinion: "Imperial Liberalism: The True Path of the Salvation of Russia"]

[Text] NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA does not make it a rule to explain the reason why a particular article was published on its pages, but in this instance we are compelled to speak. Lately people are increasingly insisting that they know a third path—neither conservative nor radical—for the development of our country. Judging by some indirect data, the idea of a third path is finding more and more sympathy in the highest echelons of power as well, and reputable state institutions are employed in developing it. In our view, the article presented today reflects the philosophy of adherents of this idea in its most concentrated form.

They invited us to follow the road to the Temple, but is becoming increasingly clear that it is not the outlines of the Crystal Palace one sees on the horizon but only a small burial chapel over our common fraternal grave. Do we need to hurry so?

Let us try to analyze what is happening. Without speaking about the so-called "conservative" forces whose political practices are already well-known to everyone, we will look more attentively at that which usually pertains to the "leftist" democrats. At first glance everything looks quite seemly here: Human rights, the right of nations to self-determination, the struggle against a totalitarian state and an unyielding Center—from this comes mass support from the population and ideological supremacy among the intelligentsia. As a

result, certain "democratic" clichés of conduct are beginning to take shape in the consciousness of many people which, under certain conditions, find expression in bloody conflicts. Why do such good intentions lead to such bad results? "It is very simple," they answer us. "The evil Center does not wish to yield to the noble democrats, and this is the source of all the troubles. Yield to us, give us power, and then universal peace will ensue." But is it only a question of the evil intentions of the Center? After all, it was the Center that gave—literally gave—political freedoms to its opponents. After all, today's democrats did not win their freedom on the barricades. There was no political opposition in the country; there were only individual "renegades" as they were called then, and all the rest were in a deep sleep. Why are there so many heroes now?

But let us imagine that the Center yielded. The democrats are in power. What will be the general scheme of activities in accordance with the best variant? The goal is to break down the "evil empire" (that is, Russia) into individual sovereign national-democratic states. If they consider it advantageous, these states will voluntarily delegate a portion of their rights to a common center which, in the end, depends on them and carries out only support functions—that is, it becomes in essence a lackey of their national interests, a willing lackey in white gloves. Democracy and the market are the means for smoothing over contradictions in such a conglomerate. The example is Western Europe and other "civilized" countries. When the ethnic democrats talk about this, dreaming about power in states that are independent of Russia, it is understood that they are acting correctly: Having united an ethnic group which densely populates a single territory against a common enemy, they subsequently, by splitting up nations and territories, merely reinforce their rule over the area that is subordinate to them. But when, in imitation of them, our Russian democrats also embrace this idea, the results in fact turn out to be different and the whole danger of the thoughtless application of abstract schemes that are profitable for others and ruinous for us immediately becomes apparent. The chief danger today consists of this abstraction, this hollow phraseology, this love of self-reproach which approaches political imbecility. When the idea of political suicide begins to possess the mass consciousness, as is happening today, there are only two ways of fighting it: To show those who can still understand that stupidity lies at its base, and to apply force to those who can understand nothing. Addressing ourselves to the former, we will try to examine characteristic examples of our fashionable myths and at least show that everything is not as simple as it seems at first.

They have declared Russia sovereign. This signifies that they consider Russia to be not the entire territory upon which Russians live but only a portion of it. But even within the framework of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] individual republics that feel strong are beginning to separate from Russia, some in the form of declarative sovereignty but counting on

independence over the long-term. This means that we too, following the path of democracy, in time will have to be cut down to size. And autonomy of Siberia and individual oblasts is not far off. The ancient dream of opponents of the Russian empire is beginning to come true. But if it comes true, does anyone really think that in place of the empire there will arise numerous small, peace-loving Switzerlands whose populations will trade and smile amiably for tourists? No, even now the savage bared teeth of nationalism is frightening off not only the tourists. Refugees are already wandering all over Russia by the tens of thousands in search of a haven. Our future is that of the refugee. It is that of a large Lebanon. The Russian nation cannot be sovereign in the sense that Lithuania or any other national democracy can. For them sovereignty is independence. For us it is ruin.

We are an imperial nation. Russia was formed in a thousand-year war as a state called upon to restrain the destructive flow of nomadic peoples over the vast spaces of Eurasia. Over the entire continent we froze those conflicts which it was impossible to end and which can only be decided by blood. We are the cement of a structure whose destruction threatens millions of victims. Whoever undertakes to destroy it will himself be buried. Historical reality shows that for Russians national existence consists specifically of internationalism, which can be reflected in the form of world revolution or imperial consciousness, call it what you wish, but the essence will be the same: We cannot exist in the form of a closed national state; the means of our existence is an empire, and as for whether it is bad or good, totalitarian or liberal, that depends on us. Therefore in order to avert catastrophe and save ourselves and others, we must under no circumstances repudiate our international destiny. On the contrary, we must accept responsibility, take up the burden of an imperial nation, and become an intermediary of peace and freedom between peoples. Those who repudiate this role under the guise of democratic internationalism doom everyone to involvement in insoluble interethnic conflicts. True, all of history is nothing but injustice, and no empire is an exception to this. But is it really necessary to dredge up the past in order to add to the evil of the present? No, by going that route we will merely go around the circle once more and end up at this same point again, and history will simply confirm the idea of the empire as a "remedy" for insoluble problems once more. We need to make use of what has been given and preserve the status quo, leave the problems of the past to history and not allow anyone to make use of them against the present, and, taking the path of liberalization of the empire, use a strong government to return the country to the resolution of existing problems through creative, constructive solutions and not through the settling of accounts.

And "humane" thoughts on the unifying role of the market in interethnic relations can only give rise to a sad smile. They point out the West to us again. But before Europe arrived at its present state, rivers of blood were poured out there and the most terrible wars took place in

an era of developed market relations, and they fought for the most part over markets. Are our inter-Union market relations really at a higher level than those in Europe, for example, in the 1930's? After all, an internal customs war is already being fought in our country and more than 150 various administrative formations are preparing to become national states and win themselves a place in the sun.

There still remains democracy, the last illusion of the Russian intellectual. But admit it honestly, my friends: Is it not that you, with your high intellect, wish that the "demos" was ruled by you? What you desire is known as "intellectocracy." You look at the West and rely on your intellect, but "let he who has eyes see": The former system, which contributed to the overproduction of intellectual mediocrity, has already doomed the majority of "intellectuals" to social extinction in a new society. In the West the ruling circles govern in a civilized manner because there a level of production has been reached which permits one to ensure the basic vital needs of the population, and therefore the question "Who gets how much?" moves to the background. In our country this still has not happened, and the intelligentsia stands on unsteady social ground and is still trying to demonstrate its activity despite this. It is increasingly dragging everyone into a whirlpool of instability from which it will rise up first to some kind of new-fangled "democratic dictatorship."

Thus:

1. Neither the rightists nor the leftists are positive, constructive forces. They have pulled each other into a vicious circle where each step by one side results in a response by the other, each step more powerful and more radical. Each side tries to become stronger and in this fashion splits society increasingly deeper. A third force able to halt the spinning of this diabolical flywheel has not yet appeared, at least not to a significant degree.

2. The solution is in the unification of all healthy forces around the Center. Yes, around that same "drifting" Center which formulates even its own politics in contradictory terms—one minute the "threat of the restoration of a bourgeois sector," and the next minute the "quickest possible transition to a market," etc. The point is that this Center is the stronghold of a rule-of-law system in the face of the threat of the reestablishment of totalitarianism and growing chaos. Naturally it does not carry out its functions in the best manner. But after all it has been deprived of support from below; in essence, this is the cause of its vacillation between the right and the left. It really is an attempt to sit on two chairs which are leaning in different directions. It is clear that such a situation cannot last long. Either they will go their separate ways and the Center will fall, or these chairs will come together and appear as the needed third force, in which case those who are presently on the edges—the extremists—will be discarded.

3. Imperial liberalism can be the only ideological central force. It stands for the desire for comprehensive fundamental reform of our society at the same time that a fuller preservation of the status quo is possible in those areas where its violation will lead to catastrophe. For the nations that have chosen independence, it proposes movement to independence by way of compromise on a rule-of-law basis. And the word "empire" should no longer frighten us or the entire world. It has always been that way for us: We fear a word, but we are not afraid of cutting off our nose to spite our face.

Zaslavskaya Attacks Disregard for Public Opinion

PM2404134891 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 13, 31 Mar-7 Apr 91 p 3

[Academician Tatyana Zaslavskaya article: "When the 'Powers That Be' Err"]

[Text] The foreboding of civil war is haunting not only politicians and poets now. It has also gripped the minds of ordinary people. Opinion polls have shown that over the past year these sentiments have increased from 17 to 22 per cent.

Apocalyptic predictions are dangerous in themselves—they may court disaster. But neither is it possible to refuse to see impending problems. The situation in society has been heated to the extreme.

Our polls have demonstrated that 60 per cent of people feel uncertainty about the future. Over 50 per cent expect mass unemployment, 40 per cent—famine, a third—the stoppage of railways. The expectation of economic disaster has laid its imprint on the entire atmosphere in society. VCIOM [editor's footnote: Soviet Centre for Public Opinion and Market Research] experts asked what feelings had taken root in people over the past year. First-mentioned were concern and uncertainty, with malice and aggressiveness coming second, and terror—third.

It is hard to imagine a more pessimistic picture. And the immediate future will hardly add cause for optimism.

This week has seen the convergence of developments which most likely will only tend to aggravate tensions in the country. The price hike, the Congress of Russian People's Deputies, the miners' strikes with so far unpredictable outcome. The consequences of these events could be prognosticated with a sufficient degree of objectivity, were our "powers that be" themselves predictable. We however, can never say how our main political "duet"—Gorbachev-Yeltsin—will behave. After all, their confrontation not merely dictates the moves in the political game, but also affects the character of decisions adopted.

The saddest thing is that this "battle of giants" has been prompted by the logic of the struggle itself. This has taken policy perhaps even farther away from nationwide interests than separate tactical blunders made by the leaders of Russia and the Union. The people are already themselves coming to understand this. According to our polls, the bulk of the population watches the struggle at the top not simply with concern, but also with mounting irritation. Both leaders' popularity has been dwindling, though Yeltsin's rating is still sufficiently high.

Regrettably the power structures judge people's real sentiments mainly by "letters from working people". Neither deputies nor the President have ever requested us to provide them with the findings of sociological polls. Isn't that the reason why we are being persuaded that the country can be extricated from the crisis solely by the Communist Party, although in fact full confidence in it has been voiced by a mere 6 per cent of people? Or why official opinion has refused to admit popular support for the "so-called democrats" although the rating, say, of Democratic Russia is much higher than that of the CPSU?

As our research studies have shown, it is still early to write off democracy here. People understand that democrats cannot give them bread because they have no real power. But even disillusioned with them, they do not deny them their support.

However neither should the democrats delude themselves with this patience. As long as the democratic movement is fragmented, it is incapable of opposing the party which still possesses a monopoly both in the sphere of the economy and in the sphere of policy. The monopolism of one party can only be opposed by another mass party. Today the democrats are often judged solely by the behaviour of extreme left-wing radicals. But the democratic movement is sufficiently diversified. If it merges into one party, people will get a more adequate idea of its objectives and missions. Moreover, the fragmentation of the democratic movement not only weakens it, but introduces inter-party wrangles into the political process. They can also become an element provoking civil clashes.

In the political struggle being fought today both right- and left-wingers make reference to the people's opinion. I am afraid that both rely more on their feelings in this respect than on the reality. But if the opposition errs, it merely deprives itself of the prospect of coming to power. When the "powers that be" err, they confront the country with the threat of social cataclysm.

The gap between policy and social expectations is more dangerous today than ever before. It will only add to the radicalization of both right- and left-wing forces in society. In the absence of a stable political centre the hopes of achieving consensus may be finally extinguished.

Baltics

Estonian Foreign Policy Examined

91UN12784 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 29 Mar 91 p 2

[Report by SOVETSKAYA ESTONIA Political Commentator Valeriy Merkin on foreign policy roundtable "Foreign Policy of Estonian Republic at the End of Transition Period"]

[Text] Three and a half months ago this newspaper organized a "roundtable" on the topic of the "foreign policy of the Estonian Republic." Judging from readers' reactions, the problems that were discussed there elicited lively interest. At that time we reached an agreement with specialists on foreign affairs to conduct such a discussion on a regular basis, no less frequently than every four months.

Today's participants in the exchange of opinions concerning the place and role of the foreign policy of the Estonian Republic during the transition period are: P. Vares, deputy director of the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Law of the Estonian Republic Academy of Sciences; G. Vainu, associate professor at the Tartu State University; U. Tihase, chief of the East European department of the Estonian Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs; T. Alatalu, associate professor of the Tartu Pedagogical Institute; V. Ladva, deputy department chief of Estonian Radio; and V. Merkin, SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA political observer.

[Merkin] During the time since our last "roundtable," the situation has changed substantially both in the USSR as a whole, and in the Baltic region in particular, including Estonia. This time encompassed a period of especially high tension in society, the peak of which fell in January of this year. The use of military force, which has led to human casualties in Vilnius and Riga, and barricades on the Toompea in Tallinn, literally exploded the tenuous balance of diplomatic forces and contributed completely new elements to the formation of public opinion in the Soviet Union itself and in the West in regard to the processes developing in the Baltic republics as they make their way to independence and sovereignty. As for Estonia in particular, the important moment in determining the distribution of forces was the republic referendum conducted on 3 March and the all-Union referendum conducted on 17 March. Their results are known and it seems to me that they had been programmed in advance somewhere. I think that now the main point is not in trying to figure out who lost, but in determining who won.

The question is how the referendum results will be used. Affirmative answers to questions put before the people cannot substitute for consensus in society, which is so much needed in this dramatic moment we are living through.

[Alatalu] I would still touch upon the referendum conducted in Estonia on 3 March. In general, political scientists divide such actions into two categories: a) a referendum whose purpose is to find out the opinion of the majority on some specific problem; and b) a referendum which provides those in power with a new mandate of confidence. In addition, there are referendums that are part of normal development, and referendums of crisis periods.

The conduct of the 3 March referendum cannot be separated from the consequences of the January crisis in the Baltics. It caused an abrupt change in the minds of Western politicians which was manifested by their support and recognition of the ways of moving toward the genuine independence of the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Iceland went further than anybody else in this respect by announcing at the end of January its diplomatic recognition of Lithuania. The Estonian Government decided to follow in Lithuania's footsteps, some time after adopting the decision to conduct a republic referendum, it made preparations for Prime Minister E. Savisaar to visit Iceland. Much hope was pinned on this, but, after the USSR Foreign Ministry demarche to the Government of Iceland, Reykjavik decided to refrain from further steps in the diplomatic recognition of Estonia. This shows once again that the current republic leadership makes errors in the complicated political game and does not take into account all the nuances of the foreign policy situation.

As for the results of the referendum, they would have been even more impressive if one took into account the fact that by the beginning of March the crisis in the Baltic was already behind us and that the question on the ballot (I mean the term "restoration") turned out to be poorly chosen in terms of its perception by the non-indigenous population.

[Merkin] But one cannot say that the results of the referendum were poor, can one?

[Alatalu] That depends on how we look at it. Had the question been formulated slightly differently, the activity of the population in the northeastern part of the republic and in Tallinn would have been higher, which means there would have been more "for" votes. Everything is learned by comparison. If we look at the results of referendums in Latvia and Estonia, we can see that our neighbors mustered more support from the Russian-speaking population.

I think that Estonia has acted somewhat rashly in regard to the timing of the referendum. Perhaps it would have been better to do it the way Georgia and Armenia did, that is, schedule it for a later date? By then the results of the all-Union referendum—which now provides certain food for thought—would have been known; this, and taking into account that the real test of power is just beginning, suggests that conduct of the referendum in, let

us say, September, could have brought additional political dividends. Undoubtedly, in this case the international community's attention to Estonia would have been more impressive.

[Merkin] There are noticeable changes in the Western attitude toward the Soviet Union regarding the Baltic question. This was clearly demonstrated during the latest visit to the USSR by U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, who said in Moscow that the problems of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia stand on their own. In this regard, perhaps we should already start thinking about what will happen after the transition period. In his recent speech, the head of the Estonian Government said for the first time that this period is nearing its end. Thus, the obvious conclusion: We need to start formulating right now a more clearly defined line in the sphere of international relations.

For instance, taking into account the irreversibility of its movement toward sovereignty, Estonia must develop some determining principle for its foreign policy—for instance, one that is based on a classic form of state neutrality. This would have permitted us to take a special status which, as evidenced by world practice, evokes sympathy from other countries in the world and at the same time permits us to approach the issues of the deployment of military formations under Union-level jurisdiction on our territory, and of the nuclear-free zone, in a completely different way.

[Vares] I agree that it is necessary now, not in some future time, to build the basic structure for a future foreign policy. Whether it is based on the principle of neutrality or something else is something to think about. We must ask the question: Are we going to go the Finnish way? Is this option satisfactory for us? In the practice of international relations, the term "Finlandization" is not always used in a positive sense. Let us visualize the role of a future independent Estonia in the world community. Western specialists agree that, considering its insignificant economic weight and inability to compete, it is destined to play the role of a dwarf state. However, the mission of some kind of bridge linking the economic and political interests of the West and the USSR offer a variety of promising prospects. Rein Taagepera deliberated on this type of middleman principle way back in 1971.

[Ladva] I would like to go back to the recent visit by Secretary of State J. Baker to Moscow. An interesting point: He met separately with three Baltic representatives and the twelve representatives of other USSR republics. This says that the U.S. Administration maintains a clear position of recognizing the Soviet Union in the boundaries which the United States registered at the moment of establishing diplomatic relations in 1933. Thereby, they confirmed the principle of not recognizing the forcible incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the USSR.

As for the work in the area of defining the principle of neutrality as a dominant one in future foreign policy strategy, I think we can talk about it only in the sense of what would be the decision regarding deployment of the Soviet Army on Estonian territory.

[Vainu] Unfortunately, we have to admit that the Estonian people know little about the foreign policy concept of the People's Front government. On the one hand, it has been discussed in the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Supreme Soviet and in the government, but, on the other hand, everything is kept secret. I agree that there may be points that really are not suitable for open discussion. But the general contents should be published so that people can judge the effectiveness of the policy and the degree of its implementation.

In our foreign policy, we are still encountering a situation in which clear priority is given to the Western direction, and we pay little attention to the East, meaning primarily the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, events of great importance are brewing there. At the same time, many of our deputies have been recalled from Moscow.

This means that our information is meager. E. Savisaar makes trips to Moscow but, as a rule, does not stay there long. E. Lippmaa met with Baker, but on his return reported on the contents of the meeting only to the Estonian Congress. Our press publishes a lot of materials about the support the Estonian position receives from the West, and sometimes one gets the impression that this support is much more powerful than it really is. It seems that very soon the republic will declare its independence.

[Vares] First of all, I agree with the point of view already expressed here that the change in the Western attitude toward Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia occurred not as a result of the referendum, but after the January events. Of course, we should not diminish the significance of the Estonian referendum, since it demonstrated once again the direction in which the people intend to go. And in this respect I do not see any particular difference in foreign policy before and after the referendum. The goal is the same—sovereignty and independence. But conceptually we still have to recognize that as of now Estonia, as well as, by the way, Latvia and Lithuania, does not have a foreign policy *per se* and cannot have it in the full sense of the word. The point is that not being a sovereign state we cannot even control our foreign contacts. I will give an example: Last spring Tallinn public organizations, with the approval of the Foreign Ministry of the Estonian Republic, invited William Haaf, a well-known American specialist on the Baltics. Well, when he arrived at Tallinn port he was not even able to come ashore, he was sent back to Finland. It turned out that he had been "blacklisted" by certain Union organs and declared *persona non grata*. Or another matter: "Can we guarantee today that any Estonian citizen can go abroad?" No! The central authorities in Moscow can come up with some sort of extraordinary circumstances and, for

instance, not permit holders of passports issued by the Estonian Foreign Ministry to pass the border control checkpoint.

From a foreign policy point of view, Estonia's current position on the world scene resembles the situation in the Europarlament. It does not have a true foreign policy, either, since it does not have authority on the territories of the member countries. Generally, it is an influential political organization, but its documents, including the well-known Resolution on the Situation in the Baltic States of 19 January 1989, are only recommendations.

As for the foreign policy of the Government of the Estonian Republic during the transition period, I would characterize it as rather dynamic, sometimes more successful, sometimes less, but it would be more precise to call it Estonia's activities in the area of international relations.

[Tihase] We need international support, and we are trying to get it. In these actions, we draw on historic experience. For instance, the Finns who are watching the situation in the Baltics may feel they are watching a replay of their own country's past. In his diary entry dated 17 December 1917, U. Paasikivi recalls his trip to the capitals of the Scandinavian countries, for the purpose of discovering their attitudes toward the unilaterally declared Finnish independence. Russia was also living through a very difficult period then, and Russian troops were in Finland. What was the reaction from Sweden, Norway, and Denmark? In their statements, they expressed sympathy toward the Finnish people, but refused to officially recognize Finland's independence until the situation in Russia cleared up. Paasikivi says openly in his memoirs that he was "wandering around the world like a vagrant." Today Finland itself declares: "In the current situation the only thing we can help the Baltics with is practical advice—get your relationships with Moscow in order." Thus the historical parallels cross.

As of today, Estonia has signed agreements to establish information centers on a bilateral basis with Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. During L. Meri's latest visit to Denmark a protocol on cooperation in the area of culture and science was signed. The Government of Denmark declared that it recognizes Estonia as the sovereign state it has been since 1921, and reaffirmed that it does not recognize its forcible annexation by the USSR in 1940. Interestingly, several days ago USSR Foreign Minister A. Bessmertnykh handed a protest note to Denmark's ambassador in Moscow, in which it was stated that such unilateral steps constitute interference in USSR internal affairs.

[Merkin] Do you agree that there is still too little effort expended on explaining the government position to the non-indigenous population of the republic?

[Tihase] I would answer this way: The 3 March referendum was needed, because it was necessary to determine the attitude of the entire population toward the restoration of Estonian independence. The results showed conclusively that such support exists. It is possible, however, that support would have been greater if the Russian-speaking population had had the main directions of the internal and external policy of the Estonian Republic explained to them. The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is ready to undertake such steps in the nearest future.

As a result of implementing the treaty with RSFSR "On the Foundation of State Relations", signed during this year's January events, Ye. Golikov, Estonia's permanent representative in Moscow, will very soon present his credentials to RSFSR Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev. An additional agreement had been worked out in the course of recent negotiations in the RSFSR Foreign Ministry, whereby both sides stipulate the protection of the rights of their citizens residing on the territory of the other country (Estonian Republic and RSFSR). This agreement contains a point "On the procedures for resolving matters of migration policy and migrants." In accordance with its contents, we will bring together all information on violations of human rights in one way or another, and make a preliminary decision which will then be passed to both governments. For this purpose, we intend to create a permanent bilateral expert commission which will include three representatives of each side. It will meet on a bimonthly basis in Moscow and Tallinn, alternately. This addendum to the treaty has not been submitted for consideration to the governments of both republics and will probably be signed in the near future.

[Vainu] We have to realize that today we are only laying the foundations for our future foreign policy. Naturally, the bent toward relations with the West (United States, Western Europe, the Nordic States) is justified, but underestimation of the eastern direction can cost us dearly. The fact that our diplomatic school has started functioning is a step in the right direction, but—have you noticed: We still orient our best cadres toward the West. Unfortunately, we find ourselves in a difficult situation right now: Estonia has practically no specialists in international relations. They do exist, but as the saying goes, you can count them on your fingers. Most of them have not studied international law, political science, or human rights. It is not our fault, and we are really no more stupid than others. The trouble is that all these disciplines have always been Moscow's domain; it was the most difficult feat to be accepted at the or the Diplomatic Academy. Only a small number of Estonians studied there, mostly representatives of the party nomenclature. You may ask: How are we utilizing this small, but nevertheless still existing, scientific potential of the republic in formulating foreign policy concepts? The Estonian press mentions that representatives of various parties gather at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and coordinate their actions in the area of foreign policy.

But behind the party leaders should stand specialists acting as advisers, experts, and consultants. Who are they? There is a certain shroud of secrecy surrounding the foreign policy "kitchen." In the West, the names of those who stand behind one political decision or another are, as a rule, known. We do not have this.

Sometimes we hear: Perhaps, we should bring in specialists from Estonian emigration? I think that we will be disappointed in this respect. There are few specialists in international affairs there. The only thing that is left to us is to train our own, and quickly. Meanwhile, we are not utilizing even the opportunities that already exist. For instance, Moscow offered to let us send two people to study at the Moscow Institute for International Relations this year. Estonian youths categorically refused to study in the USSR. There were many contenders among the Russian-speaking population but none of them had a perfect command of Estonian (what kind of Estonian diplomat would one make if he did not speak Estonian?). As a result, these vacancies went unfilled.

Another problem: The level of knowledge of foreign languages among our diplomats. Their English, German, French, and even Russian leave much to be desired. There are objective reasons for this. Estonia went through a period of Russification when, in protest, young people refused to study Russian. There was a period of no contacts with the West, so people simply stopped studying English and other languages. Now it is very difficult to change this psychology. Personally, I am worried: Are our young people ready to devote themselves to studying Georgian, Armenian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and other languages? We have to admit that, to our shame, we do not even understand well the situation our neighbors are in—all because of poor knowledge of languages.

[Vainu] We should not forget that foreign policy is a search for compromise. In our small republic, we have to involve representatives of all political forces in the search for decisions.

The notion of the East includes not only our "big" neighbor—the Soviet Union—and the countries of Eastern Europe. It is also Japan, South Korea, and other countries. If we want to cover the distance to a highly developed economy in a short period of time, we should study more the experience of Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. We must already start thinking about developing these relations, and prepare for it seriously and thoroughly.

One more comment. In my opinion, in our search for ways to gain independence and international recognition, we spend unjustifiable efforts on analogies while forgetting that analysis is still the main method that also applies to formulating a foreign policy strategy. Sometimes one gets the impression that high-ranking Estonian politicians 70 years ago were much smarter than those of today. The signing of the Tartu Peace Treaty is proof of

that, although the conditions then were extremely difficult. One does not detect such flexibility and, if you wish, political sixth sense among our leaders today.

[Merkin] I think that all those present will agree that effective foreign policy is not possible without the understanding and support of the populace, and the latter, in its turn, is impossible without objective and—to the maximum degree possible—comprehensive factual information in the mass media. It is understood, however, that optimal foreign policy cannot always, without exception, be conducted in full compliance with public preferences. It is also improper to place upon the public the burden of responsibility for decisions, the making of which is part of the duties of the political leadership. This is one more reason for needing objective information.

Supreme Council Deputy Scores Latvia's Ethnic Development Law

91JUN1291 USSRISK D I I I I I I I in Russian
27 Mar 91 pp. 1, 3

[Article by T. Zhdanok, member of the Latvian Communist Party and deputy of the Latvian Supreme Council: "The Desired and the Actual or the Noisy Reaction to One Law"]

[Text] Last Thursday friends telephoned from Moscow: "Congratulations! The law against discrimination has been passed in Latvia!"... In response to my perplexity they explained that this was the headline on a BALT FAN agency report published on the front page of the evening edition of Moscow's IZVESTIYA.

I had to disappoint my friends. After I had obtained the newspaper next morning I was convinced that not only the title but also the content of the law passed on 19 March by the Supreme Council had been reflected by the news agency in accordance with the principle of "give them what they want, not what is."

In fact it is a question of the law with the long title of "On the Free Development of National and Ethnic Groups in Latvia and Their Right to Cultural Autonomy."

In the comment published in IZVESTIYA, in particular, it states that during the course of the debates it was decided to include in the law a clause giving each inhabitant of the republic the right "freely to choose, at his own option, whether or not to show his nationality in documents." This passage can be explained only by an indelible influence exerted at one time on the BALT FAN correspondent by the well-known proposal to abolish the paragraph on "nationality" in all kinds of state forms, contained in the... Interfront Declaration. But the corresponding article in the law (real, not imaginary) states the following: "Every permanent resident of the Latvian Republic has the right freely and in accordance with his own national awareness or national origin, to indicate or establish his own national affiliation in documents."

Those who wrote the law also had no doubts about whether or not nationality should be indicated in documents. Moreover, the word "documents" appeared in the final version (a document is, in particular, a passport), at the time when the draft was proposing that national affiliation be freely indicated in birth certificates. I note that in most states passports are used for trips abroad and indicate only "citizenship," while identity cards for internal use are even more free of information such as nationality.

I would like to draw readers' attention to another article of the law: **"The Latvian Republic guarantees all permanent residents in the republic equal rights to work and wages regardless of national affiliation. Any action, open or covert, limiting opportunities for permanent residents to choice of profession or position in accordance with capabilities and qualifications, based on national affiliation, is prohibited."**

Evidently this was the article that BALT-FAX had in mind when it announced that the law "guarantees equal rights for all national and ethnic minorities in Latvia." But I see in the article at least two stones hidden underwater. One is more obvious: the words "in accordance with capabilities and qualifications." We should not forget that qualifications in most specialties include knowledge of the official language. The second stone is somewhat deeper: at first blush it cannot be seen in the phrase "permanent resident in the Latvian Republic." In the opinion of some influential local legal experts it does not apply to thousands of people living in Latvia. For an explanation of this I must resort to extensive citations.

First let us turn to the resolution on questions of citizenship passed by the last, the third, People's Front of Latvia [NFI] Congress (ATMODA 13 Nov 1990):

During the transitional period no one will be granted citizenship. The present contingent of citizens of the Latvian Republic must be officially determined by decision of the Supreme Council, which in accordance with the Latvian Republic law on citizenship that was in force at the moment of the occupation, is made up of persons who were citizens of the Latvian Republic on 17 June 1940 and their descendants. The immigration law should make provision for giving those inhabitants of Latvia who are not citizens the opportunity to be citizens of the Latvian Republic and to obtain from the immigration service permanent or temporary permission to stay in the republic. **Inhabitants of Latvia who obtain permanent permission to stay acquire the status of a permanent resident of Latvia.** (my boldface—author's note)

The resolution gives no answer to the question of who will and who will not obtain this permission. The matter is being discussed.

"Only those who moved to Latvia legally before 17 June 1940 but have not yet obtained citizenship of the Latvian Republic will be recognized as permanent residents of the Latvian Republic"—that is what the deputy

chairman of the Latvian Committee of the Citizens' Congress, M. Grinblats, believes (ATMODA 27 November 1990).

E. Tsilinskis, member of the Latvian Committee and deputy of the Latvian Supreme Council who is part of the NFI faction's working group on the problems of status for permanent residents, writes the following in answer to my official question as a deputy to the Supreme Council Presidium:

"The status of permanent resident will not be granted to the following:

"1. Persons who are members of the USSR Armed Forces or persons studying in educational establishments of the USSR, except for those who before service in the Army lived in and were permanently registered in Latvia.

"2. Cadre associates of the USSR Committee for State Security.

"3. Cadre associates of USSR internal troops except for firefighters and workers in corrective establishments.

"4. Persons discharged from the service and retirees in the categories as indicated in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3.

"5. Family members of persons mentioned in paragraphs 1 through 4.

"6. Persons who are members of organizations hostile to the independent Latvian Republic, and also persons calling for the violent overthrow of state order.

"7. Persons who have been involved in crimes against mankind and in genocide against the people of Latvia.

"8. Persons convicted of serious criminal acts.

"9. Persons who came to Latvia or obtained permanent registration in Latvia in violation of laws and other legal enactments in force.

"10. Persons who are registered temporarily.

"For persons who are not granted permanent resident status in Latvia, their sojourn in Latvia is regulated by the law 'On the Status of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons Temporarily in Latvia' and also by international treaties."

In publishing this document I am sure I shall again hear reproaches from my opponents: They will say, why make the **drafts** public? So what should I do, wait in silence for a draft to be adopted?

And not get used to accusations?

Incidentally, some of them are undergoing startling metamorphoses. At one time the party committee at the University of Latvia led by its secretary A. Endzins sharply censured me "for activity promoting the strikes on 28 April 1989." On 12 March 1991 the Latvian Supreme Council, in which A. Endzins heads the commission on legislative issues, passed a resolution entitled

"On Support for the Process of Democratization in the Russian Federation," which, in particular, "assigns the Latvian Republic Council of Ministers the task of cooperating with public organizations and labor collectives in providing humanitarian aid in regions of the miners' strikes."

Every day Latvian state television and radio, led by R. Labanovskis, calls for support for the striking miners. Eighteen months ago the Kirovskiy Rayon Latvian CP Committee Bureau, of which R. Labanovskis was a member, rejected my appeal against the above-mentioned censure.

The esteemed A. Endzins and R. Labanovskis are now making a 180-degree turn with respect to the strikes, and are trying to have the party censure rescinded, but what bad luck—for a long time neither have been members of either the aforementioned elected organs or the Latvian Communist Party.

FROM THE EDITOR: The fact that in its work **BALFAX** agency adheres, to put it mildly, to what are not the best of rules, is common knowledge. And the comment in **IZVESTIYA** to which Supreme Council Deputy T. Zhdanok refers is just one more proof of that. True, it must be noted that it is being helped in offering disinformation to readers by the double moral standards of local national-separatists in absolutely everything. But it is difficult to understand why a solid newspaper like **IZVESTIYA** has taken the bait so easily. The newspapers **TRUD** and **KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA** are another matter: Their correspondents G. Lapinya and K. Makaryan have recently been hastening without a second's hesitation to follow in the wake of **BALFAX** to deceive their readers.

Latvia's Rubiks Interviewed by KYODO

PM0404160091 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 16 Mar 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with A.P. Rubiks, Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and First Secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, by Journalists of Japan's KYODO News Agency]—**SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA** headline; interview conducted in Riga "recently" and attributed to the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Press Center]

[Text] At the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee recently A.P. Rubiks answered questions put by Shiyutsu Khemmi [surname as transliterated], a journalist for Japan's leading KYODO News Agency. A record of that interview is published below.

[Khemmi] A group of KYODO journalists has come this time to visit all three Baltic republics and to size up the situation. We see it as our task to take in as many viewpoints as possible and to listen to as many people as possible.

My first question concerns the fact that a public opinion poll was held 3 March, including in Latvia, and I would like to learn your opinion, as first secretary of the republic Communist Party Central Committee, of that poll.

[Rubiks] I proceed from the premise that any republic has the right to organize any poll. As regards this poll, it was conceived as a barrier on the way to the 17 March referendum, in order to create difficulties for the referendum. It was organized urgently and there was no time to prepare for it—only approximately three weeks—and so I do not consider the poll a great event in the life of the republic. Still less because there were many violations of citizens' rights and human rights in the process of preparing for it and holding it, and it is not an accurate, adequate expression of the state of public opinion among the republic's population.

What kind of violations? First, whole groups of the population were denied the opportunity to participate in the poll. They were sailors in the merchant and fishing fleets, servicemen's family members, and servicemen themselves. There were many violations in drawing up the lists. They included children and deceased citizens, women were included under their maiden name and under their husband's name, and much besides. An official statement in this regard was issued by the "Equal Rights" faction, which works in the Supreme Soviet. It was published in the press, and so I will not go into details.

Right from the start you could detect the desire of the organizers of this poll not so much to learn public opinion as to get the answer that suited them. The very wording of the question was such that you cannot, in general, call it unambiguous, for apparently different concepts had been lumped together. Whereas every normal person wishes to live in a democratic republic, in a democratic state, to live in a state which is independent or dependent on someone is another question. The following question is supplanted here: Are we to live together in the Soviet Union or not? In answering one thing, a person answers another, as it were. And the poll organizers set a perfectly clear aim: to gain more than two-thirds of the votes of the voters who replied in the affirmative to the question. Why more than two-thirds? Because, according to the USSR law on a subject's secession from the federation, this question may only be considered if more than two-thirds of the votes are obtained. Here they wanted secretly to apply the poll to this law. This did not happen, and so those who favored this poll are now propagandizing a different figure: three-fourths of the participants, and not 62 percent of all voters. That is, this figure is not advantageous to them.

[Khemmi] Is that 62 percent of those who participated?

[Rubiks] No, 62 percent of all who have the right to vote

It is in this connection that the Latvian Communist Party regards this poll as a poll conducted with violations, as a fact which has no juridical consequences for the republic, and as an attempt to hinder the referendum, the real referendum on 17 March.

[Khemmi] Now let me put the next question: The date 17 March, when the all-union referendum will be held, is already approaching. What is your prognosis? Roughly what will the results be here, in the republic?

[Rubiks] In the conditions under which this referendum is being held, it is hard to speak of the results today, for the republic Supreme Soviet has officially refused to hold the referendum. And its organization has fallen, in practice, to labor collectives themselves and sociopolitical organizations. The party cannot actively organize the referendum, otherwise we will be accused of seeking a particular outcome... This is the difficulty.

Proceeding from this, we supporters of the referendum set ourselves a minimum task and a maximum task. The minimum task is to gain no less than 25 percent of the votes "for," i.e. positive replies to the set question, plus one voter out of the whole number of voters. This fulfills half of the referendum's conditions. Because, under the conditions of the referendum, to be considered valid, it is necessary to have the participation of no less than 50 percent plus one. Then the result is positive. And the maximum task is to secure the participation of 50 percent plus one, i.e. to fulfill the second condition of the referendum. And, of the participants who have cast votes "for," no less than 33 percent plus one, i.e. also to fulfill at the same time the task which the poll did not fulfill: The minimum task is realistic, while the maximum is very complex.

[Khemmi] The Latvian Supreme Soviet is known not to support this nationwide referendum, and you will succeed, let us assume, let us hope, in fulfilling the maximum task. How, in that case, will relations shape up with the Latvian Supreme Soviet, i.e. reelections or?...

[Rubiks] It is putting it mildly to say that it does not support it. On the contrary, everything is being done in the republic to intimidate people, to stop them going to the polling places. All propaganda, official propaganda on radio and television, opposes the referendum right round the clock. It urges people not to go or to vote against.

Not only deputies of the majority faction in the republic Supreme Soviet but also people's deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet zealously participate in this work, despite the fact that there is a special USSR Supreme Soviet decision. Another USSR Supreme Soviet resolution has been published in the press today, urging USSR people's deputies not only to participate but also to promote the holding of the referendum.

Under these conditions we believe that every 10,000 votes in our favor, for the referendum, is like in wartime, you know, when one year counts as two, and so here too

they have special weight. I do not doubt that the referendum will have a positive result in the Union as a whole. In accordance with the Law on the Referendum, the referendum results are binding throughout the Soviet Union's territory. Consequently, the result that the Soviet Union exists will be obtained. If our republic persists and insists that it wishes to secede, there is a law on secession, if you please, and it will be necessary to seek a new referendum and hold a referendum on secession from the Union. The Latvian Communist Party has advocated this viewpoint from the very first day that disagreements arose among us, and for two years now we have been saying that, if we want to secede, we must not just do so by adopting a unilateral declaration but must hold a referendum. But they are afraid to hold a referendum because they will not gather so many votes.

[Khemmi] We have visited Estonia, are studying the situation in Latvia, and will then go to Lithuania. By contrast with Estonia, where everything is proceeding, in general, relatively peacefully and calmly, your situation is complicated by a series of mysterious explosions. This is getting very wide coverage in the Japanese press and in the Western press. What kind of forces do you think might be behind these explosions, and what aim do they pursue? Of course this is a complex question, but maybe you have some views?

[Rubiks] I can only express my own attitude to this. Because those who ought to have cleared up these explosions—I mean the republic's law-enforcement organs, headed by Minister of Internal Affairs Vaznis—simply are not doing so, in my opinion. I do not believe that an entire ministry cannot clear this up. Consequently, they are not doing so, having an interest in not clearing it up. I accuse no one, other than Vaznis, of the fact that they have not been cleared up. What forces are behind this? Those which erect barricades and those which benefit from having such rigid confrontation and opposition here, as distinct from seeking the path to a dialogue. There was no real need to erect these barricades. They did so in order to fuel moral psychosis, because anyone can understand that these barricades are not an obstacle to anything. It is just so that everyone thinks that someone is on the point of mounting an attack when they go to the television center, the Council of Ministers, or the Supreme Soviet. No one intended to attack anyone there. All this is to fuel psychosis and arouse disquiet in the population.

The version which is going around in the republic that the barricades were supposedly built in response to the events in Lithuania is not right either. The corresponding forces set about creating and preparing these barricades long before the events in Lithuania. And corresponding information, proving this with facts, will be published in the very near future. Another idea is traced there: to call reliable people to the barricades, so that they can get to know each other, become united, and are ready to act under conditions if they really need at some time to oppose those who are defending Soviet

power. There is no one else here whom it would be necessary to oppose, only those who defend Soviet power.

[Khemmi] As the day of the nationwide referendum approaches, we are, unfortunately, observing an exacerbation of relations between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. A big demonstration in support of Yeltsin took place in Moscow recently. This exacerbation is very dangerous. What is your viewpoint? How do you view these events?

[Rubiks] This confrontation began back at the time when Yeltsin was a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. And since these disagreements could not be resolved at that time, they dragged on and are now entering the final, maximum phase, so to speak. Feeling that many of his actions are supported only by his supporters and not by the broad masses of the people, Yeltsin has staked his all, as the saying goes: He has declared war on Gorbachev and the center in the literal sense of the word and has declared unequivocally that one of them must go, but he means Gorbachev, of course. But I think that Yeltsin has miscalculated once again in his recent statements. By accusing first secretaries of oblast party committees and declaring that they must be arrested he is plainly disregarding the party's strength and the solidarity which will be elicited by such an accusation against some party leaders on the part of others. He has aggravated his own position. For myself I see just one thing—that the question will finally be resolved not even 17 March so much as at the time of the Congress of Russian People's Deputies 28 March. Because it is clear that the Union is largely held up by Russia itself, since this is the backbone, the basis of everything. Therefore the fate of the Union depends on the way Russia's relations with the center shape up. I believe that after the Russian Congress one of them must remain: either Yeltsin or Gorbachev. Ask me: Who? I favor Gorbachev. Why Gorbachev? Because Gorbachev's policies really are modern. If it seems to someone that he does not make decisions quickly enough, these are things that can be rectified. He is essentially a democrat, essentially someone who is capable of taking different opinions into account—something that Yeltsin is totally devoid of.

[Khemmi] Could you be more explicit as to how this will occur?

[Rubiks] This is how I perceive it: The Russian Congress is convening as an extraordinary congress by demand of a group of people's deputies who have become aware of Yeltsin's inability to continue to head the Supreme Soviet. This line must gain victory, it is correct. Yeltsin is heading for a confrontation, and the more power Yeltsin gets the more dictatorial rather than democratic this power will be. This is the real state of affairs. This must be viewed with due consideration for the outcome of 17 March and the poll of Russia's population on the supplementary ballot papers. If Russia votes that it must have a president then, regardless of whether Yeltsin remains chairman of the Supreme Soviet or not, I think

that he will attempt to run for election as Russia's president. I do not believe that Yeltsin can win against anyone else. But if Yeltsin gets through all this and does emerge victorious, the question of Gorbachev will come up. Moreover, this question will be raised by his supporters and his opponents alike. The question of another extraordinary congress will come up again. This is because two completely different policies cannot exist on such a massive scale. There must be a uniform policy. Especially since the referendum results will already be known.

[Khemmi] Yes, these are indeed two diametrically opposed forces but, if their differences are not successfully resolved within parliament's framework, do you think it possible that the situation might deteriorate further still? Will there be demonstrations, strikes, and possible clashes, maybe even armed clashes? How high do you rate the chances of such a development of events?

[Rubiks] You know, I assume that there will be demonstrations, but I do not believe that there will be any clashes. Why do I not believe it? Because the main forces maintaining order in the country—the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] troops, the bulk of the militia, not all the militia but the bulk of it, the Army, and the KGB—have been and still are upholding the USSR laws and are on the USSR president's side. It is absurd to ignore this force or act against it.

[Khemmi] But is there not an equally great division, a split within the Internal Troops and the militia?

[Rubiks] Yes, there is in the militia, but not in the Internal Troops. Since our militia acquires its manpower mainly from among the local population, each republic has its own contingent, and since there is a split, a division among the population and between republics, this syndrome also affects the militia. But this does not extend to the Internal Troops.

[Khemmi] Following the results of the 17 March universal vote, is there any possibility of similar contradictions between the Communist Party and yourself personally on the one hand and the Supreme Soviet and Gorbunovs on the other?

[Rubiks] To use a sporting expressing, Gorbunovs and I are in different weight categories. He holds high office in the state structure, while I am nothing more than the head of a political organization. Neither my plans nor my dreams involve any struggle against Gorbunovs as such. Not at all. But the party program must be upheld and defended, it must be demonstrated that it is more acceptable than the program and the policy pursued by the Supreme Soviet, in this regard the answer must be yes, this is going on now.

[Khemmi] Of course, we understand your complex position, but are you rendering any specific assistance in holding the 17 March referendum, like preparing ballot papers or something else along similar lines?

[Rubiks] We as a party are not involved in any technical work. All this is being done by the Central Electoral Commission and the other commissions, the ward commissions which have been set up in the republic, there are about 450 of them.

But we play an active part in explaining our position, we are showing people how to vote. This topic is covered by our press, radio programs, propaganda workers, and by deputies—Communists and non-Communists alike—who share our position. We are, of course, engaged in agitation work. Communists are also members of ward commissions. After all, this referendum is not just a poll, it is a referendum according to law and, in compliance with the law, it is being conducted by a state organ, a special organization.

[Khemmi] Following the important events on 17 and 28 March, the situation in the Soviet Union might change radically and, in this context, do you think that there is any likelihood that Gorbachev's visit to Japan may be canceled or postponed?

[Rubiks] Yes, I have thought about this. In my view, mutual relations between the Soviet Union and Japan are so important and serious today and can yield so much in the future that Gorbachev will go to Japan under any circumstances.

The serious nature of these relations is not only determined by the stepping up of U.S. activities in the Persian Gulf region and to the south of our country, it is also conditioned by the need to seek mutually advantageous economic relations and the solution of territorial questions.

[Khemmi] Territorial questions could be the most important problem at the Soviet-Japanese talks. What is your viewpoint?

[Rubiks] Yes, I agree that this could be the paramount issue, and I think that it is the main issue now, during the consultations. I proceed from the premise that, on the whole, any injustice must be rectified sooner or later. Such injustices often occur as a result of the outcome of wars. But one injustice cannot be rectified by another.

As for territorial disputes, they are exceptionally complex and fraught with long-term consequences. I do not think that the Soviet Union is short of territory or that these islands today are as strategically important as they were right after the war. A solution to this question must be found, but this does not mean that everything will be settled right now.

I am convinced that, given the foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Union today and the position firmly held by Gorbachev, a solution to this problem will be found.

[Khemmi] Therefore, when you speak of injustice, do you also mean territorial questions?

[Rubiks] I did not mean these islands specifically, this is my creed in general, this is my approach toward the question.

[Khemmi] But what do you think, is there any chance of reaching even a small compromise on the territorial question when Gorbachev arrives in Japan?

[Rubiks] Yes, without fail. I know Gorbachev as a master of compromise. I feel optimistic about the solution of these questions.

[Khemmi] Will the referendum results affect Gorbachev's position on the territorial problem?

[Rubiks] Students would describe this as a "catchall" question. Nonetheless, I do not think that they will have any direct effect.

[Khemmi] You have visited Japan on numerous occasions and, generally speaking, the Japanese know you as one of the few Soviet leaders who are quite familiar with Japan. What has impressed you most in Japan?

[Rubiks] I am afraid that this will be a rather too general answer, but when visiting the city of Kobe I was amazed by the way a new city—and now there are already two new cities—was built in the ocean. And when I started figuring out how this was achieved, I arrived at the conclusion that it was achieved through high standards of technology and industriousness. [Rubiks ends]

In conclusion, Shiyutsu Khemmi expressed thanks for the interview.

Lithuania's East, West Policy Achievements Assessed

91UNI2301 Vilnius EKHO LITY in Russian
16 Mar 91 p 4

[Cheslovas Yurshenas: "Notes of a Political Scientist: Have We Gone That Far?"]

[Text] It seems like it was only yesterday. Yes, it was only yesterday, it seems, that we, the republic's newly elected parliament, were beginning the marathon session whose outcome was the historic decision on the restoration of the independence of the Lithuanian state. But a year has elapsed, a year of strenuous work, difficult decisions, and tragic events.

Let us in connection with this first anniversary reflect on whether we have progressed far and what our achievements in the East and in the West have been.

Some people (and not only among the opponents of Lithuania's independence) are of the opinion that the republic has in the year achieved practically nothing: the West has not established or restored diplomatic relations with Lithuania and pays only lip service to support for us, and the East, more precisely, the USSR, does not recognize self-determination, more, has employed crude power politics against us, specific examples of which

were last year's economic blockade, the tragic January events and so forth. Skeptics and, of course, our opponents conclude on this basis that we started wrongly and that none of this should have been started at all. There is clearly, no changing the minds of the opponents, but I would respond to the skeptics and doubters as follows:

Realists (among whom I consider myself), continually recalling the West's attitude toward Lithuania throughout the 20th century, have primordially believed that only moderate success could be expected. Such a conclusion has been substantiated by our geopolitical position, consideration of the particular features of the international situation, and an analysis of the interests of the West. Specifically, important international events (the political reorientation of East Europe, the impending reunification of Germany, the growing tension in the Near East, the fruitful disarmament negotiations) prevented our affairs from becoming a most important international problem subject to priority solution. Although it was morally on our side and adhered to the doctrine of nonrecognition of the incorporation of the Baltic in the USSR, the West was not interested in harming relations on account of us with the Kremlin and risking the loss of the USSR's support in the solution of priority questions for the West. In addition, many people in the West fear a rapid disintegration of the USSR, believing that this is fraught with various dangers for the rest of the world. It is galling, but on the basis of past experience it has to be affirmed, perhaps, that we are only a means, an instrument in the hands of the great and the strong of this world.

As far as the East is concerned, it is not hard to see taking a sober view of things, that we could not have looked for immediate success. It is immaterial that the law (including the Soviet Constitution), history, and morality are on our side. What is most important is that the Kremlin is opposed to the collapse of the empire and that the interest of the present Soviet leadership is preservation of the integral nature of the Soviet state. True, it has been said repeatedly that the Lithuanian leadership failed to opportunely display the requisite flexibility and subtle diplomacy. I agree that this was the case. But had it been otherwise, would we have progressed further, the Kremlin's interests being different?

And now let us realistically take a look at our international achievements as a whole. I consider the main one the fact that we and our cause are on the international agenda and that many people in the world recognize that our problem is not only a problem of the USSR but also of Europe and the whole civilized world. Consequently, time, patience, and skillful diplomacy are required.

Further, we can rejoice in individual successes. First, the decisions of Iceland and Denmark in respect to Lithuania. Second, the admittance of Lithuania's social democrats to Socialist International. Third, the participation (not full, it is true) in certain international and regional conferences. Fourth, the establishment of news bureaus and interest bureaus in several European countries.

Fifth, the establishment of various ties to leading politicians and public figures of Europe and America.

Nor can our affairs with the East be given an exclusively negative evaluation. Let us consider: In past months we have prepared in earnest for negotiations, formulated a package of draft agreements, chosen our arguments carefully, determined the makeup of the delegations and even introduced the position of special minister for negotiations with the USSR. And, further, at the end of 1990 parliament abandoned a preliminary statement and prior conditions for the start of negotiations.

Thus it is now up to Moscow, which, evidently, is not yet fully "ripe" for negotiations. We, however, soberly evaluating what has gone before, will, I hope, opt for a realistic path and the optimum version of the achievement of full independence of the Republic of Lithuania.

Lithuanian KGB Deputy Interviewed on Vilnius Events

91U10464 Vilnius *RUSPUBLIKA in Lithuania*
24 Jan 91 p 1

[Interview with Col. Edmundas Baltinis, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Branch of the KGB, by journalist Valdas Kvedaris; place and date not given: "A No Win Situation"]

[Text] [Kvedaris] First of all we would like to find out what the Committee's administration and staff think about the tragic events that took place in January in Vilnius.

[Baltinis] What took place is absolutely unacceptable; we oppose such behavior toward peaceful citizens. Any use of force against a democratic process is improper. Such methods are unacceptable and contemptible. After we became aware of the situation and the course of events, we stated that these kinds of tactics would not achieve positive results.

[Kvedaris] Are you collecting documentation regarding these tragic events?

[Baltinis] The Committee was not informed about these events beforehand and was not prepared for them. Therefore we do not have any kind of documentation or video tapes. We have taken statements from several witnesses; we have given some of them to the procurator's office and will forward the rest soon.

[Kvedaris] You have not held an investigation! Isn't that rather strange—like putting one's head in the sand, not wishing to use one's investigative resources? Is this not against regulations?

[Baltinis] The Lithuanian government has forbidden us to conduct any investigations and we have obeyed the instruction. We also cannot call in people because we would then break the Republic's laws.

[Kvedaris] Your position boggles the mind. The net of witnesses keeps getting smaller.

[Baltinis] I think that the committee's bizarre behavior can be attributed to purely political expedients.

[Kvedaris] Did you offer your services to the parliament?

[Baltinis] Unsolicited offers are not valued.

[Kvedaris] Can you confirm the fact that after the tragic events of 13 January, a large number of workers left the security organs?

[Baltinis] Yes, more than 20 left. I understand their position completely. As was formerly stated, not one of them was forced to stay.

[Kvedaris] There is talk that your men are working in buildings commandeered by the military forces and that they are looking for relevant documents. Furthermore, it has been confirmed that security organ employees are working out of the press offices which were stormed by the military and that they plan to return items that disappeared or were confiscated.

[Baltinis] That is not correct. Our employees did not enter the press buildings. The only material we received from the military were papers found in the State Security Department (I want to stress once again that our relations with the military are not close). These papers contained notations that were fuzzy and indistinct; they referred to some repressive conditions. The notes contain surnames, addresses and descriptive information. Collaborator, nomenklatura supporter...

[Kvedaris] Are there many names on the list?

[Baltinis] In the copies submitted to us, there are over three hundred. The listings are hand written; they are not attested to by either signature or seal.

[Kvedaris] Is there any truth to the rumor that Committee Chairman Marcinkus has resigned?

[Baltinis] He has not told us anything about it. We did speak by telephone. He indicated that he is fed up with the leadership. I would not be surprised, if angered by the lack of cooperation on the part of the military with the committee, he might of said that he could not head an agency whose opinions were ignored.

[Kvedaris] You are not only a security officer, but a politician as well. Who, in your opinion, could have ordered the military operations?

[Baltinis] The military is accountable only to its own higher command; there is no way that a civilian organization could have given it orders. The answer to where the orders came from will be obtained only after some clarifications are made. I doubt that the Vilnius garrison chief could have assumed such a responsibility. There remain only two choices—Riga or Moscow. If there were

some early signs of the coming events, the orders could have been given without Moscow's knowledge.

[Kvedaris] Are you saying that a revolution was planned?

[Baltinis] Don't twist my words! I said that it could have happened without Moscow's knowledge. If certain activities were discovered beforehand, that could have created a special situation. For a revolution to occur, certain special situations are required. They did not exist in the republic—the parliament and the government were operating normally. The government changed without any complications. If anyone got it into his head that this was a revolutionary situation, he was stupid and crazy!

[Kvedaris] Have you any comment on the fact that a military person, a KGB officer, was shot in the television tower?

[Baltinis] Was it really a security officer or some worker? Our committee has not received any information on this matter.

Vagnorius Comments on Lithuania's Government, Economic Options

91UN10394 Vilnius LIEUVOS RYTIS in Lithuanian 3 Jan 91 p. 5

[Interview with Gediminas Vagnorius, deputy to the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic, by Ausra Maldeikiene; place and date not given: "There Is No Choice. Only a Market Economy"]

[Text] [Maldeikiene] The year 1990 is coming to an end. What will the future bring?

[Vagnorius] How will we fare? I may be wrong, but for more than a half a year, I have tried to predict what will happen. In my opinion, conditions for rural residents will improve. You see, conditions for predicting the dynamics of market prices for agricultural products are much more favorable now than previously. And how will the rest of us make out? Well, that will depend on whether we choose to strive with all our might to do something positive by the beginning of the year or whether we choose to stay with a passive agricultural policy. All the necessary regulations already have been approved by the parliament; now, we only need to decide whether or not we will put the authorized market prices into practice. In view of the above, if we choose a market economy, the responsible government agencies must get ready within a month or two. If we do not, conditions will worsen. This deterioration, even under the best of conditions, will continue for three or four months and then there will be much unrest among the people.

Therefore, I can see only one path—a market economy. Only a market economy can ensure profitability. And secondly, only a market economy can put order in our economic relations with the USSR and with the West. This is how I am predicting the future: conditions will

improve in the autumn if we take determined measures during the winter and spring. On the other hand, if we do otherwise, the situation will no longer be only a matter of economics.

One of the basic things necessary for this transition to take place is the introduction of our own monetary system. Maybe there even has been too much talk about this matter already, but now it is more relevant than ever because our market system is intertwined with the USSR's decrepit system. It is clear that another country's monetary system would be suitable for us, but, of course, it must be a real system. For example, Germany might accept us into their monetary system.

At this stage, the primary responsibility is no longer with the parliament, but with the governing organs. As early as possible, we are inviting the government to participate in serious discussions and are demanding that it make definitive decisions.

[Maldeikiene] I happened to hear that if the current government resigned, you might be offered the post of prime minister.

[Vagnorius] I previously have stated that if something like that occurred, I would not accept.

[Maldeikiene] Why?

[Vagnorius] I do not mean for my answer to apply only to me. On general principle, I do not think, that at the present time, the prime minister should be an economist. He would not be able to resist the temptation to work for economic reform.

Economic policy must be reformed by economists who are dedicated solely to economic changes. It is physically impossible to be a leader both in political matters and in economic reform.

[Maldeikiene] Do you think that the current ministerial cabinet is capable of carrying out reforms?

[Vagnorius] This cabinet is not capable of carrying out any kind of reforms. I do not mean to insult the health or education ministers or any other ministers individually. I am talking about the full cabinet. So, you see, it is my firm conviction that this cabinet will not make any fundamental reforms. Those who should be spearheading the reforms (primarily, of course, those with economic interests) do not have a flexible attitude toward other kinds of economic systems. Furthermore, the cabinet now should not merely function but should work with initiative, energy and a sense of self-sacrifice. I do not see this happening.

[Maldeikiene] Do you not see a contradiction here? Initiative is demanded from the cabinet; and yet, the parliament is very sensitive about the interference of some political groups in the work of the government. Under such circumstances, is it possible for anyone to take the initiative?

[Vagnorius] Yes, it is. A great deal of attention has been given to the government's lack of initiative. Yet the taking of initiatives in all matters is the primary function of a government. I have not noticed any attempts by the parliament to introduce any initiatives. There were frequent demands for active measures, but not for those suggested by creative economists. For example, we do not support the government's practice of using special resolutions to sell buildings under certain exceptional circumstances. The end result of this practice can lead to corruption.

[Maldeikiene] What kind of cabinet can lead Lithuania out of this dead-end situation? You already mentioned one thing—economics must be separated from politics...

[Vagnorius] They (I am speaking about people with economic interests) must be competent. They must be willing to take the initiative and be interested in other kinds of economic systems. They must represent those political forces which are interested in reform.

[Maldeikiene] Well then, what about the first requirement—the distancing of economics from politics?

[Vagnorius] Of course, economic reorganization may be thought of as politics. But I had in mind a wider concept of politics. Let us say, for example, that some high level personages, instead of holding hearings on agricultural goals, decide to go off on trips unrelated to this urgent work. That, of course, is their personal decision; or it may be said that it is an indicator of their sense of responsibility.

[Maldeikiene] Do you see a great deal of such a lack of responsibility?

[Vagnorius] While the long-term future of the Lithuanian Republic is being decided, some cabinet members are taking trips overseas. What is this, if not a lack of responsibility?

[Maldeikiene] It is said that currently there is a shortage of competent people in Lithuania. If some economist in parliament took it upon himself to carry out reforms, would he find the necessary number of such specialists?

[Vagnorius] Yes, of course. There must be core of people in the cabinet who basically support reform. When they vote, a majority will support the new way. And furthermore, it is my firm conviction that a majority of the government's members must be politicians and represent the Party. The interest, the sense of responsibility, and the discipline created by the Party will enable us to have faith in our success.

[Maldeikiene] Recently an idea was floated about concerning the establishment of an economic reform center. What do you think about this idea?

[Vagnorius] We presented many variations of this idea to the prime minister: From a consultative center of experts to an economic reform committee made up of five

people (which would serve as command brain center). But there was no support because the government...

[Maldeikiene] The statement by the economists within the parliament were circulated rather widely; essentially it opposed your position and proposed its own economic schemes. What do you think of this document?

[Vagnorius] After hearing about that statement, I gave the Devil his due. But all in all, I think my opponents are wrong.

Lithuanian Official on Unconfirmed Rumors, Tension

LD1904193491 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Excerpt] At today's press briefing, Supreme Council representative Audrius Azubalis stated that information is constantly coming from some sources which compels the workers of the country's Defense Department and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to be vigilant.

For example, for several days now reports have been received that preparations are under way to attack banks and objects of the communication system. Such information was received last night, too.

This information has so far not been confirmed and it is not clear, according to Audrius Azubalis, what is the aim of those who spread it. May be the intention is to constantly increase tension or may be the opposite effect is expected. May be, it is expected that, after a few weeks of unconfirmed rumors, tension will decrease and then it will be possible to attack the above-mentioned objects. In any case, we must be vigilant.

Sometimes officials of the country's Defense Department are informed that somebody somewhere is shooting, and when they go to the place of the alleged incident it becomes obvious that nothing has happened. Thus, there are grounds to think that somebody wishes to check how fast the country's Defence Department officials arrive at one or another place, what kind of transportation they use, and so on.

Last night information was received that soldiers were searching in Varcionys for youths of call-up age, but there was no news of anybody being detained or kidnapped.

Audrius Azubalis also told the briefing that the Supreme Council's appeal to officers and soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces and the interior troops stationed on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania has been sent to officials of the Baltic military district.

It was also announced at the briefing that Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis will receive Polish senator Tadeusz Kłopotowski, who has projects

for cooperation between our parliaments and governments. [passage omitted commemorating January events in Vilnius]

RSFSR

RSFSR Deputies' Voting Record Reported

91UN12884 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 15, Apr 91 pp 4-5

[Excerpts of voting records of RSFSR deputies from Moscow and Leningrad (city and oblast) only: "What Russian Deputies Voted For: Some Roll-call Voting Results"]

[Excerpt] Practically all votes taken at the last Congress were roll-call votes. Many of our readers are suggesting that their deputies' voting records be published in local newspapers. Through this distinctive report, voters would be able to compare their positions with the positions of those who vote on behalf of the people. In our opinion, this suggestion merits attention. But in the meantime, we are listing five votes...

1. "Units, services, and personnel of USSR militarized formations are obliged to observe the laws of the RSFSR and not undertake any activities that infringe on the power of the people or the sovereignty of the Russian Federation on the territory of the RSFSR" (Amendment to Paragraph 11 of the Draft Resolution in accordance with B. Yeltsin's report (April 3)—no decision was made. Results: 456 voted for, 417 voted against, 40 abstained, and 133 did not vote.

2. To permit the representative of the striking Kuzbass miners to speak at the Congress (March 29)—a decision was made (a procedural issue). Results: 461 voted for, 327 voted against, 39 abstained, and 135 did not vote.

3. To include on the agenda a paragraph "On the President of the RSFSR" (March 29)—no decision was made. Results: 456 voted for, 447 voted against, 51 abstained, and 108 did not vote.

4. To adopt as a starting point Paragraph 10 of the Resolution in accordance with B. Yeltsin's report—on de-partyization of state institutes and organs of the procuracy, justice, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], KGB, state apparat, state institutions and organizations (April 3)—no decision was made. Results: 444 voted for, 406 voted against, 40 abstained, and 173 did not vote.

5. To adopt as a starting point Paragraph 8 of the Draft Resolution in accordance with B. Yeltsin's report: "Let us propose to the USSR Supreme Soviet, USSR President, and union republic Supreme Soviets that we immediately begin formation of a coalition union government of people's confidence and national harmony (April 3)—no decision was made. Results: 428 voted for, 396 voted against, 57 abstained, and 178 did not vote.

NOTE: The letters signify: F-For, O-Opposed, A-Abstained, B-Absent, N-Did not vote

MOSCOW

Name of Deputy	Vote Number				
	1	2	3	4	5
Solovyev, A.N.	F	O	O	O	O
Ivchenkov, S.S.	B	O	F	B	O
Gololobov, V.A.	F	O	O	F	O
Gurov, A.I.	F	O	O	F	O
Yegorov, A.N.	F	O	O	F	O
Kondrashov, B.P.	F	F	O	F	I
Golovin, A.L.	F	F	B	F	B
Ivanov, M.P.	F	F	F	F	I
Bocharov, M.A.	F	B	B	F	F
Belyayev, A.A.	F	F	F	F	F
Zhuravel, Ye.N.	F	F	F	F	I
Zakharov, M.L.	F	F	F	F	F
Komchatov, V.F.	F	F	F	F	I
Lysenko, V.N.	B	F	F	B	I
Lunin, V.V.	F	F	F	F	I
Oleynik, V.I.	F	F	F	F	F
Travkin, N.I.	F	B	F	F	I
Filatov, S.A.	F	F	F	F	I
Shelov-Kovedyayev, F.V.	B	F	F	F	I
Vorontsov, N.N.	F	F	F	F	F
Medvedev, P.A.	F	F	F	F	F
Aksyuchits, V.V.	F	F	F	F	B
Arutyunov, M.G.	F	F	F	F	O
Astafayev, M.G.	F	F	F	F	B
Zolotukhin, B.A.	F	F	F	F	F
Koryagina, T.I.	B	B	B	B	B
Krasavchenko, S.N.	F	F	F	F	F
Mukusev, V.V.	F	F	F	F	F
Druganov, S.P.	F	F	F	F	B
Kononov, A.L.	F	F	F	F	A
Shabad, A.Ye.	F	F	F	F	F
Sheboldayev, S.B.	F	B	F	F	F
Ambartsumov, Ye.A.	F	F	F	F	I
Bugrimov, A.L.	F	F	F	F	F
Volkov, L.B.	F	F	F	F	B
Zadonskiy, G.I.	F	F	F	F	F
Zaytsev, Yu.V.	F	B	B	F	I
Zyatkov, N.I.	B	F	F	B	I
Kovalev, S.A.	F	F	F	F	I
Kozhokin, Ye.M.	F	F	F	F	I
Kuznetsov, V.M.	F	F	F	F	B
Lysenko, V.A.	F	F	F	F	I
Maley, M.D.	B	F	F	B	B

MOSCOW (Continued)

Name of Deputy	Vote Number				
	1	2	3	4	5
Medvedev, A.N.	F	F	F	F	I
Meshcherskiy, A.M.	F	F	F	B	I
Mironov, V.P.	F	F	F	F	I
Novikov, V.I.	F	B	F	F	I
Poltkovskiy, A.V.	F	F	F	F	F
Ponomarev, L.A.	F	F	F	F	B
Popkov, N.N.	F	F	F	F	I
Poptsov, O.M.	F	B	F	F	F
Rebrikov, V.A.	F	F	F	F	I
Romanenko, V.P.	F	F	F	B	I
Rumyantsev, O.G.	F	F	F	F	I
Smirnov, S.A.	F	F	F	F	I
Starkov, V.A.	F	F	F	B	I
Surkov, A.P.	F	F	F	F	I
Tarasov, A.M.	F	B	F	F	B
Uglanov, A.I.	F	F	F	B	B
Urazhtsev, V.G.	F	F	F	F	F
Chelnokov, M.B.	F	F	F	F	I
Shevnis, V.L.	F	F	F	F	F
Shinkaretskiy, V.I.	F	F	F	F	F
Yushenkov, S.N.	F	F	F	F	F

MOSKOVSKAYA OBLAST

Name of Deputy	Vote Number				
	1	2	3	4	5
Gekht, Yu.G.	O	B	O	O	O
Demidov, A.V.	O	O	O	O	B
Korolev, Yu.V.	O	B	O	O	O
Lapshin, M.I.	O	O	O	O	O
Maltsev, I.M.	O	O	O	O	O
Prilukov, V.M.	O	O	O	O	O
Chibisov, V.I.	O	O	O	O	O
Mikheyev, S.V.	O	O	O	O	O
Cherepanov, I.M.	O	O	O	O	O
Belin, K.M.	B	O	O	B	B
Yegorov, Ye.V.	O	O	O	O	O
Sokolov, A.S.	O	O	O	O	O
Zakharov, V.S.	B	O	O	B	O
Grishin, B.M.	O	O	O	O	O
Gulko, Yu.A.	O	O	O	O	O
Slobodkin, Yu.M.	O	O	O	O	O
Kramkov, V.I.	O	O	O	O	O
Komkov, V.P.	O	B	O	O	O
Bezverkhny, S.F.	O	O	B	O	O

MOSKOVSKAYA OBLAST (Continued)

	Vote Number				
	A	O	O	F	O
Medvedeva, N A	A	O	O	F	O
Bryukhovetskiy, V F	O	B	O	O	O
Prokofyeva, N N	A	O	B	A	B
Guberman, M S	O	B	A	O	O
Kozlov, N D	O	B	O	O	O
Korovnikov, A V	F	F	B	B	O
Surkov, A B	A	B	A	B	O
Kobets, K I	B	B	F	B	B
Kozlova, L V	F	F	F	F	I
Smirnov, Yu A	F	B	F	B	B
Pushkina, T A	F	F	F	F	I
Andropov, S N	F	F	F	F	I
Lukin, V P	F	F	F	B	I
Bondarev, G S	F	F	F	F	B
Veretennikov, G V	F	F	F	F	I
Gorelov, G V	F	F	F	F	I
Dorkin, V I	F	F	F	F	I
Yeskov, Yu A	F	F	F	F	I
Kuzmin, V G	F	F	F	F	I
Linkova, V V	F	F	F	F	I
Tikhomirov, A N	F	F	F	F	I
Yakunin, G P	F	F	F	F	I
Adrov, A N	F	F	F	F	I
Blokhin, A V	F	F	F	F	I
Yeltsin, Yu A	F	F	F	F	I
Ivanilov, Yu P	F	F	F	F	I
Lazarev, V P	F	F	F	F	I
Paramonov, A R	F	F	F	F	I
Khrulev, Yu K	F	F	F	B	I
Shrakhray, S M	F	F	F	F	I
Shustov, S P	F	F	F	F	I

LENINGRAD

Name of Deputy	Vote Number				
	1	2	3	4	5
Serdvukov, V A	O	B	A	B	A
Smirnov, I N	F	A	O	F	B
Aleksandrov, M A	O	B	B	O	A
Yegorshin, V M	F	O	O	F	B
Vasiliev, V Z	F	O	A	F	B
Morozov, V A	A	B	O	F	I
Konstantinov, I V	A	F	F	F	I
Nesterov, Yu M	F	F	F	F	B
Tolstov, M N	A	F	F	O	I

LENINGRAD (Continued)

	Vote Number				
	B	F	F	F	F
Stepashin, S V	B	F	F	F	F
Dmitriyev, M F	F	B	F	B	A
Ryabov, N K	F	F	F	F	F
Bogomolov, G A	F	F	F	F	B
Molostvov, M M	F	F	F	F	B
Salys, M Ye	F	F	F	F	F
Kiselev, M M	B	F	F	F	I
Arzhannikov, N M	B	F	F	F	I
Tolstoy, N A	F	F	F	B	I
Bastilashvili, O V	F	F	F	F	I
Kurkova, B A	F	F	F	F	I
Luchinskiy, Yu M	F	F	F	F	I
Pudovkin, Ye K	F	F	F	F	A
Travnikov, V N	F	F	F	F	B
Dmitriyev, V V	F	F	F	F	I
Zinovyev, V S	F	F	F	F	A
Yugin, V A	F	F	F	F	F
Alekseyev, A A	B	F	F	B	F
Varov, V K	F	F	F	F	B
Gorbachevskiy, N M	F	F	F	F	B
Kucherenko, I M	F	F	F	F	B
Starovoytova, G V	F	F	F	F	B
Filippov, P S	F	F	F	F	I
Formozov, B N	F	F	F	F	F

LENINGRADSKAYA OBLAST

Name of Deputy	Vote Number				
	1	2	3	4	5
Yermakov, V F	O	B	O	O	B
Kokoshnikov, Yu P	O	O	O	O	B
Sokolov, Yu V	O	B	B	O	O
Vorfolomeev, V P	O	O	O	O	O
Kirpichnikov, V A	O	B	O	F	B
Ryabukhin, P P	O	F	O	A	A
Yarov, Yu F	O	F	A	O	O
Gerasimov, V I	B	F	A	B	F
Zanin, Yu S	F	F	F	F	F
Ivanov, I B	F	F	F	F	F
Yakovlev, S D	F	F	F	F	A

[passages omitted]

Interim Information Analysis Group under the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Glasnost, Mass Media, and Ties with Public Organizations: A. Sobyannin, O. Apostolova, S. Morozov, and D. Yuryev.

Western Republics

Political Ambitions of Belorussian Front Assessed

91UN12384 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA
in Russian 30 Mar 91 pp 1, 3

[Correspondent I. Grishan's "notes" from the Second "Adradzhenne" BNF Congress: "They United To Oppose or Whom the New Spiral of Confrontation Benefits"]

[Text] "Thanks be to our opponents for the fact that now everyone in the republic knows about the Belorussian People's Front [BNF]." This was roughly how it was put in a speech at the Second BNF Congress....

Well, truly, we cannot hold our peace now either for the above event evidently merits interpretation. Yes, the Second "Adradzhenne" BNF Congress, which was attended by more than 400 delegates from all oblasts of the republic and also representatives of a number of young political parties (the United Democratic, National Democratic, Peasant and others), was held 23-24 March in the Minsk Thin-Cloth Production Association Palace of Culture. Following the benediction conducted by priests and words of welcome from Belorussian People's Author V. Bykov, the congress opened....

I frankly confess that the day before I was still nurturing certain hopes that the congress would, finally, recognize the need for an end to the spurring of passions, the setting of people against each other and their division into "clean" and "unclean." I thought that the delegates would say: Enough of squabbling and abuse; after all, the people are tired of various political games and the dancing on ideals trampled in the dirt. But the political report (this was what it was called) to the congress delivered by Z. Poznyak and the subsequent debate and the documents which were ultimately adopted shattered my hopes.

I shall quote individual propositions of the report:

"A movement in opposition to the present regime" (that is, the BNF—I.G.) "was formed two years ago in Vilna. But we have not achieved independence and freedom since the communist bureaucracy has hegemony"

"In connection with the low national-cultural and political awareness of the Belorussian people few supporters of the BNF have been elected to the soviets. The conservative majority in the Supreme Soviet, incapable of grasping what is rational, is blocking the enactment of laws whose drafts have been prepared by the People's Front opposition, and it will be necessary to dissolve the Supreme Soviet...."

"The alternative meeting organized by the BNF on 7 November 1990 in Lenin Square in Minsk 'was not only of political but also historical interest,' and the Communists were unable to stage their demonstration" (?!—I.G.).

For the umpteenth time V.I. Lenin was called "the bloody architect of people's extermination," and its Nuernberg awaits the Communist Party of Belorussia-CPSU, in the BNF leader's opinion. Z. Poznyak sees as the main reason why the BNF has not become a mass movement in the republic the low cultural level of the population's consciousness and in this connection he called for study of the experience of the activity of the people's fronts of the Baltics, ultimately observing that communism is "a dreadful, inhuman phenomenon," that it will disappear and "be dispelled like the fog" and so forth.

All this is distressing.... Of course, we could question each of the propositions quoted above or even simply prove its slanderous content. One rarely encounters, today, for instance, a person who knows that communism was not discovered in 1917. This idea has possessed mankind for millennia and will continue to do so as an idea of social justice and internationalism. And that communism is responsible for the Stalin, Khrushchev, and so forth distortions to the same extent as the Christian religion is responsible for the savage medieval inquisition.

It may be said also that the anticommunist orgy in Lenin Square on the day of commemoration of the October anniversary should from the viewpoint of morality be called precisely that, not a great "historical event" (nor, incidentally, did a number of the delegates who addressed the congress agree with Z. Poznyak's evaluation of this action).

We should, finally, defend the name of V.I. Lenin, which is respected throughout the civilized world, and also note that even in purely human terms it is rather lightweight maintaining that the communist people's deputies are people who are not greatly advanced in intellectual development for they are, after all, "incapable of apprehending what is rational."

One could, generally, take exception to the majority of positions set forth in the political report. But the fanatical supporters of the BNF will hardly, evidently, be persuaded to change their minds or, at least, forced to ponder their words and conduct by this. After all, an unbending position is at times, according to Stanislaw Jerzy Lec, a result of paralysis.

But I shall now permit myself to deviate somewhat from a chronological illustration of the course of the BNF congress and shall dwell on its key moments. Delegate Goncharov, who spoke, called for the congress to adopt specific decisions primarily on socioeconomic problems. After all, according to him, people are asking: What have you ordained for an improvement in our life? O. Trusov proposed the formation in the Soym of a strong group of economists. At the same time the congress did not, in my opinion, arrive at a solution of economic questions and was unable to offer a more or less specific plan of the extrication of society from the present state of crisis. One

hears in the program statement adopted in this connection, mainly calls for the establishment of the priority of private ownership, the speediest introduction in circulation on the territory of the republic of its own unit of currency (the Belorussian taler), price liberalization, and so on and so forth. Altogether, the market! Privatization! And not a word about whether things would be better today for the majority of the population on account of this. The appeal "On the Price Increases" adopted by the congress high-handedly observes that all people should unite against the antipopular policy of the partocrats, who wish to solve their problems at the people's expense... (one wonders whose problems the liberalization proposed by the BNF, that is, the establishment of free prices, would help solve).

In his speech Yu. Burutin, a delegate from Minsk, disagreed with the statement heard in the political report to the effect that Marxism-Leninism has already failed and called for canvassing and propaganda among the public for the purpose of enlisting the people's masses at large on the side of the BNF. A. Kurdyukov from Mogilev even quoted Lenin, calling many of the front's actions "tailing," and proposed more purposive work with the youth (the formation of scout troops and so forth). Many of the speakers paid particular attention to the creation of a strong print organ of the BNF and new publications and the centralization of ideological activity.

Yes, it has to be said plainly that at the congress the delegates did not attempt to avoid the sharp corners, openly cited their current problems and proposed ways of solving them. I shall quote some examples.

Ya. Lopatko (Novopolotsk): "The report overstates the political assertiveness of the population. What we have is its apathy, particularly in the provinces.... I met with many people. They asked: Why were you carrying a lynch rope? I believe that the BNF's action on 7 November harmed us."

P. Tarasevich (Minsk): "We are attracting the masses insufficiently."

A. Maldis (Minsk): "The 7 November action was a tactical defeat for us.... What are needed now are specific actions to enhance the Front's authority in the eyes of the public."

Yu. Khodyko (Minsk): "We have insufficient organization and discipline.... The BNF's position must be clear and comprehensible to people. We are required to acquire work experience."

However, it seems to me that the main event at the congress occurred on its first day of business, when, following a debate on the draft statutes of the BNF, two positions were revealed.

The first: The Front should unite all parties formed recently in the republic in order to become a fitting opponent of the Communist Party of Belorussia.

The second: Eliminate the broad People's Front and afford these parties freedom of action.

Only a few delegates to the congress adhered to the latter position, as subsequently became clear at the congress. For instance, the conversion of the BNF into a party and the adoption of a common program were opposed by A. Rimashevskiy. But his was a voice crying in the wilderness. Only the next day did A. Yemelyanov, leader of the National Democratic Party, express himself as follows: "Following the adoption of its statutes, the BNF has become a party, and this is a tilt away from democracy. In addition, there is evidence here of signs of the origins of the virus of a chief and chiefism...."

And, as it appeared to your correspondent, the Belorussian National Democratic Party slogan "Whoever Is Not Against Us Is With Us!" will hardly be taken into consideration by the leaders of the front.

How, though, did the vast majority of speakers justify the need for the BNF to take the young parties "under its wing"?

Let us listen to the delegates.

A. Fedorov (Mogilev): "The times dictate an ordering of the structure of the BNF."

Yu. Khodyko (Minsk): "We need to win support among the people. For this reason we need a strong party. When the young parties strengthen (and this is a matter of time), it will then be possible to transform the BNF also."

A. Konstantinovich (Bobruysk): "It is necessary to create under the auspices of the BNF an organizing center which would specify the goals of the new groups and parties which are taking shape.... Our main opponent is the CPSU."

Ya. Lopatko (Novopolotsk): "In order to be strong, all parties need to unite in the People's Front. We need organization."

I. Bartashevich (Gomel): "An amorphous, unorganized movement will not survive. We need a clear-cut vertical structure.... We must not become a 'debating club.'"

A. Kulik (Polotsk): "It is necessary to work in the BNF, not simply be a supporter," and so forth.

It was unequivocally decided at the congress to remove from the name of the Front the words "for perestroika" for, according to Z. Poznyak, the president of the USSR has abandoned the radical reforming of society and moved toward an alliance with "military reactionaries." Generally, "perestroika is finished," consequently, the BNF does not need this word. The main goal, on the other hand, was declared to be the achievement of Belorussia's state independence and its secession from the Union of SSR. After all, "if we are a sovereign state, there will be no domination of the CPSU," the report observed. "We need to coordinate our actions in order to

show people the needlessness of the signing of the Union treaty, and the leaders of the BNF should travel to the periphery more often, meet with people and persuade them of this," a delegate from Khoyniki insisted.

It has to be mentioned also that at its congress the BNF once again clearly and openly declared that it is an antisocialist, anticommunist movement, which allows the membership of individual Communists (six CPSU members, incidentally, were delegates to this congress), but on condition of their subsequent compulsory resignation from the party.

At a news conference held during a break your correspondent asked Z. Poznyak this specific question:

"What is your attitude toward A. Malofeyev, first secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, and will you cooperate with him and seek a compromise?"

The answer was, on the whole, unequivocal: "We have different positions, and, aside from individual contacts, cooperation with the Communist Party of Belorussia is altogether impossible, it would be amoral since there is no compromising with gangsters."

And the appeal "Attitude of the 'Adradzhenne' BNF Toward Political Parties and Public Organizations" adopted by the congress says: The Communist Party of Belorussia-CPSU...is a total shadow power system. This rules out any possibility of constructive cooperation with it.

To conclude these notes I would like to mention that, first, the congress reflected the manifest aspiration of the BNF to unite in one all forces in opposition to the Communist Party of Belorussia, and although none of their representatives unequivocally stated the parties' direct incorporation in the structure of the People's Front, this does not mean that this merger cannot occur.

Second, there are signs of BNF's organizational structuring in a united party fundamentally opposed to the communists, and socialist ideas in general, with a vertical structure of composition, individual membership, payment of dues, internal discipline, and the formation of its own components in the workforce.

Third, the clearly expressed personal ambitions of the leaders of the BNF and their aspiration to come to power and, having implemented the slogan "Enough of Experiments—It Is Time To Switch to Capitalism," put the Communists on trial.

But could this fanatical confrontational attitude, which, as the congress showed, has spiraled further, bring our people, weary of the multitude of problems, stability and prosperity? Hardly.

Declaration of Moldovan Party Goals Published

91UN13064 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 8 Mar 91 p 1

[Declaration of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee "On the Present Situation"]

[Text] The sociopolitical situation in the republic at present is characterized by an intensification of negative processes and increased confrontation. A parliamentary and governmental crisis is at hand. A linking up of far right forces on positions of anti-Sovietism, anticommunism, and separatism is taking place. Under conditions of a breakdown in existing economic ties, an increase in instability, and the absence of new mechanisms of economic management, the economy continues to result in serious failures. National income is falling, inflation is rising, and the living standard of the people is declining.

Given the severe shortage of daily necessities and food, and the lack of a consumer protection system, control, and accountability, the shadow economy is flourishing, and official and financial abuses are spreading. The republic is being flooded with fence-sitters and profiteers who, taking advantage of the incompetence of a number of state organs and sometimes with the complicity of individual members of the government, are contributing to the drain on national wealth and hurting the republic, its economy, and the people. The inflation of prices and efforts by any means, including illegal, to make excessive profits are leading to a sharp worsening of the economic position of the population and complicating the possibility of resolving critical social problems.

The content of the political struggle is changing abruptly and is increasingly assuming the character of a confrontation of individual groups. One can also see in it the ambitious strivings of certain politicians. Pluralism of opinion and a multiparty system, proclaimed by the party at the beginning of perestroika, are being emasculated and turned into an illusion by the efforts of destructive forces that call themselves democratic. The symptoms of a monopoly of power, diktat, and totalitarianism, thrown off by the will of the people, are returning in a new form. In this situation, in order to cover selfish schemes and distract the public from pressing problems, anticommunist hysteria is being stirred up and attacks are being intensified against the party, which is firmly and consistently defending the interests of the working people.

The Communist Party of Moldova is resolutely against the claims of any forces to play the role of exclusive spokesman of patriotism and the idea of the sovereignty of the republic. The Communist Party has expressed its position on these questions more than once, and it remains unchanged today. The attempts of the leaders of the People's Front and other extreme right forces to appear in the role of sole spokesman of the aspirations and hopes of the Moldavian people are without any

grounds whatsoever and lead only to a further aggravation of interethnic and social confrontation, an increase in separatist aspirations, and threaten the territorial integrity of the republic.

A new factor which substantially aggravated the already complicated situation in the republic was the decision of the republic parliament calling for refraining from conducting a national referendum in the Moldovan SSR on the question of the need to preserve the Union in a new and revived form.

At the same time it should be recognized that the USSR Supreme Soviet approved the decision to conduct a referendum without taking into account the real sociopolitical situation in the republics and without a clear plan for renewing the Union.

At this critical historical juncture, when the price of wrong decisions increases many times over, and when the very fate of the people is being decided, in maintaining its fidelity to the position of the republic party conference, the Moldovan CP Central Committee believes:

1. The deep crisis in the economy, politics, and all spheres of society is rooted not only in the vices of the past but also in the miscalculations of the present. The republic has run into a critical shortage of competence, political will, and political culture.

The weak shoots of democratization are degenerating into diktat and permissiveness; humanism, into an orgy of the shadow economy and crime; and glasnost, into the exchange of one information monopoly for another. Repoliticization is taking place under the guise of depoliticization. There is a slipping toward a new authoritarianism, pluralism is being transformed into diktat, and there is an effort to push to the side of the road those political forces that are sober-minded but politically objectionable.

In this situation, the Moldovan CP Central Committee supports the efforts of the deputies in parliament who uphold a position of realism aimed at the normalization of the situation in the republic and the approved decision on the transfer of executive authority to the president of the Moldovan SSR. We believe that the formation of a coalition government of national conciliation can now make a contribution to getting out of the crisis.

2. Remaining devoted to the political position worked out at the republic party conference that the right of final decision on the necessity for preserving a Union of sovereign republics rests only with the people themselves by way of referendum, the Moldovan CP Central Committee at the same time declares that it is not functioning as the organizer of this referendum, and rejects accusations that some party committees have assumed functions of its conduct. We are convinced that the republic parliament will return to the question of the conduct of a referendum, and that all the people of Moldova will have the opportunity to make their fateful choice. We assert once again that the Communist Party of Moldova

was and will be for the sovereignty of the republic on the basis of the declaration adopted by the parliament of the Moldovan SSR.

3. Without civic peace and interethnic harmony, the republic does not have a fitting future. At this historically crucial moment there is nothing more noble and humane for the members of parliament, leaders of political parties and movements, and all people of goodwill than the search for ways to achieve civic consensus. Therefore, we are for the creation of a bloc of left-centrist forces, parties, movements, and organizations that base themselves on the principles of political realism and civic harmony.

The preservation of the territorial integrity of the republic is of vital interest to every citizen. Getting rid of everything that disunites us, we must achieve interethnic harmony on the basis of the draft Civic Consensus submitted by the Communist Party Central Committee to the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Moldovan CP Central Committee calls on all sound political forces and movements in this extremely difficult sociopolitical situation not to submit to premature and superficial judgments, decisions, and actions, and to be imbued with civic responsibility for the preservation of the integrity of Moldova, the unity of its people, and peace and harmony in our land. Only the people themselves have a right to decide the fate of the people on the basis of the wishes of each of us.

Moldovan Party Members Respond to Opinion Poll

9JUN12684 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 16 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by A. Zavtur, director of the Institute for Sociopolitical Studies and corresponding member of the Moldovan SSR Academy of Sciences, and G. Entelis, institute sector chief and professor: "Communists Evaluate the Situation"]

[Text] The Communist Party of Moldova is operating in a complex, truly dramatic situation. While gradually transforming into a qualitatively new democratic sociopolitical organization, it is nevertheless subject to vicious attacks. Anticomunism sentiments are being promoted even by persons who occupy leading state positions, and by individual parliamentarians. The policy of the Moldovan Communist Party, which is directed at achieving national accord and civil consensus, is being perceived in various ways. The Moldovan CP Central Committee's line toward stabilizing the situation and resolving any questions by peaceful political methods, as well as its constructive contribution to the development and realization of the concept of social well-being, are often doubted and refuted.

The Moldovan Communist Party clearly defined its political position at the republic conference. As it is perceived by the republic's Communists, to what degree

does it correspond to the realities of the present day? The sociological study conducted in February of this year in the city of Kishinev and in five rayons of the republic should have given the answers to these and other questions. Altogether, over 800 Communists were surveyed. Of these, 36.7 percent had held party membership for 10 years, 23.9 percent for 11-15 years, 21.2 percent for 16-25 years, and 18.3 percent for 26 or more years. Every second person surveyed was a Moldavian.

Our questionnaire was also published in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA. In a short time, 658 persons completed it and sent it to the editors. Of these, 642 were members of the CPSU and 16 were nonparty members. Over 70 percent of those who sent in the questionnaires were Communists who had held party membership for over 26 years. Their opinion is particularly important to us. For the sake of brevity, we will refer to this group of respondents as the "newspaper readers".

The materials of the last republic party conference evoked serious interest among the republic's Communists. It is true, not more than 38 percent of the survey participants were sufficiently familiar with them. Every second respondent had read only some of the materials, while every tenth respondent (10 percent) had not had time to familiarize himself with them. As we can see, the clarification of the conference materials and the basic ideas of the Moldovan Communist Party's course remains a current task. Among the SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA readers, around 72 percent have a good knowledge of the conference materials.

How do the Communists evaluate today's complex sociopolitical situation in Moldova? Slightly over 12 percent of those surveyed believe that a normal process of activation of political life is going on in the republic, although with some overlap. However, this is natural for the initial stage of democratization of society.

Most of the Communists (65.6 percent), regardless of their nationality and occupation, believe that Moldova is in a state of serious political crisis which has been coming to a head for a long time, and if measures are not taken the situation may become unpredictable. Among the newspaper readers, 79 percent hold such a viewpoint. It is true, there is also a part of the Communists (16.3 percent) who believe that the political processes are already out of control, and that the republic is unmanageable.

In the opinion of over 24 percent of those surveyed, the Moldovan Communist Party is implementing an independent, realistic, and well-planned policy. Approximately 23 percent believe that it is constantly making concessions to the "separatist forces", and over 26 percent believe that it is guided by the "nationalistically oriented forces". However, this is not all. Over 12 percent of those surveyed noted that the Moldovan Communist Party implements the center's policy, and around 15 percent did not respond to the question.

Around 30 percent of the survey participants (and among the newspaper readers—53 percent) believe that the political position of the Moldovan Communist Party approved by the conference represents the program of their activity as Communists. Another 47 percent believe it to be such only to a certain degree. Yes, the process of democratization has gripped the party and a large part of the Communists. And of course, we need great endurance, will, and conviction in the correctness of our ideas in order to withstand the attacks of the angered pseudo-democrats and the separatist and nationalist elements. The deep-seated interest of the Communists in stabilizing the situation and preserving the integrity of a sovereign Moldova must be combined with constructive labor. Only along the path of building is renovation possible. At the same time, we must change the forms of activity of the party organs and the methods of political work among the masses, and gradually win the trust of the people. Today, unfortunately, we have not been able to propose serious constructive ideas for solving the most acute problems of social protection of the people.

Such important documents as "On the fund for social support of the Communists", and "In defense of the honor and dignity of Communists" were first adopted at the conference. Over 25 percent of those surveyed believe that the basic ideas of these documents, once realized, will be able to provide a real guarantee of social support and protection of the honor and dignity of Communists. Every second respondent was unsure of this. The party's capacity to protect Communists is becoming more and more current. The concern about social support of Communists is also becoming an important direction of the activity of party gorkoms and raykoms, as well as primary party organizations.

The problem of retaining the stability of party organizations worries everyone. In connection with this, the responses of Communists to the question, "Has your attitude toward party membership changed since the conference?", are of particular interest (given below in percent).

Variants	Throughout entire area	city of Kishinev	rayons of Pravoberezhye (right bank)	rayons of Levoberezhye (left bank)
I am a party member and intend to remain such	72.2	75	65.7	78.8
I intend to leave the CPSU	6.7	7	7.4	4.5
I would like to join another party	1.2	0.6	2.4	0.7

Thus, over 72 percent of the Communists surveyed declared their firm resoluteness to remain within the CPSU. This testified to the outlined positive shifts in the sentiments of the Communists. Part of those surveyed did not answer the question. Evidently, they have not yet determined their attitude toward party membership. Their continued membership within the ranks of the CPSU is tied with the development of the sociopolitical situation in the Moldovan SSR, with the political activity of the Moldovan Communist Party, as well as with the work of the party committees.

After adoption of the Decree on Power, under the conditions of formulation of the multiparty system, the party press and party committees at various levels have often raised the question of the Moldovan Communist Party's organizational structure. We would also like to know what party structure the Communists prefer. It turned out that 53.9 percent of them favored the industrial structure (work in the labor collective), while 9.3 percent favored the territorial (at place of residence). Around 27 percent spoke out in favor of combining the industrial and territorial structures.

In our opinion, many have not yet understood that under the new conditions, when the struggle for electoral votes is becoming one of the party's primary tasks, the creation of territorial party structures could really facilitate the success of the party in elections to the local soviets. The Moldovan Communist Party stands on positions of political realism and civil accord. It is capable of aiding in constructive cooperation of various political forces interested in the democratic renewal of the republic who speak out against national totalitarianism and separatism. It is capable of actively aiding in the transition from a totalitarian society to a civil, all-encompassing process of denationalization and transition of multi-variant ownership.

It is capable of actively participating in the rebirth of the people of Moldova.

Moldovan Opinion Poll on Republic Leadership Evaluated

91UN12694 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 21 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Professor G. Yentelis, sector chief at the Institute of Sociopolitical Studies: "Do the Deputies Justify Our Expectations? (Based on the Results of a Public Opinion Survey)"]

[Text] As we know, society must continually be examining itself, especially in crisis situations. Express-surveys facilitate this to a certain degree. Last year, in 1990, the republic's organs of state power did not succeed in implementing any radical changes which might ease the food problem or aid in the struggle against corruption, in bringing about order and resolving the questions of national-state organization, in resolving conflicts on national grounds, etc. The authority of the local organs of management continued to decline, and

the attitude toward the deputies of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet and the local soviets is synonymous and largely negative. Yet quite recently we were convinced that the soviets would take power into their own democratic hands, and that local affairs would begin to improve.

The USSR law "On general principles of local self-government and local economic management in the USSR" defined the local Soviets of People's Deputies as being the basic link in the system of local self-government. On their territory, the soviets coordinate the activity of the entire system of local self-government and ensure the normal life of the population. How effective are they in performing this task?

We have before us a report by the Moldovan SSR State Department on the statistics of the republic's socioeconomic development in 1990. It testifies to the continued decline in the scope of social production, a decline in its effectiveness, a disruption of economic relations, and deterioration of labor and contractual discipline. As compared with the preceding year, the produced national income declined by 6.6 percent, while the productivity of social labor declined by six percent. The ecological situation, the increased crime rate, etc. evoke the serious concern of society.

We will not delve into a detailed analysis of all the reasons which have led up to this outcome. We will only deal with an examination of certain results of the express-survey conducted in December of last year in five of the republic's rayons. This survey dealt with the operational effectiveness of a number of institutes of power. Altogether, around 1,000 people were surveyed. The breakdown of those surveyed by occupation was: Workers in industry, construction, transport, sovkhoses and kolkhoses—47.4 percent. Specialists in the national economy—20.2 percent. Workers in the sphere of services, white collar workers, and others—32.4 percent. By nationality: Moldavians—71.4 percent, Russians—11.4 percent, Ukrainians—14.5 percent, Gagauz and Bulgarians—2.4 percent. By age: Under 29 years of age—30.5 percent; 30-49 years of age—58.7 percent; 50 years or older—10.8 percent.

We must remember that the express-survey is not that representative, because the comparison of the obtained data allows us to draw certain conclusions about the judgements of only a certain portion of the population. We should not rigidly and synonymously fix a certain opinion with a certain social group. We must understand [these opinions] only in the plane in which they were expressed by those surveyed. And one more preliminary comment. As we know, mass consciousness is by its nature pluralistic. Various interests of social communities and their interrelations which are reflected in the mass consciousness also define the various tendencies in its change. Today it is extremely excited and unstable. The public concentrates its attention primarily on the material conditions of its existence. People perceive with particular acuteness such important problems of social

life as national and ecological problems, social protection, etc. There is a notable predominance of a high degree of dissatisfaction and criticism, often reaching the point of fault-finding, as well as low political culture.

All this is so. At the same time, the mass consciousness is becoming unfettered. People are beginning to more freely express what they are really thinking, at the same time achieving a sense of their own dignity. There is also a re-evaluation of social values. All this is reflected to one degree or another in public opinion surveys.

We wanted to determine how fully informed the persons surveyed were about the activity of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet and the rayon and rural soviets. Around 14 percent believed that they were quite fully informed about the work of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, and another 31 percent were generally informed. As for the activity of the rayon soviet, only 12.7 percent have a sufficient knowledge of what it does, while another 40 percent have a general knowledge. Around 19 percent are fully informed about the work of the rural soviet, and another 20 percent are generally informed. About seven to eight percent noted that they are not interested in the activity of the soviets, while one out of ten respondents did not answer the question.

The main sources of information on the work of the soviets are primarily the newspapers (63 percent), and the local radio (32 percent). Around nine percent indicated that their source of information was meetings with soviet leaders, while seven percent of those surveyed stated that they received their information by associating with the deputies.

How well do those surveyed know "their" elected officials? 38.5 percent (in Ungenskiy rayon—22.4 percent) know their Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet deputy, and have met with him. Around 15 percent know him only by sight, while 22 percent—only by name. 24.6 percent (in Ungenskiy rayon—44.3 percent) do not know him at all. As strange as this may seem, about the same distribution of opinions was found also in relation to the rayon soviet deputies. However, every second person surveyed indicated that he is well acquainted with and knows the deputy of the rural soviet. As for meetings with the deputies, approximately 63 percent of those surveyed confirmed that they had not had a single meeting with the deputy of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet or the rayon soviet since the elections. Forty-four percent indicated that they had not had any meetings with the rural soviet deputy. Only 12-20 percent had met two or more times with their elected officials.

How often had those surveyed appealed to the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet deputies on some questions, and what was the result of these appeals?

Around 83 percent had no appeals at all. Up to five percent noted that their questions and appeals were resolved quickly and positively, while about 11 percent stressed the fruitlessness of their appeals to the deputies.

Up to 67 percent of those surveyed had never appealed to the local soviet for help. Around 13 percent were pleased with how their questions had been resolved, and around 20 percent indicated that their appeals to the local soviet were unsuccessful.

The overwhelming majority of those surveyed gave an unsatisfactory evaluation of the rayon soviet's activity in terms of organizing provision of industrial goods and food products (75-85 percent), resolving such important questions as housing, public health, education and culture (up to 55 percent), maintaining law and order, and solving ecological problems (57-55 percent).

As it turned out, those surveyed had a rather low evaluation of their deputies' activity.

Evaluation of deputies' activity	MISSR Supreme Soviet	Rayon soviet	Rural soviet
Quite high	6.5	4.3	8.0
Satisfactory	19.4	18.9	20.4
Not quite satisfactory	13.9	15.8	11.5
Unsatisfactory	32.4	28.6	24.4
Declined to say	29.4	22.7	18.9

Thus, practically every fourth respondent gave a satisfactory evaluation of the deputies' activity. The number of unsatisfactory evaluations was somewhat higher. Many (up to 30 percent) declined to answer the question altogether.

Disappointment in the deputies' activity was evidenced also in the reaction of those surveyed to the following question: "If the elections were being held today, would you vote for your current deputy again?" The responses were distributed as follows:

	MISSR Supreme Soviet	Rayon soviet	Rural soviet
Yes, definitely	16.1	18.3	24.4
No, I would not vote for him	47.9	48	37.1
Declined to say	28.1	29.8	20.3

Thus, we may conclude that the limit of trust toward a number of deputies is almost exhausted. And only real and effective actions toward easing the life of the people can change this situation.

As we know, transition from totalitarianism to democracy requires the presence of effective power which rests on law, enjoys the authority of the citizens, and takes into consideration the traditions and character of the people. Many years ago, the Russian philosopher Nikolay Berdyayev wrote that democracy is often understood inside-out, and not placed in dependence on the internal capacity for self-government and on the character of the people and the individual. According to

Berdyayev, the transition to true self-government depends "on the quality of the human material, on the capacity for self-government in all of us...". "The crowd, the masses, are not democracy," affirmed the philosopher. "Democracy is already the transformation of a chaotic quantity into a certain self-disciplined quality".

Before our very eyes, the soviets (and their ispolkoms) of all levels are spending more time playing politics and less time solving specific problems in the territories under their authority. How can we explain all this? Perhaps the soviets have already exhausted themselves and are incapable of acting effectively? Or perhaps they are not given the opportunity to solve problems? If this is so, then what is holding them back? All these and a number of other no less important questions require specific answers. Instead of this, in the framework of the non-classical "triangle" (republic president—Supreme Soviet—government) we have not yet even been able to clearly define the authority and function of each power. This reflects to a significant degree on the activity of the local soviets.

In our life today there is much desperation and hopelessness. People are not hearing or understanding each other. We gave our survey respondents a chance to express their opinions about the prevailing attitudes of the people close to them. Over 34 percent pointed out the growing conviction that there may be less democracy, as long as there is more order. Order, but not violence. Around 31 percent noted fear of the future and insecurity about tomorrow, while 27 percent said they were tired of the long drawn-out opposition, discussions and debates. What are the people hoping for? Up to 27 percent of those surveyed believe that life will become easier in the next two to three years, while 16.5 percent believe that improvement will come no sooner than in five years or more. Approximately 36 percent believe that things will get even worse. As we can see, the limit of optimism has not yet been exhausted. We will hope that the political passions in the republic will at least partially subside, and that the deputy corps will regain the trust of the people.

Caucasus

Armenian Nationalists Kill MVD Officer

91UN13734 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 23 Apr 91 First Edition p 4

[Report by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA special correspondents Zh. Kasyanenko and V. Kondakov, Rostov Oblast: "Revenge for a Good Deed. Nationalist Gunmen Have Committed an Act of Terrorism in Russia"]

[Text] A burst of automatic fire shattered the morning silence the day after Easter throwing all of Rostov, with its population of 1.5 million, into a panic; it was not just anybody who had been killed but the deputy chief of the Internal Troops Directorate of the USSR Ministry of

Internal Affairs [MVD]. And he was killed not underhandedly but almost as a demonstration—right there in the center of the city, cruelly, for all to see.

The chief of the oblast militia, Colonel M. Fetisov, got on the telephone without delay trying to dispel the dreadful rumors that were disturbing people. He promised on his oath: The murderers would not get away with this. Although at that time he probably did not really believe he would be successful any time soon, for in the opinion of criminologists, the crime was absolutely professional.

Judging from everything, it had to have been carefully prepared down to the last detail. For several days the criminals conducted observations on two panel high-rise buildings built on a corner in which the families of officers of the internal troops lived. They took note of who left at what time to go on duty, and when they returned. They estimated the time when there would be no people in the area.

They decided that 0740 would be zero hour when, according to the information gathered from the observations, the area was usually empty. That morning, however, a young boy who went to school during the second session took a dog out for a walk. At the corner of the building he noticed two stocky dark-complexioned young men, but paid no attention: They may have been waiting for anyone. What happened next reminded the schoolboy of gunmen from the Wild West: One of the young men approached the vehicle Colonel Blakhotin had just entered to go off to his duties and, stealthily pulling out an automatic weapon, began shooting at the officer at point-blank range. He fired a long burst of 16 rounds. At the 17th the weapon jammed. The criminal rushed to a car parked not far away and took off at high speed.

Investigators were at the scene of the crime within minutes. All patrols and duty personnel were immediately notified. The alarm roused personnel of the militia, state security, and the internal troops.

The operations headquarters set up by the leaders of the law enforcement agencies in the oblast operated around the clock, sorting out one scenario after another. The work was hampered by the fact that the motive for the crime was totally incomprehensible for Col. Blakhotin served as chief of internal troops in the rear for the North Caucasus and Transcaucasus. That is, he was the main economic planner. According to those who served with him, he was a man with a high sense of his military duty who under no circumstances would sully the honor of an officer or bargain with his conscience. Under conditions of the acute shortages affecting the army, the colonel did everything one could think of—and what one could not—to insure uninterrupted supplies of food and provide housing for the soldiers in the mottled berets who stood as a living border between the belligerents in the

hot spots of the Transcaucasus. Blakhotin considered it the duty of an officer and citizen to help the defenseless and unfortunate: A bowl of soldier's porridge and a hunk of rye bread were always ready for those who were hungry or persecuted, whether they were Armenians or Azeris, Georgians or Ossetians. And you do not refuse the helping hand, you do not kill your rescuer. Then who had shot the colonel, and why?

The honeycomb of barriers around Rostov was so dense that on the day after the funeral, the fourth day after the murder, the catch was made.

The investigation is looking into all aspects of this brutal case. But already the chain of indisputable facts makes it possible to assert that what we are dealing with here is not some primitive criminal act. What we are dealing with is a preplanned act of terrorism by nationalist gunmen—a political murder.

All those directly involved in the crime and their accomplices are persons of Armenian nationality. Many of them were born in and have lived in Nagorno-Karabakh. They are saying that before they traveled to Rostov they received detailed instructions in Yerevan. At one time a congress of the national Armenian army of Nagorno-Karabakh pronounced the death sentence on a number of internal troops officers who had served in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. That very army is an illegal, anticonstitutional formation, all the more so since it has no legal right to replace the judicial organs or pronounce sentences. And it is doubly, triply criminal to pronounce the death sentence on servicemen who come to the aid of the peoples living in the NKAO and in no way transgress existing laws.

Those directly involved in the act of terrorism arrived in Rostov in mid-March with travel documents issued by the Amaras philanthropic society. The stamps and signatures were all genuine. One thing is unclear: What was the mission of the philanthropic society in sending the young men to Rostov? Murder? But the Amaras motto is "God our light and our salvation." And indeed the society's aims are laudable: "To help those in dire need, orphans, large families, the disabled, and the population." However, instead of help for orphans the emissaries from Amaras made orphans of Blakhotin's children. Instead of good, they created a cruel tragedy. And at the very least, the slogan printed in the criminals' identity cards "To act in every way possible to carry out the noble mission" causes bewilderment. Behind this blasphemous and pharisaical statement stand the signatures of not just anyone, but the USSR people's deputies from Nagorno-Karabakh and people's deputies of Armenia.

There is more. When the criminals were arrested an entire arsenal was discovered. In addition to a Czechoslovak Scorpion automatic, a rifle with a telescopic sight, a sawed-off weapon, a grenade, and a multitude of ammunition were seized. Those who traveled to Rostov had been furnished with counterfeit documents for any

contingency as well as Japanese cameras and video-recording gear to observe potential victims.

We are quite ready to allow that by using the Amaras society as a "cover" for the terrorists, the organizers of the Rostov murder have cast suspicion on the philanthropic society and on the very idea of helping the unfortunate inhabitants of Karabakh. Whether this is so has not yet been answered.

The anonymous organizers of the act of terrorism chose as the blind tools of their will young men who, as they themselves recall, were just drifters. The subject of moral qualities can be spoken of only by a great stretch. Only one of them was working—a driver in that same Amaras. The others were either on cooperative lists or were leading a free and easy way of life. They were quite ready for any kind of carousing. They did not shun drugs. When they were sent to Rostov "for the business" they "charged themselves up" quite well so it would not be so terrible to kill.

However, they were also using another drug—an inner drug. What we have in mind is frenzied nationalism that darkened their consciousness, instilling a belief in their own exclusivity and ability to act with impunity and with a birthright to despise and judge foreigners. Intoxicated by the drug of nationalism they lost all concept of reality and, for example, truly believed that all the Armenians living in Rostov would consider it an honor to help them in their bloody deed.

We made a special trip to Myasnikovskiy Rayon in order to understand the mood of the Armenians living on the Don. It is wonderful to look at their fine and beautiful villages and on the well-groomed fields that under labor-loving hands give the highest yields of grain and vegetables in the oblast. Kolkhoz chairmen A.G. Tskhayan and M.Kh. Ekizyan, who enjoy the highest of esteem in the oblast, expressed the opinion of the farmers quite explicitly: "We are decisively against terrorism. We have no need of self-styled intercessors or teachers; we have minds of our own. Our forefathers have lived for two centuries in a state of good-neighborliness with the Kazakhs, and we do not consider ourselves different." The first secretary of the party rayon committee, G.M. Dagldyan, and the chairman of the rayon executive committee, T.M. Puchenkova (an Armenian woman by nationality), painted for us a far from conflict-free picture of development in the rayon and of the interethnic relations in it. But there was not even a hint of confrontation or mistrust in our conversation. When an emissary from the Transcaucasus turned up in the rayon, the local Armenians showed him the door: "Our motherland is here and we have no quarrel with our neighbors."

Meanwhile, those who sponsored the act of terrorism had a secret purpose, namely, to sow the seeds of national dissension on the Don. And it would not have discountenanced them at all if after the bloody provocation, the Armenians of Rostov had perhaps had to deal

with the general outrage of the population. This was exactly what they were counting on: Well, they would say, let the Armenians on the Don find themselves in trouble; against their will they will look to the nationalists. This is why it is so important in today's tense situation to show wisdom and keep unbridled passions in check. Someone would very much like to turn the Don into a Russian Karabakh.

Many of the people of Rostov, however, are today asking alarming questions: How was it possible for so dreadful a crime to be committed in their city? And level-headed thinking leads on to this thought: We ourselves have opened the doors to misfortune. Side by side in Karabakh a war has been going on for a year. The flames are raging in South Ossetia... Essentially the Don is in the frontline area. By reviving its heroic past it could become the new Army of the Don, defending Rus against incursions. But on the southern outpost of the Russian land (we do not fear to say this) complacency and lack of concern—unforgivable for the Kazakhs—reign.

...Two young women of Rostov plying the world's oldest profession spent their days and nights hanging out around their Transcaucasian admirers but did not get underfoot. They saw the dreadful preparations but remained silent, as if they did not understand where things were going. Even when the murder had been done these young women hurried off, not to the militia but to a telephone booth—to report to Transcaucasia what had occurred.

"Such recreants should be publicly thrashed in the square according to old Kazakh custom." This was the outraged proposal from workers at one plant in Rostov. Suddenly, one can say nothing. The beautiful city must be cleansed of the considerable layer of criminal scum, not after the thunderclap but before.

Or take this subject. In Rostov you cannot get into even the worst hotel without a reservation. And the terrorists stayed in the best, the most expensive—the "Inturist." They reserved several rooms, and others stayed in them. There were mobs, orgies held, and... No bother!

It is not just in Rostov, however, that one encounters this! Everywhere the lack of order and discipline in these present, extremely alarming times results in terrible and tragic consequences.

It turns out that the shooting in Rostov may not have rung out if a thousand kilometers away, up in Kaliningrad on the Baltic, the judges had done their job conscientiously. Early last year one of the terrorists—let us call him B—made an attempt on the lives of three persons. It was only a misfire that saved them from death. When he was arrested a Makarov pistol was taken from the bandit along with two radio sets and a cylinder of gas. The court in one of the rayons of Kaliningrad sentenced the criminal to three years six months in prison. However, in May the oblast court collegium for criminal cases found the sentence too harsh. Well, they said, B has an exceptionally good work record (he had not worked for a long time) and is exemplary in his domestic life (although he

was an unrestrained drunk). The collegium considered that the court had acted without justification in rejecting the appeal from the oblast committee trade union for local industry workers in the NKAO asking for a suspended sentence and reeducation for B. The collegium decided to release the criminal from custody immediately.

The procurator of Kaliningrad Oblast lodged a protest, pointing out that B had nothing at all to do with the collective of the obkom trade union that had taken him on for "reeducation." And in August the collegium for criminal cases issued its ruling: The case should be closed because of...the death of B in a flying accident. The basis for this was a statement by relatives with a death certificate issued by the Stepanakert civil registry office attached.

This was eight months before the tragedy in Rostov.

During questioning the disheartened perpetrator of the murder admitted that a mistake had been made, that the bullets had been intended for someone else. We suggest that the bandits had been led on by their predilection for drugs.

Does this mean that the nationalist gunmen will try to "correct the mistake"? Will there be more gangs of terrorists on the Don to carry out the rest of the sentences?...

Now you can judge for yourselves if it is quiet on the quiet Don.

Leader on Armenian Republican Party's Creation, Goals

91US04601 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 5,
Jan 91 p 8

[Report on interview with Ashot Navasardyan, leader of the Armenian Republican Party, by SOYUZ correspondent Vigen Sarkisyan in Yerevan; date not given: "The Republican"]

[Text] *Ashot Navasardyan, 40 years old, leader of the Armenian Republican Party. A people's deputy of the republic and member of the standing parliamentary commission for the establishment of independent statehood and national policy*

Navasardyan is a man with a dramatic story. He told me as we were introduced: "I have a sparse biography—I have spent 12 years out of my 40 in prisons and camps." In 1967 he joined the clandestine National United Party. Two years later he was given a two-year sentence for "the formation of an anti-Soviet organization and anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation." He makes no secret of the fact that, as a personality, he was largely shaped under the influence of fellow thinkers in prisons and camps on the territory of Mordovia and Perm Oblast. "The world was divided for me into the 'large zone [the Soviet Union] and the small zone [his own camp]." On a

second occasion he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment and two years exile. The implacable fighter of the national liberation movement was arrested and sentenced on a third occasion also. In 1987 he was amnestied. Last December he was fully rehabilitated.

Despite his outward composure, he is emotional and defends his position passionately. He does not recognize a half-baked approach and meekness or the union treaty, although he urges the development of horizontal relations between the republics.

Almost 18 months ago, in the period of the protracted crisis in the region, when the political confrontation had spontaneously grown into an open armed conflict, an "independence army" was formed within the Union for National Self-Determination (SNS). The supporters of the SNS considered it their duty not only to fight for Armenia's independence by ideological methods but also to defend the integrity of its borders weapon in hand. Fortunately, this need shortly disappeared. A time of agonizing recognition of what had gone before began. For some people the reference point was February 1988, for Ashot and his associates, the mid-1960's. It came to be understood in time that it is not always prudent to seek changes by mass meetings, demonstrations, and marches alone. The masses do, indeed, have a power of destruction, but creative power may be imparted to them by actual ideas. Last April Navasardyan announced the creation of a new party. Why Republican?

[Navasardyan] We believe that republicans are national radicals. It could have been called something else: simply the Radical Party, but the aspiration to the Republic of Armenia predetermined the issue. The question arises: Why did we not join the traditional national parties (he refers to the three emigre Armenian parties—author)? The Dashnaks, for example, have a history going back more than 100 years. It will perhaps sound subjective, but I believe that their programs do not fully correspond to national hopes and aspirations. In addition, the social part of their program was not realized, after all, the first Armenian Republic lasted just two years—from 1918 to 1920. We have no intention of making good these omissions. I say this for the added reason that a tendency to create a new party and movement on the mistakes and miscalculations of one's opponents is showing through clearly in Armenia. There is with us a tremendous aspiration to our sources and roots and to the natural development of the nation according to its age-old wise traditions, under no circumstances excluding the experience of world civilization. But we do not support a mechanical transplanting of the experience of developed countries and cannot infinitely and with impunity engage in random cross-breeding experiments. We have engaged diligently in this the whole 70 years and have arrived at the most complete collapse of a vast country. "Republicans recognize all forms of ownership—this is the very foundation of their program. It seemed to me that when it came to the rules everything was far simpler. No one has disaffirmed an improvement in analogous documents of other parties, and the experience of the

National United Party has been taken into consideration. The Republican Party generally is to some extent a legalized National United Party, but under conditions of political liberties now. True, many people have yet to rid themselves of an "underground" mentality. There are among Navasardyan's supporters many former political prisoners who even recently could not imagine that a time of abrupt changes would come this century.

[Sarkisyan] But an army has become a party?

[Navasardyan] Yes, the new structure was not to everyone's liking. The Republican Party has only 500 members. We are frequently going to the neighborhoods and meeting with people. The man with a gun should voluntarily become a part of the corresponding state structure. Parliament's decision is the law for all. The times of gun ideology are past.

In our party, as we are accustomed to saying, there are representatives of all strata of the population. It is something else that troubles me. The intelligentsia has proven to be out of the game, as it were. But on whose wishes? It itself has chosen this role for itself. It is easiest to be in opposition, engaging in carping criticism and doing nothing. But it is a pity, a great pity.

[Sarkisyan] Whatever the case in other respects, we have no shortage of parties and movements. Whether this is good or bad, I do not know. I am troubled by the low standard of political dialogue and struggle. We have rightly abandoned our past heritage, but have as yet discovered nothing new in exchange.

[Navasardyan] We have many public, not political, organizations. Some are involved in questions of language, others, in philanthropy, but they should not be confused with parties.

It seems to me that in a couple of years there will be seven or eight parties in Armenia, "large and small," and there is nothing surprising here. Parties will "come and go" until the political palette is saturated.

I share your opinion that the standard of political struggle with us is not at the proper level, and how could it be? But I am more worried by something else. Mafia circles, fostered, I profoundly believe, by the former rulers, have now found themselves without their customary party cover.

So we are receiving highly "tempting" proposals from the powerful of this world and "leaders" of the erstwhile shadow economy. They are offering strong financial support. It is not a question of temptation but of the extremely serious material situation in which the young parties have found themselves. For example, the dues with us are of a purely symbolic nature—R1 per month. So what is to be done? We now need a law on parties regulating all these questions like the air we breathe. The solution to this cannot be allowed to take its own course, otherwise the mafia will once again be the master of ceremonies, and all our democratic gains of recent years

will become a theatrical prop. Politics is quite a complex and, at times, dirty business also, and we are required to concern ourselves with the purity of party morals.

[Sarkisyan] Mr. Navasardyan, our weekly has notified readers about republican parties formed in various regions of the country. Have you established contacts with them?

[Navasardyan] We have quite close ties to the republicans of the Ukraine: we are exchanging documents and meeting. It is a question of mutually enriching contacts. As far as the Russian party is concerned, I confess that we are treating it with a certain caution. It has been formed from forces which abandoned the Communist Party literally on the eve of its impending disaster. In any event, we welcome the birth of new republicans, and life will fine-tune our relations.

Republic President Views Situation in Agdzhan

NC1504112691 *Baku Domestic Service in Azeri*
1700 GMT 12 Apr 91

[Text] The townspeople of Agdzhan in Lachinsky Rayon addressed a letter to President Ayaz Mutaibov sometime ago. The letter was published by the newspaper KARABAKH on 6 April. Herewith the text of the letter:

Armed Armenian bandits have organized bloody attacks on our town several times. Our town was completely evacuated due to these attacks. The town was completely destroyed by fire and our homes were ransacked. The murderers have killed four of the town's residents and wounded another within a period of a few months. One of the town's residents has been taken hostage. Our people have left the town as a result of this pressure. The bandits are now behaving as though they live in the area.

President Ayaz Mutaibov held a meeting to examine the problems outlined in the letter in connection with the social and economic development of the town of Agdzhan and the other [words indistinct] on 12 April. It was noted that regardless of the strong Armenian opposition, the leaders of the republic have carried out significant work to stabilize the situation and remove tension in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and the rayons which border Armenia. However, this is not enough.

President Ayaz Mutaibov summed up the meeting. Viktor Polyanchko participated in the meeting's preparations.

Tbilisi Accuses Vremya of Misinformation

RU1204152491 *Tbilisi Domestic Service in Russian*
1445 GMT 12 Apr 91

[Text] On 11 April, "Vremya" broadcast an interview with one of the internal troops generals, who arrived in Tskhinvali, about the operation they had accomplished in Samachablo. The general stated that they had

detained 21 Georgian militants, and submachineguns confiscated from them were shown. That was yet another deliberate lie to which the "Vremya" program and the military resorted. These so-called militants were, in fact, Georgian militiamen who had been illegally detained by the units of internal troops in the morning of 10 April in the village of Tamarasheni, and the submachineguns shown on the TV screen had been confiscated from them. Maybe the "Vremya" program will tell us why the military did not find and disarm those 15,000 Georgian militants who allegedly surrounded the town of Tskhinvali, something that the Central Television has been convincingly proving to millions of television viewers over two weeks.

Adzharians Hold Sit-Down Strike, Demand Autonomy

RU1704164091 *Tbilisi Domestic Service in Russian*
1430 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Text] On 15 April, a sit-down strike began near Liberty Square [Ploshchad Svobody], on the initiative of Adzharian regional organizations and the all-Georgian societies of Merab Kostava and St. Ilia the Just. The signs displayed there read as follows: We demand that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Samachablo [South Ossetia]. We are calling upon the population of Georgia to show national disobedience. We demand that an extraordinary session of the Adzharian Supreme Soviet be convened to discuss the question of a referendum on Adzharian autonomy. Instead of elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Adzharia Autonomous Republic on 28 April, a referendum should be held on Adzharian autonomy, and others. At the moment, there are only about 30 of us here, said Mirad ("Maldmadze"), one of the participants in the protest action. We will soon be joined by representatives of Khulo, Keda, Khelvachauri, ("Chabkhi"), and Kobuleti. The Batumi regional committee of the Georgian National Front, the Radical Union, and the All-Georgian Society of Selim ("Khinchashvili") also promised their support. The action will continue until the demands of the strikers are satisfied.

Central Asia

CP Instructor Views 'Kyrgyzstan' Democratic Movement

RU15046841 *From: C SLOVO KYRGYZSTANI*
in Russian 23 Mar 91 p. 7

[Article by Erkin Mamkulov, instructor in the Kyrgyzstan Communist Party Central Committee Ideological Department and candidate of historical sciences: "The 'Kyrgyzstan' Democratic Movement: The View From the Side"]

[Text] The processes of perestroika have aroused millions of people and the various social strata and population groups to active involvement in public and political life. Within the country a legal foundation is being laid for the

operation of a multiparty system. The USSR Law: "On Public Associations" came into force on 1 January 1991; this opens up extensive opportunities for their independent, autonomous existence. The increased civic and national awareness and true political pluralism have led to the emergence of new public associations in our republic also.

The "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement, formed in May 1990, announced itself with the most noise. Since then the movement has engaged in a number of actions that have caught the public's attention. A quite broad range of reactions to it has been formed, from ecstatic assessments to total rejection. In this connection I would like to express my own personal viewpoint as a citizen, communist, and social scientist concerning the role and importance of the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement in public life, and the prospects for its development.

Whether people like it or not, the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement is today a reality that cannot be ignored. In my opinion its emergence is natural and associated with the formation of a certain vacuum in the republic's political life.

It seems to me that the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan objectively needs an alternative force that would "help" it to develop.

The "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement has already shown its forceful side—its ability to organize its supporters and respond in a flexible manner to urgent political tasks.

The "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement has openly stated that it is an alternative to the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan. In the grand scheme of things this intention deserves attention. But the question arises: To what extent is this justified? Say what you will, today the Communist Party and the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement are acting, to put it graphically, in different weight categories. To compete on equal terms with a party that has great potential it is necessary to be a strong and serious, in the full sense of the word, political organization. Is the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement such?

I personally am also discountenanced by the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement's oversimplified assessment of the role and place of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan in the republic's life. It comes down mainly to importunate exaggeration of concept, and moreover, always in a negative context—"the party of a totalitarian regime," "party apparatus," "partocracy," "party elite" and so forth. Initially this was perceived as openness and forthrightness of judgment, and it helped the movement to achieve a certain increased popularity. But today it is beginning to pall. Even at the First "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement Congress in February, appeals were heard in particular speeches for a more realistic and better-considered assessment of the role of the Communist Party in the republic's life. Although it still cannot be

said that this understanding has yet become a determinant within the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement. At that same congress statements with an anticommunist slant dominated.

At a meeting organized by the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement on 2 March in Bishkek city, the banners and posters were like this: "The USSR and the CPSU—A Noose Around the Neck of Democracy," "Neo-Bolshevism Is the Rusty Chain of the CPSU Around the Neck of the Freedom-Loving Republics" and so forth. In this connection I would like note that in the political lexicon of the country and republic we observe an obvious "confusion" with respect to key concepts, which sets democracy and socialism at odds. The idea that democrats are supposedly one thing and communists something quite different is being persistently introduced into the public awareness. That is, that they are supposedly two incompatible, alien, antithetical concepts. Is this kind of postulation of the question correct?

It is very important for any political organization to stand on the ground of the realities. Today those realities are that whether its opponents like it or not, the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan is an influential force possessed of immense, and as yet largely untapped, possibilities. Yes, the party is not now living through the best of times. Many of its organizations and communists themselves are in a state of depression and confusion. Resignations from the party ranks are increasing, and ideological turncoats are appearing.

To consider, however, that these processes are permanent in nature, that the party is on the threshold of inevitable "collapse," is naive, to say the least. There is already justification for saying that though it may be difficult and agonizing, the party is nonetheless starting to extricate itself from crisis.

The Communist Party is still the ruling party, and its opponents should not forget that. The republic is led by communists, and they also constitute a majority in the Supreme Soviet. In the rule-of-law state for which we strive, under the conditions of a multiparty system and political pluralism the communists will in the future defend their positions. That is their right, as it is the right of political opponents. Not to take this force into account and to permit oneself to disparage it indiscriminately is to make a serious mistake.

In line with the logic of the matter, the desire of the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement to become a republic-wide political organization dictates the need to create appropriate organizational structures. The "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement unites several dozen different kinds of formations, from the relatively large Ashar to the small "parties" such as "Asaba" and "Erkin Kyrgyzstana." Here too are the social democrats and the "Memorial" society and the "Voters' Club," and so forth. What we see is a quite variegated mosaic of formations that have been born on the soil of the same rejection of the command administrative system and

opposition to the "totalitarian party regime," but that ultimately have their own more specific goals that do not always coincide.

Until now the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement has managed to maintain relative unity and a balance between its component forces. At the same time, the dynamically developing political processes must affect the position of these associations. Their possible correction taking the changing situation into account may lead to the emergence and growth of contradictions between them.

Neither should we disregard the trend, unpleasant for all of us, of the revival within the republic of a unique "tribal" syndrome and the desire for regional isolation. Will not this unique kind of "neotribalism" bode ill for the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement?

But what especially draws our attention is the lack of any adequately developed theoretical basis in the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement. Desirable though it may be, they have nothing with which to replace the declarative statements about the need to break the totalitarian regime, create a rule-of-law state, switch to a market economy, stay loyal to the ideals of democracy and so forth. In an interview given to the newspaper SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA published on 9 February, one of the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement cochairmen announced that change in the social order in the republic was a program goal. A statement as serious as that obviously needs proper justification. But it remains unclear what the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement proposes to put in place of the socialism it rejects. No matter how "democratic" they may sound, a collection of declarative slogans, vague and nonspecific and obviously borrowed from other regions, the Baltic in particular, puts people on their guard and evokes mistrust among a considerable proportion of the population, first and foremost the Russian-speaking population.

I think that it is not by chance that the makeup of the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement is uni-national. The fact that there are a few representatives of European nationalities in its leading organs fools no one. It seems to me that the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement leadership is beginning to recognize that under the conditions of multinational Kyrgyzstan, this circumstance objectively "works" against the movement. However, measures to expand the base of the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement through the non-Kyrgyz section of the population have up to now been unsuccessful. Thus, at the movement's first congress an attempt to elect a Russian-speaking representative as one of the cochairmen ended in failure.

The "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement's transition from its widely announced "opposition" to the "totalitarian party regime" to constructive activity has been very slow. It is still counting on one-time actions and "playing on" particular sore points. Yesterday it was the tragic events in Osh Oblast and the election of the

republic president, today it is the referendum on the question of preserving the USSR, and tomorrow it will be the 75th anniversary of the 1916 uprising in Kyrgyzstan, and so forth.

There is no doubt that these kinds of tactics can bring temporary success and cause a burst of popularity. But it in no way replaces constant practical activity.

Now, when the republic finds itself at a crucial turning point and when finding solutions to a set of very complex issues is on the agenda, the question of specific practical steps to extricate us from crisis and stabilize the situation and provide social protection for the low-income strata of the population arises. These urgent tasks require creative efforts by all parties and movements. Whoever neglects them risks finding himself on the sidelines of political life.

A few words about the forms and methods of "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement activity. They include the holding of meetings and organizing hunger strikes and pickets, during the course of which members of the movement champion certain demands. Of course, any public organization has the right to define for itself the forms of its own work as long as they do not go outside the framework of the law. In this connection I nevertheless note that when engaging in political actions the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement as it were balances itself on the very brink of what is permissible.

Even with all my personal respect for the civic action of those who took part in the hunger strike organized by the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement during the work of the republic Supreme Soviet second session, I cannot agree with the reasons given for that action. For essentially healthy people were used as a means to apply moral and psychological pressure on the Supreme Soviet people's deputies. The same can be said of the pickets organized by the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement. If we could just create the rule-of-law state for which we must strive, not in words but with deeds, making use of the legal, civilized forms and methods of political struggle.

Under the conditions of the multiparty system that has now been established, we are becoming increasingly convinced of the catastrophic absence of political standards in our society. Rejecting an opponent's opinion, intolerance, labeling people; that is proof of this. And the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement is no exception. The low level of political standards in the movement stands out in sharp relief, and, to be blunt, it is rather a total lack of standards that is shown in O. Abdyrakhmanov's pamphlet: "Caricatures of Deputies" published under its aegis. Even given the most unsophisticated taste, it cannot be classified under the genre of satire. Many of the caricatures to be found in it are insulting and disparaging to people's dignity, including members of parliament elected by the people. I am sure that in any rule-of-law, democratic society, which seems so to please

the members of the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement, the authors and publishers of this kind of work would have to sustain moral and material losses.

The question of the numerical strength of the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement is a natural one. I believe that today no one, including the leaders of the movement themselves, could give an accurate figure. True, the figure of 300,000 is being bandied about. I think that even given extreme optimism it is nonetheless much lower.

On the social plane, young people make up the base of the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement. It is not possible to talk about any serious support among the working class, peasantry, or intelligentsia.

In my opinion the steps taken recently by the republic leadership create a good basis for recruiting public associations, including the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement, to insure stability, civic peace, and inter-ethnic accord in Kyrgyzstan. At the 14 February meeting between President A. Akayev and representatives of a number of sociopolitical and national-cultural associations, a joint statement was issued. As is known, the president expressed the wish that the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement would move to constructive activity and help in resolving tasks such as the formation of a national working class and national intelligentsia and intellectual strata of the Kyrgyz people, and the creation and development of national entrepreneurial activity and business.

Yes, today the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement is not what it was yesterday. The movement is trying to grow up and gain experience. At the same time, along its road there are many problems and difficulties on whose solution the future of the "Kyrgyzstan" Democratic Movement largely depends. The sooner it grows out of its "short pants" and becomes a serious social force using civilized political methods in its work, achieves an adequate level of political standards in its organization, respects not only its own opinion but also the opinions of opponents, and has a theoretically sound program for specific actions, the better it will be both for the movement itself and for the republic as a whole.

Uzbek President on Kazakh, Uzbek Mutual Interests

91US0433A Alma-Ata SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN in Kazakh 23 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with Islam Abduganiyevich Karimov, Uzbek SSR president, first secretary of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee, recorded by SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN special reporter Ayan Nysanalin: "There Is a Light on the Other Side of Tashkent"]

[Text] [Nysanalin] **How the time flies! It seems as if the time we met in Alma-Ata was only yesterday. At that time the heads of the Central Asia republics and Kazakhstan got together in one room, signed a statement of great**

importance for related peoples with common viewpoints and a common foundation, and made another good advance towards brotherhood in a very difficult and complex time in the life of our nation. Islam Abduganiyevich! What changes have taken place since then? Once sunny Uzbekistan proclaimed Kazakhstan a center of friendship, and announced it to the world, and our support for one another was untiring. But now! There are a lot of words but few results. The good feelings and intentions have wasted away. We have let go things we cherish spiritually. It is as if, before our eyes, the ship we are riding has sprung a leak, and the trouble-makers have been thrown into the sea. Now we no longer see the light shining from the other side of Tashkent. What do you think about this?

[Karimov] Indeed, it is so. In truth we live in a time when a very rich and vast nation comprising one-sixth of the earth's surface is suffering great adversity. A great many vital political, economic and ethnic questions have emerged. Under such circumstances there are, in my view, two things of decisive importance. These are: a leadership position deeply concerned about the fundamental needs of the people; an appropriate relief for each member of society according to the problems of each. There is no other way. No meetings, with good purposes and goals, no strikers and rabble-rousers can fill the empty shelves of stores with needed goods. None of this will improve our lives. The sooner we deal with this worrying truth, the sooner we will be delivered from the illness that has become a pandemic. We must rethink everything today. Above all, it would be wonderful to put the relations of the center and the republics onto a proper basis. In particular, conditions in Central Asia and in Kazakhstan are extremely difficult. If certain republics are in excellent shape, we must say that it is at the expense of regions and areas such as our own. This is because all income is in the end the result of finished products. Since time immemorial we have lived under the hopeless conditions of raw material producers. In Alma-Ata they have refused responsibility, and have refused to have a deep appreciation of such difficulty, and of the extremely great tasks which lie before us. We cannot make the usual agreements, founded in the established way of doing things. Extremely important initiatives have come into being out of the consideration of the present and future fate of neighboring peoples with a common historical basis. As a result, relations of mutual benefit have been broadened, have deepened and have been strengthened. For example, as part of these initiatives, plans have been developed on a broad basis for 1991 for the exchange of various products, and for the development of solidarity between the two sovereign republics. However, today's relations are in themselves preconditions for the renewal of a union of Soviet sovereign republics, and for the drawing up of a new union treaty. Can one always sit on one's hands and pass the day relying on the help of others? If we join our forces, we can improve the supply of food to the masses, the production of consumer goods and services. Our living standards will rise drastically as a region rich in

natural resources prospers. No one doubts that Kazakhstan stands in the front ranks of the regions of Central Asia in terms of goods turnover. Some 46 percent of the meat and agricultural products among the goods we receive are from Kazakhstan, and half our grain needs are met from Kazakhstan. At the same time, Kazakhstan is considered a major center for bulldozers, oil, lead, coal, construction materials and other things. We, on the other hand, can supply fraternal republics with gas, electrical energy, mineral fertilizers, tea, cotton, thread, artificial fibers, tractors and excavators. All of this has now begun to bear fruit.

Transition to a market economy is not an end, it is a means. We are observing in our republic in this regard noteworthy changes, even if they are not immediate. The results for 1990 are in. We harvested the cotton in a short time with an increase in production. Other products are on the rise. Free food is being given to primary school students, the proper concern is being shown to teachers, and conditions have been somewhat improved for Great Patriotic War and labor veterans, internationalist-warriors and students. These beginnings have been well received by the people. If you think about it, nearly half of the population of Uzbekistan is comprised of children under 17. Providing them with a multifaceted, model spiritual education, and arming them with modern knowledge is still the order of the day. Our republic must in forthwith take in hand an economic "upsurge" in the shortest time. In this regard we must rely on the leading experience of the countries of the Pacific. For this reason, departments of Japanese, Chinese, Korean and other eastern languages are being strengthened in our universities, and we are trying to draw more young people into them. The way is open for young people expressing the desire to study abroad.

[Nysanalin] There is the need to reconsider many aspects of glasnost, the system of new thinking, and the democratization of society. Difficulties have accumulated from all sides, and it is not easy to administer the people by indirect means. What Moscow is saying is: "During the era of perestroika we have noticed in the republic some special, well-known intelligent leaders. They are sharp, thinking men, for example, Nazarbayev, Karimov and others. And if they are knowledgeable and experienced, they also know how to make a deal..." Is this view an accident?

[Karimov] For a long time we have become utterly used to meekly living by rote, to being slaves, and to fulfilling instructions from above, and to falling into line no matter how ridiculous it was.

Today, as ways of thinking are changing in the republic, a new kind of leadership has emerged. One good thing, these new leaders are not appointed but elected. They are chosen because they are concerned about the interests of their people. When I think how much I am free from the iron chains weighing on those above, I carefully take this into consideration. What is needed today is not just feeling and pure sensitivity, but a cool head, intelligence

and experience. No one can denigrate the role and importance in society of whatever is based on this.

[Nysanalin] Uzbekistan was the very first to ratify a law on an official language. What can you say about this? At the same time, what is being done in your republic in sectors of cultural and spiritual life which have become greatly impoverished in our nation?

[Karimov] To be sure, giving the Uzbek language status as an official language was of great historical significance in the life of our people. There was nothing easy about this. While this was needed, a great deal of energy had to be expended, and much work had to be done from scratch. I have said and continue to say that benefits and freedom for one people do not have to be at the expense of another. We took this into consideration in drawing up the law. It was expressly stated in the law that everything possible would be done to promote the development and flourishing of the Russian language, in terms of inter-nationality relations, and also other languages, among them the Kazakh and Tajik languages. In this connection the following fact must be mentioned: some 808,227 Kazakhs live in the UzSSR according to the 1989 census. Beginning last year, a republic cultural-informational center for Kazakhs is being built in Tashkent. In charge of it is a knowledgeable specialist, an ethnic Kazakh and counsellor of the Presidential Council. Such centers have begun to operate in outlying regions with large numbers of Kazakhs. Starting this year, a republic newspaper called DOSTYQ TUIY will be published in Kazakh in thousands of copies. All of this is being done to help prepare specialists as traditions of the friendship and solidarity of fraternal peoples are further developed, as major stimuli are provided for the dissemination of leading examples of customs and traditions, as nationality theaters are formed. Relations between the neighboring oblasts of Syrdarya and Chimkent are being enhanced as time passes. There is a Kazakh studio in the Zhizaq Theater, and an organization of 56 creative artists. Some 53 kindergartens in Uzbekistan and some 531 general education schools comprise 134,400 young people being educated in the Kazakh language. While there are joint programs called "Friendship Television" of Kazakhstan and Central Asia on republic television screens, a radio magazine called "the USSR, our Common Center" broadcasts news

Likewise, the period necessary to provide instruction for proper mastery of the state language (eight years) has been set. In this respect there is not so much distance between word and deed. We are now carrying out meetings and councils, no matter how large or small, in our native language. In connection, experience in translating is being accumulated. Scores of devices and textbooks for teaching students how to write in Uzbek have appeared. Books of authors forgotten for some reason or the other are being reprinted, new newspapers and magazines have begun to appear, and the number of Uzbek literary figures is growing. However, the law is being carried out slowly in some areas, and there are even problems in the terminology sector. There are even

some who have only given lip service to the language law. But the law on language is special and it requires great knowledge, skill, and particular sensitivity.

[Nysanalin] Today we cannot forget for a moment that the Aral and the disaster in the region are not just the individual disaster and grief of a single area. Not only is the sad shadow of this disaster, as it continues, creating danger for our people, but the disaster is exciting the people of the world and we have begun to hear frequently their voices of concern. It would seem as if there is no part of the world unaffected. What measures are being planned by the Uzbekistan government, what efforts are being made to save the sea?

[Karimov] How can we not be tormented about the fate of the area which dries up and retreats not only from year to year, but from month to month. The effects of the storm clouds of salty deposit which flies up from the sea bed are known in some Pamir, Altay and Siberian regions. No one doubts that this will not just turn into a regional disaster, but at first an all-union, later a disaster for the whole world. Under these conditions, the hands of the republic are tied and it can have no impact. The Uzbek SSR Presidential Council has made the decision to establish an Aral fund. Measures are being planned on a broad front. A water pipeline is being installed from the Tyumen to Urgench and Nukus, towards the lower reaches of the Amudarya. In just 1991, 900 million rubles of financing will be allocated in the state budget to the prevention of Aral disaster. But what are we to do with these funds. It will be hard to help the Aral with only half-way measures, or measures which are too late. Famous writers and social activists see and understand the grief of the people of the entire region, are expressing socially-responsible thoughts, and are offering an obstinate criticism. We have realized that the tragedy of a sea which has been, since ancient times, the homelands of kindred peoples who have herded their livestock side by side, is not just a danger inflicted upon this region alone. UNESCO and UNEP and other organizations must be drawn in, and international forces combined to solve this catastrophic ecological problem. To be sure, during the coming year, 1992, the Aral problem must be made a part of the UN International Priorities Agenda devoted to questions of environmental protection, and considered.

[Nysanalin] For some time we have been saying frequently that ethnic relations today have become tense. Confrontations, open fighting, even the spilling of blood are unceasing. Karabakh, Fergana, the Baltic Sea, Southern Ossetia...what do you say about this?

[Karimov] Our multi-ethnic culture stands before a difficult choice. There are so many crises. If ethnic disputes are put down in one place, they appear again somewhere else, and continue to develop. Due to this innocent people are killed and blood flows. There are many social reasons why such things happen and the situation is getting worse. During previous decades there was disregard of ethnic dignities. Inter-ethnic relations

and differences were disregarded. Many problems were kept under wraps and the category nationalist was applied too easily. Under present circumstances of perestroika and of the revitalization of ethnic sensitivities, the great complexity of ethnic relations is being appreciated, and it has been decided, in connection with this, to make things easy. The republics have approved declarations of sovereignty, and have gone over to concrete acts to effectuate their declarations. It is not possible to ignore this. This approach of the central authority takes into consideration the hopes of each people for a happy life, rejects imperialistic tyranny and dictatorship. It demands that the republics determine their own paths. It is not possible to ignore the fundamental changes taking place in set social structures, and in the minds of men. Quick signing of the Union treaty will have an influence upon improvement of inter-ethnic relations. In particular, the basis of this improvement will come not from the central authority, but from a direction conceived in the establishment of justice in the relations between those producing raw materials, and those producing their final products, as relaxed relations between the republics are developed as much as possible, with power at a local level.

[Nysanalin] Has it not been necessary, during the process of perestroika, to forget about certain things entirely in order to generate concern for society in the central authority. For example, the "Uzbek Question" and certain things about the Alma-Ata December disturbances. On the contrary, blaming a whole nationality is something inhumane. In connection with this, how do you regard Gdlyan and Ivanov?

[Karimov] Let us tell the unvarnished truth. There have not been a few errors in ethnic policy with us. Previously, and later, it is not easy to set things to rights. Feelings have increased. We must learn how to redevelop and direct them. Whoever it is, a person must learn above all to honor his people. However, there is no people which has not been oppressed and wounded by special difficulty. Deep within each of us are the signs of national character. When we reach down clumsily to the sinews of those sensitive feelings in our souls, we do not know what the response will be. However, there is opposition. The defective policies of perestroika, instead of decisively and quickly solving the critical questions which have accumulated one after the other, have made the burden heavier on the shoulders of the people. One cannot make a joke of history. One perceives it creeping up on one. History gives to each, whoever it is, and to each time and circumstance its proper judgment. I repeat: we are forced to designate entire eras (capitalist). Nationality interests are not taken into consideration. Even republics such as Uzbekistan lack the right to control entirely all the natural resources within their borders, and the products they themselves produce. Irrelevant things play a role in planning. We cannot get free from the yoke of many unneeded union ministries exercising tyrannical control. The number of managers is even on the increase. We have no room to maneuver.

Adhering to everything are the foundations arising from the stagnation of precedent, and good intentions accumulated over the centuries.

Each force of the central authority striving to remain uninvolved in this manner wishes to impose on us its own light-minded, simple conceptions about the Soviet Union. Each cause finds its trouble-making rabble-rouser. Some 24,000 crimes are associated with cotton. The guilty and the innocent alike are thrown into prison. Our leaders, however, are always concerned about comfort. They hold out their bowls, begging Moscow for everything and get into trouble. This facilitates nothing. The facts of the question are clear. Most of those oppressed and intimidated by punishment have been released. Thus the republic has been forced to pay each of them half a million rubles compensation. As stated above, Gdlyan and Ivanov also used inappropriate, obsolete methods in carrying things out, with someone's encouragement. An uproar was raised and things turned out well. Human rights were trampled under foot. The USSR Procurator is advancing criminal charges against them. It is perhaps true that the case against them has dragged on too long. Another question looms in connection with this. I have read recently the memoirs of a person who was one of those ruling the people in the last few years. He is the person said to have begun the doubtful campaign against alcoholism. Leaving aside other things, he is overly sensitive in evaluating the process of perestroika, and seems confused about many things. Thus we cannot regard these our complicated times superficially or easily. The just judge who will judge severely and carefully is the future. However, I hope to live in a renewed, firmly based federation. It is possible that there is light on the other side of Tashkent.

[Nysanalin] We have touched on many questions. Answers are on the tip of the tongue. Unfortunately we will have to put this off to another day. Much thanks for the interview!

Uzbekistan: Traditional Values Laying Foundation for Market

*91US04491 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 6
Feb 91 p 9*

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Gulnara Shirmatova: "The Uzbek Phenomenon, or the Portrait of a Republic Against the Background of Perestroika"]

[Text] Tashkent—We are going through a complex and contradictory time not only in the history of our Union but in the development of perestroika processes. It is hard to understand who is headed where at present, when everything appears unsteady and unstable, when one set of ideas rapidly replaces another, and when political pluralism is transformed into a plurality of mutually contradictory "teams," blocking the mechanism of executive power in the center and in outlying areas.

It is equally difficult to understand which republic is headed where. This is why I cannot hold the theoreticians and ideologues of this new time to strict standards. However, I would like them to also understand that in crucial periods of history the degree of relativity of truths which appear to be absolute, and the only correct ones, increases. In particular, I would like to address the ideas which are gradually beginning to evolve into a theory characterizing the processes of perestroika in Uzbekistan. One cannot fail to notice how great the influence of the old stereotypical assessments is even when favorable changes in our republic are at issue. The "cotton cases" artificially inflated by interested individuals have left certain mental dispositions and attitudes. Somebody dressed these cases in robes and embroidered scull caps, calling them "the Uzbek case" and put a cloud over the entire people because of shady deals by certain groups of individuals. As a social scientist I could not but notice, and having noticed, I could not keep silent about a new negative stereotype which is being formed, this time involving the assessment of the management system which is evolving in the republic (this means that someone is also interested in this). Voices are heard every now and then that totalitarianism is being supposedly resurrected in Uzbekistan, that it represents "the last foothold of the administrative command system," that democratic processes have been wound down here...

The symptoms of deformations of democracy, of the transformation of the power of the people into the power of demagogues in some places, are already apparent in various regions of our country. Discussing the possibility of such deformations, Plato noted in his time that this happens when the people "are unduly intoxicated with undiluted freedom, and punish their officials if they are insufficiently lenient and do not give everyone complete freedom... The souls of citizens become extremely sensitive to even petty matters: Everything compulsory outrages them as being impermissible. They will end up ceasing to reckon even with laws, whether written or unwritten, so that nobody at all will have any power over them in anything at all."

As we can see, the sociopsychological regularities and conditions under which democracy degenerates into anarchy and chaos capable of exacerbating the critical condition of a society were grasped many centuries ago.

Why was the situation stabilized so quickly in the republic? New political forces and leaders did not have enough time to fully show themselves and carry out their programs. Was this due to a crack down on democracy from the top, by coercive methods, or was this the effect of more formidable objective regularities, or if it was the effect of a subjective will then, perhaps, it was the will of the people after all? I will venture to state that it is the latter. The evolution of informal associations and the incorporation of their energy into creative endeavors is an objective phenomenon which may well be explained by the regular development of a society along the path of democratization. The rally-style forms of expressing discontent prosper in places where a substantial distance

and an acute confrontation exist between the government and the people, when decisions made run counter to the interests of particular social groups of the populace. A decline in the popularity of informal associations which have opted for rally-style democracy is indicative of the fact that the programs of action of the republic's leadership express the interests of the broadest strata of the populace.

Sociological surveys conducted in Uzbekistan reveal the emerging trend toward growth in the authority of the republic leadership. I may say more specifically: Surveys taken in Tashkent where, incidentally, the Russian-speaking population predominates, have shown that the rating of the republic president exceeds that of the USSR president. What is this due to? To a certain degree, to "republic" patriotism, but also to genuine progress toward normalization in the economy. The republic has overfulfilled the plan for cotton procurement. The yield of fiber has increased. Anticipatory measures aimed at increasing auxiliary plots last year have now brought results. The overall volume of production of foodstuffs and goods for the non-production sphere has increased. Profits and contributions to the budget have increased in many sectors of the national economy which has made it possible to preserve its stable social orientation. The people may work productively only in a quiet sociopolitical situation if they perceive that care is being taken of their needs and daily necessities. Ukases of the republic president on increasing benefits, retirement benefits, and scholarships for mothers with many children, retirees, and students, and on additional preferences for teachers and day-care center instructors testify to such care.

Improvement in the forms of managing the national economy is the main line of democratization in the economic sphere. It appears to me that we may expect stable results in this field from a reorganization of the management system which is being carried out scientifically. It is aimed at simplifying, eliminating redundant elements, and increasing the initiative and responsibility of leaders of all ranks for the endeavors entrusted to them. In essence, the peaceful dismantling of a bloated bureaucratic system has begun. The new functions and tasks of executive power predetermine the structure of the cabinet of ministers within which entities have been formed which correspond to the main complexes of the national economy, social sphere, and culture. New forms of the organization of labor, particularly, economic accountability in the operation of the ministries and departments of the republic, will be implemented consistently. The unified apparatus of the president of the republic, created on the basis of the Uzbek SSR law on streamlining the power structure, is geared to specifically analyzing the state of affairs in various spheres of life, developing proposals, and ensuring prompt and effective monitoring of the unconditional and precise execution of government decisions and ukases of the president of the republic. I am against the assertion that these measures bring about a new dictatorship. The principle of collectivity and of taking the entire range of views into account

is upheld both in the process of preparing decisions and in the process of their execution; alternative proposals are compared.

The process of democratization is impossible without releasing the creative potential of personality, labor collectives, and the entire people. This is what the development of a multitude of property forms accomplishes. Forms of labor organization such as lease and family contracts are developing successfully in the environment of Uzbekistan, in areas in which the population density is particularly high and a land shortage is apparent. A trend toward the development of leasing relations in the sphere of industrial production has also emerged. Terms have been developed for the conversion of enterprises in the service sphere and trade to private ownership, and the transfer has begun.

State property will hold dominant positions only in the basic industries, air and railway transportation, communications, and main-line infrastructure. In other sectors, joint-stock, cooperative, collective, and private property will be placed on an equal footing with state property.

A network of joint enterprises is being set up in Uzbekistan. Foreign companies which are prepared to cooperate with us are granted most-favored status. The first such "swallows" have appeared not only in Tashkent but also in Karshi, Fergana, Samarkand, and Urgench. The republic stands to win because several years from now it will have modern technologies in some industries and a modern working class, the bulk of whom will be people of indigenous nationalities.

There are grounds to suggest that the program of switching to a market economy will also be understood by the populace because it does not blindly copy alien patterns but rather brings back on a new basis economic customs and traditions which have evolved in our land for centuries. This circumstance facilitates the work of the tractor operators of its implementation. [sentence as published] The main point is that the adopted program of actions is based on the positive content of the lifestyle of the local residents dating back many centuries. A stereotypical negative attitude toward community-based forms of activities in life was formed in public opinion over decades of stagnation and distortions in ideological work. Moreover, these forms were vigorously and violently crushed. Fundamental values of the traditional way of life, whose lasting significance has been repeatedly emphasized by scientist-Orientalists, were consigned to oblivion.

I am looking at: "The Risolya of the Craftsmen of Sart" published as long ago as the last century. The Risolya is a treatise of sorts, a manual, a collection of laws for artisans. It not only contains special knowledge but also regulates ethical relations between craftsmen. Ya.V. Rozen, a member of the Oriental Division of the Imperial Russian Archaeological Society, wrote: "Shops and cooperatives have existed everywhere in the Orient since

time immemorial. Studying their organization and customs promises not only interesting scientific results but, perhaps, could be of significant practical use." (Proceedings of the Oriental Division of the Imperial Russian Archaeological Society, Volume 1, page 326).

One hundred years ago, the scientist hoped that his research of the economic traditions of the Orient would, perhaps, be of practical use. Meanwhile, we destroyed these traditions within mere decades. This is why I will not conceal that many of my fellow countrymen were gratified to read in: "The Main Directions for Stabilizing the National Economy and Guidelines for the Entry of Uzbekistan Into a Market Economy" the lines saying that the development of traditional trades and crafts, together with the development of small enterprises, especially in rural areas, will lay the foundation of a future market.

They might rebuke us again: Why these patriarchal customs, why drag a wooden plow into the 21st century? We are not dragging a wooden plow; we are trying to preserve the elements of a lifestyle and a way of life which the people hold dear and toward which their interests in economic and business activities gravitate.

The restoration of folk crafts, artistic trades, and multifaceted traditional forms of operation will facilitate the successful resolution of the issue of employment of the populace. This is also vitally significant for stabilizing the sociopolitical situation in the republic. Sociological analyses of conflict situations indicate that social tension is always greater in precisely the localities where the rate of unemployment is relatively higher.

The traditional forms of spiritual life reinforce not only the material but also the ethical foundation of democratization in our society. The collective wisdom of a makhalla [city quarter], the life of which is largely built on community principles, does not just regulate family and living arrangements, as some people are inclined to believe, but also economic life to a large degree. Such regulation will undoubtedly be a favorable influence on the humanization of production relations in a market environment. Traditional regulators of the deeds and behavior of the people and ethical foundations promote

the just resolution of conflicts in various spheres of life. The unseemly actions of individuals are in plain view, and they meet with unambiguous condemnation by public opinion. It is no accident that the incidence of crime, drunkenness, and alcoholism is substantially lower in the environment of the makhallas. Various forms of mutual assistance by the people and charity are developed in the makhallas. Many centuries of the collective experience of the people, whom tremendous trials have invariably befallen, have taught the people to overcome difficulties through joint efforts. I am against one-sided judgments and idealizing the realities of life. Undoubtedly, there are negative elements as well in the community-based lifestyle, as in any social phenomenon. However, at present, the positive content of traditional spiritual and ethical values and lifestyles not only altogether promote the stabilization of the situation, but also make it possible to persistently implement programs for solving the broad-scale problems of national development adopted by the leadership.

As a rule, the obliteration of individuality which is characteristic of the totalitarian system brings about the feeling of one's own powerlessness and the social apathy which goes with it. This social apathy, which gives the appearance of stability, is precisely a product of stagnation. At present, favorable results are produced by actuating the mechanisms of personal interest in the results of work rather than an administrative influence. This is a new approach which is alien to the administrative command system of management. This very principle has now been adopted by the leadership of Uzbekistan for solving the most significant economic problems. This principle produces a striking effect in the organization of labor in various sectors of the national economy. Against the background of general instability in our country, a measure of success has been achieved in the development of various sectors of the national economy, enterprise profits have increased, and the social orientation of budgetary expenditures has been strictly maintained.

I would like to finish this article on this optimistic note which sounds discordant against the background of stereotypical negative assessments of the realities of the republic. Are my assessments and predictions correct? Time will tell.

Moldova Sets Migration Quota at 0.05 Percent

*LD1004200891 Moscow TASS in English 1820 GMT
10 Apr 91*

[By MOLDOVA-PRES-TASS correspondents Anatoliy Golya and Aleksandr Tanas]

[Text] Kishinev April 10 TASS—Migration quotas in Moldavia in 1991 will not exceed 0.05 per cent of the republic's population totalling four million people. Georgy Spiney, the minister of labour and social security, told MOLDOVA-PRES.

The Moldavian Government on Wednesday adopted a resolution on migration and granted the ministry the necessary powers to control the number of people immigrating to Moldavia from other Soviet regions.

Although the level of migration will eventually change, economic sanctions will help control it. Enterprises and organisations will pay the republic 25,000 roubles for each immigrant and member of his family hired above the quota.

Spiney says these quotas will not affect repatriates. "All people, who previously lived in Moldavia, will have the right to return to the republic at any time," he said.

TASS Expands Access to Foreign News

9JUN13511 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 16, Apr 91 p 3

[Article by V. Golovin, deputy editor in chief of the TASS Chief Editorial Office for Foreign Information: "Secret TASS Bulletins' for You, Too"]

[Text] In your opinion, is there an information market in our country? What I mean is not the availability of even the most independent newspapers at newsstands, but rather an opportunity to learn quickly, if one so wishes, about, for example, the attitude of the Singapore authorities toward the creation of joint enterprises, or to receive on a regular basis information about Poland with which your rayon executive committee may establish business contacts. Alas, such a market does not exist in our country, and information is distributed to a considerable degree through old, nomenklatura and allocation channels.

However, late last year TASS, or more precisely its Chief Editorial Office for Foreign Information (InoTASS) took its own step toward building a news market. Without asking for any special permission, we removed the classification "For Official Use Only" from all of our "classified" bulletins and reports which were delivered to the desks of officials at Old Square, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB, and other departments, but were unavailable to "common Soviet people." InoTASS is offering unrestricted subscriptions to all of these reports for the first time in Soviet history.

For example, one may subscribe to the daily bulletin MIR I SSSR, the immediate successor of the secret "White TASS," which was considered "juicy" in leadership circles. The report offers translations of the most profound and sharpest foreign articles concerning all aspects of life in the USSR, from foreign policy to culture.

We offer seven regional daily reports covering the problems of America, Western and Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East to professionals in the field of business and international relations and activists of political parties and the workers' movement. In particular, the reports familiarize us with the most up-to-date economic experience, stock exchange statistics, and the organization of the operation of state services and local self-government organs, and give "clues" for establishing business contacts with foreign partners.

Analytical materials on foreign topics, from economics to ecology, appear in the bulletin DOSYE MEZH DUNARODNYKH PROBLEM which is published five times a week. Incidentally, this is precisely what supersedes the former classified report for the supreme leadership, of which only 205 copies were printed.

However, a foreign news tape which InoTASS has been producing around the clock, in "real time," is the source of the most rapid information. So far, it has been used

mainly by newspapers, television, and radio. However, they manage to broadcast only a negligible fraction of information contained there—from the latest decisions of the White House to recommendations by Common Market experts concerning the convertibility of the ruble.

We also offer a business version of this news tape—only "serious" reports plus daily reviews of the press and TV news from the largest cities of the world (of course, without "political" corrections). We also prepare a shorter "digest" with the sharpest and most substantive materials (the so-called Planeta service) which gives one a complete idea of the situation in the world in the past day; at present, it is received mainly by CPSU oblast committees.

In short, a tremendous array of information will now leave classified files and be made available in a free market. We must warn, however, that our reports cater to professionals and cost several hundred rubles a year or more.

Credentials of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Disputed

PM1704103191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2

[Ye. Sorokin article: "The 'White House' Newspaper, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Is an RSFSR Supreme Soviet Publication in Name. But Does It Reflect the Russian Parliament's Opinions?"]

[Text] As is well known, the newspaper was started up at the demand of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Congress of People's Deputies. Naturally, there had long been a need for such a publication—and all the more now that the Russian Parliament is pursuing a policy independent of the center. That is why the publication of the newspaper was awaited by deputies and voters alike. However, as more issues of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA appeared, many deputies and voters began to be more and more confused by the tone of the articles and the problems raised in them.

It has become obvious that the newspaper has turned from an RSFSR Supreme Soviet publication into essentially the organ of the "Democratic Russia" parliamentary faction. And into an organ which, it seems, repeats the most primitive methods of stagnant party propaganda in extolling the figure of B.N. Yeltsin as the savior of the nation who has been innocently defamed by "right-wingers." And, wherever he speaks, he usually praises and propagandizes the newspaper, and wishes it millions of readers. That is what the editorial office hopes too.

Clearly, the editorial collective is in no way embarrassed about being controversial in its selection of letters under the "On Yeltsin" rubric. Journalists who visit the "White House" [popular name for Russian Government building] on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment have

seen hundreds and thousands of telegrams from all over the Union and Russia condemning Yeltsin and his statements about various problems. News like this, clearly, does not make it into the newspapers. You will agree that this fact alone leads us to believe that the editorial office is biased, extreme, one-sided, and politicized.

This last point particularly needs to be made. After all, both Yeltsin and other deputies have repeatedly emphasized that their lack of party affiliations promotes the carrying out of their duties as deputies.

But what do we find in the Russian Supreme Soviet publication? Quite a different picture. Not for nothing has ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA repeatedly been mentioned at Russian Parliament and congress sessions as a publication which provides a distorted picture of its publisher. It was even suggested that the chief editor be made to appear before the deputies. The deputies' dissatisfaction with their press organ is understandable. They who have striven so doggedly to obtain their own publication have essentially found themselves cut off from it. Thus, one deputy complained at a parliament session that ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA had not published an article of his for three months. Another said that articles in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA create the impression that there is a certain uniformity in its founder—the Supreme Soviet—whereas, in actual fact, everything is quite different. Another stated with annoyance that "we ourselves adopted the decision on the priority granting to people's deputies of a newspaper platform, but we cannot get into print with it."

This is all too true. On the other hand, the editorial office generously provides a platform for those who are in unison with its views. And these are those who reject the idea of a united Union and see every step taken by the USSR president as a "right-wing intrigue."

Clearly, confrontation with regard to the country's leader is a favorite topic for the publication. Sometimes you even encounter such pearls that, quite honestly, you feel ashamed about our journalistic standards. The Union referendum, "with its cleverly contrived question"; A. Lukyanov, a "well-known poet in his own circle"; on V. Pavlov—the "balancing act of a young premier with great experience of waging financial warfare against the people." And what price the headlines and subheads! "The president has moved further and further to the right, even though he continues to consider himself a centrist." "The market heart of Russia. The empty shelves after a bumper harvest are the verdict on the administrative system." (Although everyone knows that they are a verdict on the latter-day "democrats".)

The Union referendum in particular made the newspaper's hackles rise. The editorial office worked flat out to undermine it. Those who wanted to vote "Yes" were

threatened with the prospect of virtually medieval slavery. By decrying the Union the editorial office clearly believes that it is acting for the good of the Russian people.

But we should not talk in general terms about the coverage of the CPSU's activity. Any methods—even the most unworthy—are used in this area. Thus, the newspaper's political observer was invited to a briefing at the "Oktyabrskaya" Hotel Press Center. But he only wrote about it in passing. On the other hand, he wrote in great detail—and I would even say with philistine envy—about "party mansions" not only in Moscow but throughout the country. And to make it clear what the writer was implying, the newspaper "piece" included a picture of the notorious No. 13 Colony with the caption: "Former bosses will at least learn to wash their own dishes here."

Incidentally, the reaction to the criticism of this item is very revealing. PRAVDA printed a tiny rejoinder about it. But... Yeltsin took umbrage. And this, as we have already seen, is quite impermissible as far as our ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA colleagues see it: Under no circumstances must "their own people" be touched! This no more than 80-line note prompted a long newspaper article in which it was explained in detail to PRAVDA staffers and all other Communists how they should and should not behave.

I do not want to mimic its didactic tone. Ultimately all of us have to decide everything in this life for ourselves. But as a reader I personally am surprised about why ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA is not going to the trouble to analyze the reasons behind the failure of economic and social policy in the republic. It is not asking why, for instance, Kazakhstan or Belorussia are surpassing Russia in a number of areas; it is not looking into the reasons why the much-heralded economic agreements concluded by the Russian leadership with other republics have been a failure. You cannot help thinking that maybe the reason is because in this instance all the blame cannot be pinned on the much-denigrated center, and the real culprits have to be named.

I read the newspaper and kept thinking: What does it remind me of? And I remembered. Ilf and Petrov [Soviet writers of satirical novels] wrote about an episode when newspaper sellers, crazy with the heat, ran around town shouting "Our boys are attacking! Thank God! There are many killed and wounded! Thank God!" In short, they will use any method to defend their position, even if they have to stoop to name calling.

Lecturing one's colleagues is a thankless task. And I do not plan to do so: "Everyone writes it as they see it." I am merely reflecting. But you feel sorry for the readers. They open ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA and what do they learn from it? That the center has "stuffed" Russia, that enmity and hatred abound. Finally, that the people's salvation lies in unreserved support for B.N. Yeltsin.

I think that ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, which called on people to vote against the Union, will be racking its brains over the results of the all-union referendum. After all, is it now entitled to claim the role of all-Russian forum if the people are not heeding its voice? And how should the Russian parliament react in this instance? Whose position did the newspaper reflect when it called for a boycott of the Union referendum if the RSFSR Supreme Soviet repeatedly stated its determination to be part of the Union?

These questions, incidentally, were raised very bluntly at the extraordinary Russian congress. The newspaper's discourtesy toward deputies it did not like made some of them even demand that the Supreme Soviet leadership call its maverick ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA staffers to order. And even the newspaper's coverage of the congress was again one-sided and one-dimensional. It did not even balk at spreading falsehoods. I was told this by an indignant Deputy V. Lisin, coordinator of the "Rossiya" group. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA published a "document"—instructions for "Communists of Russia," agricultural workers, and "Rossiya" about how to behave at the Congress. This "document" was allegedly compiled by the CPSU Central Committee. "I do not know," Lisin said, "whether 'Communists of Russia' sought the Central Committee's advice before the congress or not. But as far as our group of deputies is concerned, we did nothing of the kind. It is a barefaced lie." As we can see, here too (and not for the first time!) the newspaper has clearly gone overboard in the prejudice department.

The press organ has essentially been taken over by one group. We all know which one...

USSR TV Trends Outlined/Part 4

LD2204131191 Moscow SEM DNEY in Russian No 12, 18-24 Mar 91 (signed to press 12 Mar 91) p 17 LD (tentative)

[Fourth and final part of unattributed feature entitled: "The Main Directions of Television Development"]
[Text] -Now I would like you to discuss the main thing: what strategy should be chosen to accomplish the ideas of high-resolution television?

-Hitherto it was believed that, as high-resolution television is a wideband concept, only fiber-optic lines would be suitable for signal transmission and that the existing ground network is unsuitable. But billions of rubles have been invested in the existing network, and there are insufficient funds to build a new one. Therefore scientists are strenuously seeking ways to convert the high-resolution television wideband signal.

-Apart from in television broadcasting, where can high-resolution television be used?

-There are many uses, and I believe that high-resolution television equipment can be produced right now to bring about its technical advantages. Let me merely list them.

They are the use of high-resolution television in computer graphics for creating on-screen volumetric, three-dimensional images. This use of high-resolution television is very promising in applications for exhibitions, museums, and movie theaters. An advanced television station with three cameras and one video recorder has already been developed in Japan for this purpose. It is also possible to use high-resolution television in editorial work (for example for preparing hard copies of images) and in movie production—to introduce video effects in movie scenes. It is predicted that many movie theaters, with the exception of the very largest that seat 1,000 or more, will switch to high-resolution screens. High-resolution television has started to be used in medicine for remote diagnostic methods and for use in information systems. Finally, high-resolution television will make it possible to combine the services of broadcasting and professional video communications and open the opportunity to organize video conferences at a new technical level.

- In a previous article about high-resolution television I told our readers that the International Consultative Committee for Radio, on which for many years you have headed the commission for television research, is involved at the international level in the new television and radio systems. The commission's recommendations are noted and used by broadcasting organizations, communications administrations, and firms worldwide. For example, there are the recommendations concerning a digital standard for studios, teletext, video recordings, and so on. But who, or what body, in this country is working on the new equipment for television and radio broadcasting?

-Let me begin with public organizations. The conference that we are discussing was organized by the Moscow section of A.S. Popov All-Union Scientific and Technical Society of Radio Equipment, Electronics, and Communications. The practical usefulness of such conferences, both for individual scientists and for enterprises producing television equipment, must be acknowledged. Let me take this opportunity to inform your readers about the all-union conference on television organized by the A.S. Popov Society. It will be held this November in Leningrad. Many interesting reports on various television problems will be heard and discussed.

So far as concerns an official body coordinating scientific and technical policy in this area, for many years this has been the Interdepartmental Commission for Television and Radio Broadcasting. It first started work during the introduction of color television and was originally called the Interdepartmental Commission for Color Television. It has to be said that the commission's work is useful and effective and that it coordinates and directs the work of many scientific research institutes and enterprises.

I believe that the Interdepartmental Commission for Television and Radio Broadcasting should also take into account in its plans and activities the changes taking

place in the scientific and production structures serving television and radio broadcasting.

More 'Blows' Hit Holiday Newspaper Deliveries

PM2404093091 Moscow PR VDA in Russian
19 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[S. Oganyan report: "Blow After Blow After Blow..."]

[Text] A telephone message came to the PRAVDA publishing house:

"In accordance with a decision by the Moscow Main Post Office labor collectives, newspapers will be delivered in Moscow on the 1 and 9 May holidays. There will be no deliveries 2, 3, 10, and 11 May.

"[signed] Moscow Main Post Office Deputy General Director Kabaldin, Joint Trade Union Committee Chairman Kozlova."

Just a few days ago, Ye. Manyakin, USSR deputy minister of communications, made a personal promise to the publishing house director that, by agreement with Moscow Main Post Office, newspapers will be dispatched on all holidays—that is, not only 1 and 9 but also 3 and 10 May. The publishing house was prepared to sacrifice 2 and 11 May.

Once again Ye. Manyakin's promises were empty. Admittedly, he can claim, as has happened several times before, that the ministry no longer has any power over the enterprises under its jurisdiction. But such a position only encourages arbitrariness on the part of postal workers, whose trade union committees have long behaved as strike committees, inflicting blow after blow on subscribers.

People will not receive holiday papers. The holiday will be spoiled. And not only for Muscovites. Delivery days will be just as arbitrary or, more precisely, self-willed in the republics. But the USSR Ministry of Communications is promising rather half-heartedly that further talks are planned, so maybe the postal workers will think again...

Haven't there been enough attacks on the newspapers and readers? Isn't it time to stop?

New Minsk Magazine Presented in Moscow

LD2004131191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 0200 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Excerpt] In Moscow the presentation has taken place of the new interrepublican newspaper NABAT. It is published in Minsk.

Its presentation is part of a big program timed to coincide with the fifth anniversary of the Chernobyl tragedy. The program also includes a film by Roland Sergeyenko, a Ukrainian producer of documentary films, and species by Francis and Joanne Macey, American experts. [passage omitted]

Purpose, Impact of Cinematographers' Boycott Questioned

9JUN13224 Moscow PR VDA in Russian 16 Apr 91
Second Edition p 2

[Article by Leonid Makhkamov, member of the USSR Cinematographers Union: "Ultimatum: Whom Are Cinematographers Boycotting—Television or Televiewers?"]

[Text] Dushanbe—Last spring, I happened to meet Vladimir Mayboroda in the Ukrainian town of Sumy. He had gained notoriety by presenting an ultimatum to the city authorities, which were refusing to permit activists of Rukh and other "democratic" movements to hold a city-wide rally on "the issues of perestroika" at the V.I. Lenin Square: Until they permit the rally—I will starve!

They say that he held for fourteen days. The authorities firmly refused to cave in, and the ultimatum was not carried out. Fortunately, no harm came to this hothead who seems to have started, in the fall of 1989, a kind of ultimatum—a hunger strike—that has become excessively fashionable since then.

Among those I recall has been a prolonged one—when the demand was to retire a recently appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers in the same Ukraine: there were some of intermediate duration—such as the ones here in Tajikistan, when it was necessary to divide one administrative rayon into two; I also remember a "blitz hunger strike"—I think that my colleagues from the Leningrad youth newspaper only skipped one lunch, and the oblast Komsomol committee surrendered its newspaper to its "self-sacrificing" labor collective.

I recall all of this because I feel sincerely sorry for the miners who have been on a hunger strike and the Moscow City Council deputies who decided that this self-sacrifice was precisely the way to convince the recalcitrant leadership to give in. But most of all these recollections are the result of a premonition of the danger of a just as widespread new method of putting the pressure on the authorities.

To be honest, it seemed for a while that the Cinematographers Union boycott of Central Television had been forgotten, having quietly died of natural causes. A rather logical outcome, since it did not seem to have all-out support in cinematographer circles. But now I open IZVESTIYA newspaper (No 72) and find an announcement that "on 28 March a press conference will take place in the USSR Cinematographers Union: the subject is the boycott of Central Television declared two months ago." What is there more of—the desire to remind about themselves or the desire to express in this way the support for another, much more important event of the same day? One thing is beyond any doubt—some people are really loath to part with their idea that affords them a place once again in the ranks of "fighters."

This "principled" idea in defense of glasnost apparently has more than one author. Its energetic initiators took advantage of the sensitive souls and professional solidarity of many decent artists and, it seems, bound them by this artificially constructed ultimatum. How much hidden and open disappointment is there by now in what was done? Who needed all this? But the war has been declared, and the war continues. I think that L. Kravchenko, against whom the cinematographers' actions are directed, is gaining points: Even in this environment of harsh pressure the airwaves are filled

How should we, though, appraise this situation from the point of view of a normal person who found himself bearing the brunt of the situation? From the position of a television viewer?

Conflict between the authorities and artists is not new: it has existed since the time when there emerged rulers of souls and rulers of destinies. It appears that both sides are suffering from the incompleteness of their power—a feeling that spills into envy... And, as a rule, neither side knows where to stop in this struggle; neither does it appear to want to know. Public sympathy, however, is usually on the side of the artists. And this is fair.

The sensational Fifth Congress of USSR Cinematographers—from the very beginning of preparations to its current consequences—remains in the memory of many as a liberation of public spirit, a manifestation of professional dignity, and a rebellion against the rusted vise of the authorities. But one could not help but notice something else in this "celebration of free souls": a boundless cruelty with which the artists were taking down, demeaning, and trampling their colleagues in their profession and in their craft, and not necessarily the worst ones, but also those who had, perhaps, committed a few sins from the point of view of "new thinking" but not to such an extent as to deserve to be crushed and destroyed forever. Many saw it and understood that what was taking place was clearly unfair; they were saddened, but... they kept silent for the sake of...

For the sake of what? Today the fruits of these silent concessions are already on the scales of history: I happened to be present at the Sixth Congress of USSR Cinematographers and to witness a historic event—the disintegration of the union. The heated enthusiasm of the delegates was so genuine, and so... out of place by the deathbed of a fine organization of creative talent that it was obvious—it was too late to do something, to shame, to conciliate... The house that had been built by someone's warm and caring hands was not being disassembled brick by brick so that the construction materials could be reused for something good—it was being wrecked in such way as to leave not even a grain of kind memories of the "walls and roof" of the union where more than one generation of Soviet cinematographers had previously found shelter and protection, sympathy and help.

Whatever was taking place in the industry between the two congresses of cinematographers and still continues

today can be easily explained and even justified by the confusion that reigns in the country. I agree with this. But please let us not forget who were the first ones to set things into motion, and who had been proudly wearing, up to a certain time, the title of the "hewers of perestroika." Right, it was the Cinematographers Union. And what is the result? It is, as they say, on the screen. The charge lasted long enough to "liberate" a dozen and a half good films buried during the "period of serfdom." But where are at least a dozen and a half of masterpieces of the freed artists?

It turned out to be easier to demolish something created by others than to build your own. Some did not want to account for the failures and clear disasters of the recent years; others did not want to hold either themselves or others to account; both agreed to call the sixth congress ahead of schedule. The old and the new governing boards shook hands and departed—there was not even a formal report to the congress. Union leaders, who were voluntarily "retiring into creativity," got away with coquettish finesse by reading from the congress podium their essays on the topic of cinematography. But it looks like it is not that simple to leave the stage after so many unfulfilled promises. What is the purpose of slamming the door so often then?

It is bad when the artists who claim a higher role and position in the society than that of the politicians, start repeating and copying the worst types of intents and actions of the most hapless politicians. It is worth noting that the USSR still exists, but the cinematographers are "ahead of the whole planet"—their union has already shifted onto a confederative basis. They have already divided the authority, the powers, and even the property between the republics, the "center," and Moscow... They no longer seem to be friends or classmates from the VGIK [All-Union State Institute for Cinematography] and Higher Training Course, or even colleagues. They are just... partners. New words mean new contents. Are we really paving the way for the politicians as an experiment? Or are we already politicians ourselves?

Yes, the cinema has always been in the thick of politics; good cinema has always stood firmly in defense of compatriots' interests. That is how it earned both fame and respect among both ordinary people and these same power holders. But this was Art, and it was created—without any doubt—by Artists. So why have we all of a sudden started using alien weapons?

It turns out that now we are into protecting glasnost. Are there really people left in the country who wanted to speak up but who have not had a chance to do so yet? Or is it that unless they say it on Central Television it does not count? Well, let us admit honestly—among those who did have an opportunity to communicate with us through television during the last few years, were there many who really had something to say? Of course, glasnost has made many discoveries. How many variations on the subject of freedom and democracy, disclosures, and all kinds of other things did we have a chance

to hear: how many different new names did our ears get used to... But among those, were there many whom we wanted to hear again, to meet again?"

It appears that we have had plenty of chance to talk. Now it is time to think.

All right, politics... But we have now stooped to the methods of small tradesmen. Do the warehouses filled with "products"—the works of cinematography—against the background of what is being shown on Central Television not remind us of anything? Although not all of those who declared a boycott should live in a cloud of illusion: Not everything you have hidden under the counter would necessarily bring cheers from television viewers. Movie theaters, by the way, long ago objectively determined the "rating" of each—the viewer does not want "homegrown" movies. Those who believe that "no man is a prophet in his own land" should look for their names in the "top ten," or "top twenty," or maybe even a "top hundred" of the world elite.

Films age quickly—at least the overwhelming majority of them. Cinematographers age, too—all, without exception. Only the viewer stays young. He also has a long memory, and may keep a grudge for a long time against those who, in the time of hunger—literally—have left him without moral support, without illusions and hopes. Without the cinema. Cruelty may be forgiven, but it is never forgotten. What will be the way back to Central Television—all together in a crowd, or what?

Despite the considerable distance of my place of residence from Moscow and, probably, thanks to the frenzied activity of past and present union leaders and of their "golden clip," I feel myself a member of a political party that is unknown to me, that only talks to the world surrounding it through the biting language of slogans, addresses, and now ultimatums. Whenever another address is adopted in the Cinematographers Union by a dozen or two people on behalf of the 7,000-strong union—which means on my behalf, too—I am tempted to insert in the text: Friends, we joined a creative union, not a "North" or a "South."

Rostov Oblast Town Receives Commercial TV Programs

LD1904130191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 2330 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] A local branch of the north Caucasus section of NIK-A-TV, an all-union public television company, has made the programs of Ukrainian Television available to the inhabitants of the mining town of Kamensk, in Rostov Oblast. The plans for the alternative television service in the town include not only the transmission of entertainment programs and video films and clips; it is also planned to set up a studio for the preparation of local programs. This is being done on a commercial basis. Customers will only be able to receive the NIK-A channel if they have a special decoder and have paid a special fee.

Komsomol Bureau Statement on Lenin

91US04564 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRUDA
in Russian 19 Apr 91 p 1

[Statement by the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau]

[Text] On the threshold of the 121st anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol] Central Committee Bureau deems it necessary to state its attitude toward Lenin's legacy. Unfortunately, for many years the image of Lenin, duplicated in thousands of memorials and millions of sculptures similar to one another, has not become closer but on the contrary increasingly far removed from living people and from the youth. A most ominous paradox of our national history is in evidence: The social system at the sources of whose creation Lenin stood has done everything to fence him off from the people and the people from Lenin and to build an insurmountable "zone of alienation" between them. Nor do the howling discrepancy between the goals of the October revolution proclaimed by V.I. Lenin and the tremendous price paid by our people in the course of their realization and the results we have to show today, approaching the end of the century, contribute to the removal of this alienation. There is, therefore, nothing surprising in the fact that our people, including its younger generation, are today calling strictly to account the principal "architects" of our reality. Calls for a fundamental revision of our former values and a reassessment of the role of personalities in the history of the Soviet state are being heard increasingly often.

In itself the process of revision of the past is natural and legitimate, for there are no truths given once for all. But all reassessments should begin with an in-depth comprehension of the past.

The youth is moving away from Lenin—this may be heard increasingly often today. But this is an incomplete truth, and will remain such unless we finally say: Our

youth, more precisely whole generations of Soviet youth, have not yet come close to Lenin. This was prevented by the inhuman Stalinist system.

We are not calling for the protection of Lenin from canonical positions. We must simply tell the truth about him.

Lenin was not a prophet and did not consider himself such. He was mistaken in many things and admitted this. It was we who made him an infallible icon and responsible for all our sins. We revered Lenin more than we read him. But Lenin should be read and studied—thoughtfully, inquiringly, critically.

Lenin does not have nor could he have answers to all the questions of our present-day life. But the significance of Lenin's ideas concerning the youth's path toward the new society and his dialectics of the analysis of reality are valuable for us today also.

Whatever is said and written today, V.I. Lenin's main creation—the Great October Socialist Revolution—was a supreme event of contemporary history that had a cardinal impact on the life of all mankind. And it is not Lenin's fault that the positive results of the Great October were reflected more in the life of other countries and peoples than in that of Soviet people.

V.I. Lenin is an outstanding historical personality and, like any major personality, he does not lend himself to unequivocal evaluations. His selfless giving of himself to service of the chosen idea has evoked respect even among enemies.

The indiscriminate rejection of Lenin entire is just as immoral as unrestrained eulogy of him. The fault of Stalin and the Stalinists who used the name of Lenin as an icon to cover their anti-Leninist actions is unforgivable.

If we aspire to live in a civilized society, we must learn to adopt a respectful attitude toward the founder of the state and a major thinker of contemporaneity.

National, Local Inaction on Environmental Priorities Criticized

91WEX03694 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKIY PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 91 p 1

[Article by Viktor Dik: "The Kaynar Syndrome"]

[Text] An awful story was revealed recently. A young boy lived in a village close to which nuclear bombs were tested. The people were removed from the village, and when they returned they found the wells filled in. One day this boy and his grandfather were clearing out a well and a soldier came to help. But the boy said: "Never come to our house." The soldier from the testing ground was the boy's father....

Kaynar, Sarzhal, Karaaul, Dolon....These are villages that are within the 30-kilometer zone of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground. A succession of nuclear weapons was tested almost continuously here for 40 years. The tests were on the ground and in the atmosphere during the first decade and a half. The functioning of all the vitally important organs of most of the people who have lived or are living here have been adversely affected. The doctors have called the aggregate of clinical phenomena the Kaynar syndrome—for the name of the village where they were first observed.

"The Kaynar syndrome" is not simply a collection of illnesses. The Kaynar syndrome is a deadly horror. A horror that is transmitted genetically from generation to generation. And it is almost impossible to do anything about it. One third of the babies born here are either dead or are monsters. Religion and customs have not permitted the Kazakhs to kill themselves. Today suicide is a mark of the times. Impotence and other physical defects push people, primarily youth, to the limit.

An ecological conference in the United States comes to mind. The reaction of aged American professors—scientists with world-famous names—when they found out about the custom of Aral Sea Kazakhs of lowering a child's cradle into the grave along with the dead child is recalled. They were shaken, they had never known of such a thing. What is more, they knew from this that the increase in infant mortality from birth anomalies caused by genetic defects because of a worsening of the ecological balance had become a steady trend in Kazakhstan. Thus Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] has just recently "let the cat out of the bag": the proportion of congenital defects in the development of children less than a year old has grown 1.5-fold to 2-fold in the past 10-15 years.

Here is the arithmetic: half a percent there, half a percent here.

It is horrible? It is to me, too. It is horrible that about 80 percent of the republic's population lives in an area of ecological crisis. This population breathes filthy air that is saturated with nitrous oxides and nonferrous metals and whatever gushes forth. Here the water is dirty on the

verge of unsuitability for drinking, and the forests are withering. Farm products are polluted by nitrates, pesticides, and heavy metals.

Each day tens of thousands of people in the republic miss work because of sickness. All this is terrible, as is the recognition that the crisis itself will not melt away but will grow.

In essence, we have all become hostages every day of a powerful, invincible infrastructure of departments, main administrations, and the former ideology. This ideology, with its concept of a "rosy future," became almost the only criterion for life and the people's welfare. Strange as it may seem, the haze over the city, which obscures the sun (pictures of this type still decorate the halls of the Tretyakovskiy gallery), was also considered a step toward a bright future and even an integral part of it. And so things were blackened with smoke.

The country is in ecological ruin. The state budget deficit is enormous. Each year we spend about 11.6 billion rubles for nature conservation, and this is about 1.7 percent of the gross national product.

In the United States, I found out, each year 70-80 billion dollars are spent on protecting the environment. And indeed it is well known that we need capital investment of at least three percent of the gross national product just to stabilize the situation and only with a five-percent contribution to nature can we hope for an improvement of its quality.

What is the actual practice? Actually a trend toward "one-shot" actions is noted. Multimillion-ruble injections can absorb ecological pains for a time, let us say, in that same Aral region. But subsidies, which are mighty in appearance, project only an image of dilettantes. These "rescue shots" do not in and of themselves bring any result, since they were not planned under specific active programs. And so it happens: in whatever amounts we throw money in bulk into the breach, the ecological monster, like "Derzhavin's old man," is soiled, ravenous, and howling....

Right now, while the Union government is undergoing structural changes, it is time for the republics themselves to solve their ecological problems. It would be correct, most likely, to delegate strictly defined ecological functions to the country's Cabinet/ministries along with economic functions. But indeed is that what is happening? A year ago the USSR Sovmin (Council of Ministers) adopted a decree about increasing the output of consumer goods. And this minuscule subitem was included in this same decree at the very last moment it says, the shutdown of enterprises for ecological reasons is forbidden. Of course, there are not enough commodities and the counters are empty, but let us ask the people: do they want to pay for commodities with their own health? If it is considered that in some republics enterprises of Union subordination make up 70 or more percent of the total industry, then it is not difficult to see the hidden meaning of such a decision.

It turns out that no one in the field is empowered to close a harmful production facility. At the very least, even in the "laxness" of the various types of inspection, organs of the hydrometeorological service or the sanitation and epidemiology stations were able to take steps, and a model of monitoring had been worked out. But now everything is falling apart again....

It is plainer to say that not one of the unimpressive decrees of the higher authorities on nature conservation, beginning with the seventies, was carried out completely; most of them were not carried out at all. And so it happens that if all the rayon ecological disasters named in the USSR Supreme Soviet decree of 2 December 1989 were put on a map, there would be a vast territory on which all of Europe and a good half of Africa could be placed. Wastelands of this type caused by technology also cover Kazakhstan to a considerable extent.

But we did not know much and we still do not know much. We do not know what happened to the cattle that ate contaminated scrub of the Semipalatinsk testing ground. We did not figure out where a poisonous cloud from the beryllium production facility of Ust-Kamenogorsk went. We are figuring out how, but we do not lift a finger, to save the forests of North Kazakhstan. We lull ourselves to sleep with the hope for a "good uncle" who can untie the knots of the Aral and the Balkhash with one stroke. Somehow this is, of course, the result of criminal concealment of the truth by the local influential persons concerned, who now pass by each other at their personal suburban Moscow country houses, with personal pensions or the expectancy of same while sitting in the soft armchairs of the ministries, concerns, and so on. But it looks as if this is our current state with regard to the "Kaynar syndrome"—the genetic horror beaten into us by the command-administration system.

Is it not time to see that without a splendid well-arranged ecology no economy of any kind can emerge? Theoretically what has happened can repeat itself. But such a thing is unlikely to happen in 10 years.

Chemical Pollution of Bashkiria's Belaya River Outlined

91W0369B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
4 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by R. Budrina: "The Poor Agidel"]

[Text] **We usually think about the river only when something happens to it. And so it flows by itself, and it flows. Water and water. Like the air, like the sun.**

If you live on the Belaya River—fondly named the Agidel—you expect to take a bucket in your hand. You read again the EKO bulletin, which is published by Bashkiria's State Committee for Protecting the Environment: there are phenols, nitrogen, chromium, copper

and zinc....And all in amounts that far exceed the permissible—this is the "chemical content" of Bashkiria's main river. And petroleum products?

In Vizhbulyakskiy Rayon the drinking water of 5,000 hectares was poisoned. In Ufimskaya Rayon underground water was polluted for 80 square kilometers, and many communities have been deprived of water. In Ishimbay, after the Belaya subsided into its riverbed, 382 hectares on its shore were polluted by petroleum products....

All this was extracted from local newspapers.

Who will save the river? God? Justice? Scientists? Someone must get close to the solution of the problem, as one rids oneself of "bold spirits."

This is the conclusion of Dmitriy Vyacheslavovich Zeyfert, an experienced hydroecologist and candidate of biological sciences, who is working in Sterlitamak: "The pollution of the Belaya is irreversible for 20 kilometers from the source of the discharges, even after they have ceased. A hundred kilometers of the river is unsuitable for drinking and cooking."

A scientist was dismissed because of a reduction in the staff.

Zeyfert invited in qualified specialists from MGU's [Moscow State University's] Soils Chemistry Department. But after they observed mercury in the soil, the Sterlitamakskiy Rayon Ispolkom canceled contracts with the VUZ [higher educational institution] without even an explanation of its motives.

There was a time when Bashkiria's ecologists were accepted seriously at the international level—they were invited to seminars, they were included in All-European monitoring, and there were efforts to help. Here is what that same D. V. Zeyfert wrote after a forum at Nalchik: "We were astonished that even specialists who were thousands of kilometers from Sterlitamak related with enormous sympathy to the harm to our city. They discussed proposals for partial financing of work on the state of the environment at Sterlitamak from international funds, about the assistance of foreign specialists in making analyses on pollution of the environment by organic and metalloorganic compounds, about free assistance in equipping the city with the necessary analytical equipment and reagents, and also with computer programs for personal computers. All the proposals were adopted with gratitude."

Now the foreigners are being frightened by the problems of Bashkiria—ecological impunity has taken this republic so far along.

The newspaper NABAT for February of this year said in the article, "What shall we drink?": "In Yermekyevskiy Rayon the peasantry is defending their springs with pitchforks."

People are seeking protection from the courts. But what can the courts do if the 14 April 1990 decree of Bashkiria's Council of Ministers freed industrial enterprises from fees for using up natural resources? What fuel for ecological extremism!

I was talking with workers of the Kaustik Association, whose effluents are poisoning fields, the water, and the air. And here the Deputy Chief Engineer for Protecting the Environment (!) complained about the obsolete equipment and the fines that they still have to pay to environmental protection institutions. But if only these measures had at least somehow restrained the growing avalanche of ecological damage that has literally collapsed the republic in recent years!

Bashkiria's interrayon environmental-protection prosecutor, although he has only four people on his staff and not a single (!) means of transportation, still is trying to find time for what is happening, to find and somehow to penalize the guilty in each separate case. But the trouble is that there are many cases, and too many of them have come up in recent years. The equipment of numerous chemical plants, oilfield facilities, and other enterprises has in time become unfit and requires replacement or overhaul.

Does the public understand all this? Only to a degree. At Chapayevskiy Sovkhoz in Ufimskiy Rayon, which is on the Belaya, for a long time now they have stopped bathing in the Belaya, and they drink water only from artesian wells. But they irrigate the vegetable fields from the river. One can only guess what the quality is of the produce obtained there, because there is no current monitoring over the way it is raised.

It has been estimated that each resident of the city of Ufa has sustained R312 worth of damage because of several powerful discharges of poisonous substances by Khimprom Association enterprises. But no one has calculated how much damage the countryside has suffered.

If even such a large river has not withstood the impact of industry, which is to be said about small ones? They are simply destroyed, first of all cutting down the forest. And as a result that same Agidel has become shallow. In the specialists' opinion, "as a result of depletion of the forests during the period 1941-1982, the flow pattern of the upper reaches of the Belaya has changed considerably."

Where are those laws, strict and active, which could protect the poor Agidel, and with it all of us, from ecological harm? No, we have not to this day introduced such laws. That is why ecologically dangerous enterprises continue to operate in the old way and with the old violations. It has happened that they have been fined individually. Even the republic's prosecutor still cannot stop them and force them to be concerned about the ecological safety of all life. The game goes on, on paper. And it should be time to end it.

Attempts at Local Control of Ocean Resource Exploitation Criticized

91BXN03674 Moscow PR UDA in Russian 4 Apr 91
First Edition p 2

[Article by A. Kolodkin, president of the Soviet Association of Maritime Law and doctor of juridical sciences, P. Moiseyev, doctor of biological sciences, V. Zilanov, candidate of biological sciences, and A. Vylegzhanin, candidate of juridical sciences, under the rubric: "Economic Panorama: Don't Tear the Sea to Pieces: How To Handle the Country's Bioresources Efficiently"]

[Text] The new constitutions of some Union republics declare waters, the continental shelf, and natural resources the exclusive state property of the republics. But the Ispolkom of the Kamchatka Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies took an even more radical step in March of last year. We are talking of a 200-mile economic zone—the peninsula. That's right—not a country, a republic, or even an oblast, but simply the peninsula.

One cannot fail but be alarmed at such a "new approach," the essence of which is repudiation of the USSR's sovereign rights to living resources in the economic zone and on the continental shelf and the inclination to divide these regions up piecemeal.

On the surface this approach seems to fit harmoniously into the process of expanding people's power locally. Moreover, it is to a certain degree a reaction to the serious mistakes made in the past in the matter of preserving stocks of certain types of fish and marine life on the USSR coasts, for example on the Kamchatka coast and in the Bering Sea. But will the proposed way of breaking up the sovereign rights of the USSR be a panacea for preventing previous mistakes? Is it not fraught with even more serious dangers?

One of the natural characteristics of fish, marine life, and other marine living resources is their mobility. Many species are capable of moving great distances. In order to utilize their stocks rationally, an integrated system of preservation is necessary throughout the entire habitation range, a system which includes measures to regulate industry. What will happen if now-integrated sovereign rights regarding bioresources of the economic zone of the USSR are handed over to local structures? The local organ is accustomed to managing the bioresources in a particular part of the economic zone; to determining the size of the permissible fishing catch, for example.

Will there be scientifically correlated measures adopted in several neighboring sections? Hardly. For each republic, kray, or oblast organ of power represents above all the interests of the people of its own territory. If, let us say, only immature fish live in the maritime region of a particular territory but they become mature in the neighbors' territory, it will be very difficult for the local organ to prohibit taking this kind of fish in its own "piece" just so the catch increases in the neighboring "piece." But not prohibiting it will have catastrophic consequences for

the bioresources of the basin as a whole, considering the natural interrelationships in nature.

And here is another important consideration: from the standpoint of Soviet law, the USSR's rights over the resources of the USSR economic zone are realized to the benefit of all Union republics. This principle of equality would be violated if the rights to the resources distributed around the sections of the USSR economic zone were extended only to certain Union republics with sea coasts. The interests of the Union republics without access to the sea would be infringed upon. How are these problems being resolved in world practice? In maritime state-federations (the states in the United States, the provinces and territories in Canada, the states and territories in Australia, and so on), the federal organs rather than the state formations which make up the federation have the exclusive rights to the bioresources of the economic zones. In large coastal countries which are unitary states, these sovereign rights are also assigned to the jurisdiction of the central organs of power and management, but not to the local ones (prefectures and districts in Japan, provinces and autonomous regions in China, and so on). The 12 EEC member countries have handed over their sovereign rights to living resources and the formulation and implementation of a uniform fishing policy to a single organ—the department of fishing in the executive organ of the EEC. In the international arena only the EEC organ acts alone on behalf of the EEC member countries on issues of fishing policy. This integrated orientation contains the logic of more meaningful consideration by the international community of the diverse relations among living nature in the Pacific Ocean. But it is proposed to us to move backwards and tear the sea into "pieces." That's foolish!

We must not fail to note the fact that neither the economic zone nor the continental shelf is part of the territory of any state, the USSR included, and certainly not of its republics, krais, or oblasts. In light of that and in accordance with international law, the Soviet Union has sovereign rights only for the purposes of exploring and exploiting the natural wealth of these regions and has jurisdiction for the restricted purposes precisely enumerated in the UN Convention on Maritime Law of 1982.

Scientist on Control, Dangers, Benefits of Pesticide Use

9JWN0367B Minsk BELORUSSKAYA NIVA
in Russian 22 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Yevgeniy Vitalyevich Kharchenko, candidate of biological sciences and head of the Belorussian Toxicology Laboratory of the All-Union Institute of Plant Protection, by V. Nikolaychuk under the rubric: "Timely Interview"; time, place, and date not specified]

[Text] Unfortunately, in our agriculture today, in the opinion of the head of the Belorussian Toxicology Laboratory of the All-Union Institute of Plant Protection,

Candidate of Biological Sciences Ye. V. Kharchenko, poison is really a blessing, because there is as yet no alternative in the country to chemical means for protecting plants. V. Nikolaychuk, BELORUSSKAYA NIVA special correspondent, talks with Yevgeniy Vitalyevich.

[Nikolaychuk] But first, however, Yevgeniy Vitalyevich, let us outline the set of problems which your laboratory is working on.

[Kharchenko] It is one of 28, so to speak, peripheral parts of our head institute, which is in Leningrad. And we are working on experimenting with new domestic and foreign types of pesticides for later registration in our country. For the most part they are chemical means for protecting plants from weeds, pests, disease, and, to a certain extent, growth regulators. We evaluate their biological activism and determine the optimal application norms and the application rates. At the same time, along with the country's sanitary and other scientific institutions (VNIIGINTOKSom [All-Union Scientific Institute of Hygiene and Toxins] and the Belorussian Scientific Institute of Sanitation and Hygiene, for example), we are monitoring the dynamics of residues of chemicals in the soil, ground waters, agricultural crops, air, and so on and their impact on other objects of the environment. A chemical is presented for registration in the USSR on the basis of this multifactor toxicological dossier and the healthful use regulations formulated.

The main result of this work and the work of our colleagues is this extensive "List of Chemical and Biological Means To Fight Against Pests, Weeds, Diseases, and Growth Regulators of Plants Permitted for Use in USSR Agriculture." It was compiled for the 1990s. But additions and refinements are introduced into the list for each particular year. You yourself understand that it is simply impossible to republish an entire book in full and send it throughout the country efficiently, and at your own cost too.

[Nikolaychuk] Does what you have said mean that all chemical compounds used in our agriculture are retested every year? And does there exist any system at all for controlling chemicals registered earlier?

[Kharchenko] No, we do not practice such compulsory retesting of chemicals registered earlier unless there are complaints from the sanitary or ecological services, for example from medical workers, the nature protection service office, veterinarians, the "Greens," the fisheries protection agency, and the like. But if such a signal comes in, the chemical is certainly retested.

[Nikolaychuk] Does your laboratory have its own experimental fields?

[Kharchenko] No, we do not have and as far as I know never have had such fields. We rent them from the republic's farms. Anticipating a possible question, allow me to stress that in general the managers meet us half-way, because obviously they understand that we are working above all for their benefit. But, of course, there

are complications. In principle no landlord wants to risk his crops and his land, even if we pay good money to rent it. And such a risk naturally does exist.

[Nikolaychuk] In that case where does the output grown go? Is there a guarantee that it will not end up on our table? If you recall instances when in pursuit of plans and profits certain managers plant and mow even in the 30-kilometer Chernobyl zone, the question by no means seems an idle one.

[Kharchenko] All output obtained from the experimental fields is confiscated and not used for food needs. We make sure of that. However, as they say, only God can give a 100-percent guarantee. So, although I have no examples where the output from our fields went to store counters, I would still not undertake to rule out such a thing absolutely. Especially now, when our social production is being changed to the pragmatic course of market relations, without our having any sophistication in these relations.

But I would still like to reassure your readers a little: none of the chemicals tested by us are absolutely new and completely untested. Before they reach our fields, they undergo both a scientific expert panel review and laboratory testing. And, in addition, as a rule the imported chemicals we test must be registered somewhere already.

[Nikolaychuk] But then why are there cases when a chemical being tested not only destroys the crops, but sometimes takes the fields out of crop rotation altogether? At least you hear about such cases. And, the well-known decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "On Emergency Measures for Ecological Normalization of the Country" states that "millions of hectares of once-fertile land have been withdrawn from agricultural turnover. It is dangerous to use some of the food products for food because they are full of pesticides, nitrates, and radionuclides."

[Kharchenko] I can only confirm that, unfortunately, such cases do occur, and not so very rarely. To illustrate, several years ago after flax fields in various oblasts of the republic had been treated with the herbicide "Glin," made by the American firm Dupont, row crops were not planted on these fields at all for two years because of the strong residual herbicide effect. But it was not the chemical itself which was to blame for this; according to our data and the data of our colleagues, the chemical was quite promising because of its high effectiveness and small dosages required. The negative results in this case were the result of flagrant violations of the technology of its application, in particular, substantially higher application norms.

Such cases expose not only our economic irresponsibility and neglect, but also our technical backwardness. The sprayers which exist in our country are very primitive. True, when we are speaking of applying four-six liters of chemical per hectare, excess application of 0.5-1 liter is

not so very dangerous. But applying 20 grams of chemical instead of 10 is already double the dosage, which may have serious consequences. The "Glin" mentioned was in fact one of the first chemicals with such a very small recommended dosage, which our equipment was simply unable to follow strictly. And if you add to that our national custom of doing everything by eye, approximately, and adding on a little more "just in case," then the picture is certainly not a happy one.

Incidentally, it was precisely these instances which forced us to take up predicting the possible negative situations if the technology was violated or the chemicals with a very strong biological effect were handled improperly (using higher dosages, changing application times, using tank mixtures, and the like), in order to develop recommendations on eliminating potential negative ecological consequences. At the present time data is being gathered and in the future we plan to set up models for predicting situations on a computer.

[Nikolaychuk] But still, Yevgeniy Vitalyevich, doesn't the example you cited strengthen the common opinion that the West is selling us output and technology, herbicides included, which are banned from use in their own countries? According to the principle: "Here, Lord, you can have what's not fit for us." And in that connection: to what degree do the sanitary norms regarding herbicides which exist in our country conform to foreign analogues?

[Kharchenko] Allow me to start at the end. No matter how paradoxical it may seem, in the USSR these norms are quite rigorous. And if a chemical is registered in our country, it is highly rated throughout the world. It is possible that this is just the case where the bureaucracy has had some benefit. While the chemical was gathering the official stamps from numerous houses and offices, like it or not, it had to be worked into condition. This is unlike the West, where people try to put a promising pesticide into production, even if just experimental, right off.

And now, about the quality of the output being bought in the West. Allow me to assure you once again that we do not buy chemicals known to be harmful. Because not one of them can be bought at all until it is tested and registered in the USSR. As I hope you understand, that is precisely what we are doing. We receive samples of a chemical for testing free of charge, by the way.

However, it would be naive to assume that all the means to protect plants that we buy abroad are the very latest, although the concepts "old" and "new" in this case tell you practically nothing. The main indicators in regard to means of protection are their effectiveness, safety, economy, and the like. And if today we are buying chemicals which are not always the best, it is not the West but rather we ourselves who are to blame for it. First, it is not the managers who are involved in the purchases but our businessmen, and they do not always know how to do business in a civilized manner and, to

put it crudely, sometimes don't give a damn about the quality of the output they are buying. Secondly, we are still not rich enough to buy the best of everything, because the best of everything is correspondingly expensive. And, sorry to say, thirdly, beggars can't be choosers when there is an altogether enormous shortage of means to protect plants in the country, and so their quantity rather than their quality becomes paramount. The principle "better cheaper but more" operates.

[Nikolaychuk] The principle is really dangerous, especially if we consider that frequently local areas operate on those standards too. Incidentally, do you monitor compliance with the technology for working with plant protection means? And just how effective is the monitoring which now exists?

[Kharchenko] Monitoring compliance with the norms and regulations of herbicide application is not part of our duties, and in fact physically we are unable to be involved in monitoring functions. For we test only 30-40 pesticides a year. In keeping with the practice which has become established, the plant protection offices are involved in monitoring. How effective is it? Inadequate, of course. And there are objective reasons for that: the almost universal lack of internal plant protection offices at farms and subordination of such services until recently to "Selkhozkhimiya" [Agricultural Chemicals], whose departmental interests did not always coincide with efficiency; the poor physical facilities of existing offices; and the like. This monitoring can only be considered really effective when specialists of the plant protection office are able to take not only each farm in the republic under their supervision but also each particular field and each hectare of it. But, alas, we have a long way to go to reach that point.

Incidentally, the changes occurring in the countryside intensify this concern even more. Most of the new-fledged farmers do not have elementary agricultural education, not to mention special education. To illustrate, in prosperous Switzerland, even after inheriting a farm a person has no right to manage it without having the necessary knowledge and appropriate clearance. In our country anyone who wants can work on the land.

[Nikolaychuk] But still, Yevgeniy Vitalyevich, no matter how hard we try to convince people that poisons are a blessing, it is difficult for them to reconcile themselves to it. Especially the Belorussians, who are taking a risk even when they put a berry from their own garden into their mouths because of the Chernobyl disaster. Do you take into account the consequences of Chernobyl in your work?

[Kharchenko] For the time being, unfortunately, our laboratory is not working directly on analyzing the impact of radiation on the behavior of the pesticides we test. Nor have we been involved in preparing a list of chemicals permitted for use on lands contaminated with radiation. However, this problem seems very urgent to me, as a scientist. It is already known, for example, that

radiation and pesticide effects can be interconnected, since radiation, which affects the conversion of chemicals in the plant, is sometimes able to produce very aggressive products of decomposition of pesticides with consequences that are for now unpredictable.

In general, this problem still has not been adequately studied. And since effective management of agriculture today is impossible without the use of pesticides, it is not advisable to risk using contaminated lands for growing food products at all. It is better to manage the clear areas that we have now more efficiently. Even though, as everyone knows, this position always arouses controversy in scientific circles.

[Nikolaychuk] But does the advisability of further chemicalization of agriculture cause less controversy? The mass information media cite quite a few examples from the West which prove that there a course has been taken toward biological methods of plant protection. How do matters stand in that direction in our country? And aren't you afraid of being left unemployed in connection with the turn in public opinion?

[Kharchenko] No, I'm not afraid. For now there is no alternative to chemical means of plant protection either in our country or in the world; and, I'm certain, there won't be in at least the foreseeable future. The biological method has not yet been formulated theoretically and practically in the volume and scale needed to compete on equal terms with the chemical method. To illustrate, in our country the number of types of biological compounds can be counted literally on your fingers. Of course, among them are quite effective ones, but they are more demanding with respect to storage and use conditions, more labor intensive and more expensive, require higher technology of production, and so on. That is, everything relies on the economy. For if we cannot produce even chemicals in the necessary quantities and if we have no way to apply them and nowhere to store them, then to speak of biological compounds...

As for public opinion, it is not always objective. In principle any medicine is also a poison, if it is used improperly. Nonetheless, I consider any criticism useful. The plant protection service office has long been in need of society's attention and help.

Zalygin Outlines Criticism of Salykov's Aral Crisis Approach

91B N0334.1 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Mar 91 Union Edition p 3

[Letter from USSR People's Deputy S. Zalygin, chairman of the Ecology and World Association: "What I Disagree With and Why"]

[Text] During discussion of the question of the ecological situation in the Aral Sea basin at the 1 March regular session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, I expressed my misgivings to Comrade K.S. Salykov, chairman of the Committee on the Ecology

I will explain why I did that.

More than 30 million residents of the Aral basin find themselves in a zone of poverty today. I will cite just one fact: this region has the highest infant mortality rate in the world. I will not cite other facts of this nature; they are already well-known. But I will examine the question from the aspect of the activities of the Committee on Ecology.

At the end of 1989 the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution, the third point of which stated: "...Support competitive development of concepts for restoring the Aral Sea, and in 1990, present specific implementation proposals for the examination of the USSR Supreme Soviet."

A year and three months have gone by, children are dying in the Aral basin, and Comrade Salykov, at a Supreme Soviet session announces a draft of a "new" resolution, in which there are once again no concepts; and, he asks another six months to draw it up. Strictly speaking, there is nothing in this "new" document besides bureaucratic blather and wishes addressed to Lord-knows-who.

And the Supreme Soviet, although it is sending this draft on for processing, has uttered not a word of reproach to its committee.

The word "concept" has everyone hypnotized today, the moreso since it is very convenient to hide behind this word. And so Comrade Salykov too is hiding, since a concept on the Aral was prepared long ago in the works of Soviet scientists, specifically by Academician Yanshin's commission in 1983-1985.

But Comrade Salykov, no doubt thinking that the solution of all problems begins with him, is not interested in the results of previous works.

Furthermore, we speak of an "Aral catastrophe." But this is, after all, not an unexpected catastrophe at all: this was the result of carrying out the plans of the former Minvodkhoz [Ministry of Land Improvement and Water Conservation].

Minvodkhoz long ago anticipated (!) the drying up of the Aral, and even produced maps on which the sea bottom was occupied with flourishing rice plantations. In order to achieve this goal Minvodkhoz spent billions and billions of rubles (It received approximately one-third of all capital investments in agriculture, over 12 billion rubles a year); and now the water conservationists are asking for more billions for restoration of the Aral (that is, in order to cover their own crimes, which are on an unbelievable scale).

The Supreme Soviet is providing the money. And that is understandable. But how can one remain silent about who is to blame?

Unquestionably, money for eliminating the catastrophe must be appropriated immediately (USSR Supreme

Soviet Chairman Comrade Lukyanov has confirmed this); but to whom should it be given? Should it really be given to those very same water conservationists who despoiled the Aral? In my view, the monies should be given directly to the councils of ministers (and perhaps to the supreme soviets as well) of the republics which have suffered, bypassing the hands of those engineers who are only looking for more and more billions in budget appropriations, and after receiving them, to hold sway in the localities, and excavate as needed—and, moreover, when it is not needed, and devour the lion's share of these appropriations, placing orders for construction projects themselves.

This business must be changed. Let the republic councils of ministers place orders for a minimum amount of work by the water conservationists, and let them spend the remaining funds at their discretion for health-care, and for socio-domestic purposes as a whole.

Two directions have long since taken shape in attempting to solve the water problems of the Aral Sea and the Aral Basin. The first is—conserving the flow of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya, since 44 cubic kilometers are expended here for over-irrigation [perepoliva], which is in fact the principal reason for the water shortage, and "writing off" millions of acres of irrigated land. The second variant is to transfer to the Aral Sea 27 cubic kilometers from the River Ob (To reiterate: 44 cubic kilometers are spent on over-irrigation!).

Of course, in my view, the second variant is simply another present to "Vodstroy" [Hydraulic Engineering]. According to estimates by scientists, the 2,350-kilometer long transfer canal and the ancillary projects will cost from 90-100 billion rubles, and construction will take about 30-40 years; but "Vodstroy" is ready to spend the money today. There is also a psychological aspect here: If the water conservationists receive millions and billions today (and in the near future, tens of billions and more), that means, their sins and crimes of yesterday are forgiven.

Strangely, the Committee on the Ecology has not yet spoken up. And their silence is clearly to the benefit of "Vodstroy."

Of course, the Ob-Aral transfer canal must not be combined with Kazakhstan's water needs for purposes of municipal water supply. These are two different things. We must not combine the two problems, water supply and irrigation. Such a combination, once again, benefits only the water conservationists.

The Aral is hardly the only ecological crime of the water-conservationists.

I will permit myself to recount only a few of them.

In its time Minvodkhoz undertook the transfer of the waters of northern rivers into the Caspian. The expenses amounted to hundreds of billions of rubles when the project was abolished for insolvency.

The Dunay-Dneper transfer-canal project was abolished (the Lake Sasyk estuary was ruined).

The Volga-Chogray transfer-canal project: construction was cancelled. Hundreds of millions of rubles were spent, and huge expanses of steppe were spoiled.

The Volga-Don Basin canal project: cancelled at the height of construction, principally owing to the intervention of the people of Volgograd.

Construction of the Leningrad dike: it was turned down by nearly a dozen expert commissions, but work stubbornly continues, now even with the help obedient foreign experts (and this means hundreds of thousands of dollars); although even without the experts it is already clear that the construction is defective, because before building the dike, it is necessary to build purification facilities.

However, the purification facilities have been put in second place, since it is much more profitable to build the dike; and so the builders are creating a cesspool, and from henceforth the cesspool will be at the disposal of the city of Leningrad. The protests of the Leningrad Soviet are to no avail. It too is powerless before the titanic agency.

Construction of a dike at the mouth of the Karabogaz River: once again billions of rubles and mind-boggling losses, and they will be felt for decades to come.

And, I repeat, the Aral catastrophe—the safe bastion of Vodstroy, must be added to this list of horrors as well.

One should also remember that over 3.5 million hectares of irrigated lands (more than all of Belgium) have been “written off.” Nowhere else on earth is their even such a term “writing-off” of land; but with us it is practiced as something routine; and this “writing-off” takes place under the aegis of those same water conservationists.

The value of the written-off and despoiled lands amounts to approximately 1.5-2.0 trillion rubles.

If the water conservationists are not judged, and not even called by name; if every means is taken to hide their names from the populace, then future catastrophes are guaranteed.

Is it necessary to judge the criminals? It is necessary!

There is a multitude of lawsuits and complaints, some drawn up and some not yet completed—in Volgograd and Rostov Oblasts; in Belorussia where lands in the Pripyat Basin have been drained to excess; in Siberia. But instead of this, these very same water conservationists are receiving new billions for “restoration of the Aral,” with the quiet (and at times not so quiet) patronage of Comrade Salykov. And that in fact is why I am speaking about all these facts, have spoken and will of course continue to speak, I and many other specialists; but from Comrade Salykov never a word? Or is he not acquainted with these facts? Then how on earth can he

lead the committee? Is it not because a merger is taking place here between the agency and such organs as our Committee on the Ecology?

The Minvodkhoz people refuse to take any responsibility, adopting the rather guileless camouflage, that over a two or three year period they were changed from Minvodkhoz into Minvodstroy, from Minvodstroy into the State Concern “Vodstroy,” and this state concern is covered by the Aral Consortium, which has been approved (once again as the “sole client”) by the Council of Ministers, even without a charter. Now, it is as if “Vodstroy-Aral” bears no responsibility for the actions of Minvodkhoz-Minvodstroy; but you see, in all these organizational hypostases, they were led by and are still led by the unsinkable Polad-Zades, husband and wife. She—in her position planned the “prospects,” and he—in his position as deputy minister carried them out, as he does today as leader of the Vodstroy Concern. Like it or not, one must suppose that, without support from somewhere out “there,” things would not turn out this way.

And what has the committee done in all those regions where transfers, excessive drainage, over-irrigation and writing-off of lands took place? It has not done a thing. It has not participated in one single cancellation of construction projects of this type, and has not even expressed a definite attitude toward them.

Comrade Salykov receives P.A. Polad-Zade at sessions of his committee as a welcome visitor: “Please, please offer your proposals to our committee; we shall always support you!” And, so to speak, they are old acquaintances: Comrade Salykov was first secretary of the Karakalpak Oblast CPSU Committee, and his contacts with Comrade Polad-Zade are solid. The USSR Supreme Soviet draft resolution on the Aral initially contained (under the pressure of certain deputies) a clause on establishing a commission to determine the guilty parties in the Aral catastrophe; but by the time the text was finalized it was no longer there.

Incidentally, what does one need a commission for if a crime has been committed? This is not a matter for commissions, but for the procuracy.

Comrade Salykov has never worked in ecology before, and could not even tell you what this term means.

You see, I have already spoken of this at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and I am forced to repeat it right now in order to attract public attention; the morose, since not one single newspaper has said a word about my speech.

I would like to call attention to yet another problem: as long as we have no prices for land, nor for water, we shall continue to use them senselessly and in a criminal manner. (The Committee on the Ecology is not even close to answering these principal questions.)

I agree, the land question is more complex, but the question on the cost of water has been raised for many

years already; it met with no opposition from any side but the matter has not budged an inch.

The hydraulic engineers, it is true, understand the matter in their own way: they want to trade in state water—it goes without saying, at a profit for themselves.

And yet another astonishing thing: as soon as we have another ecological disaster, thousands of volunteers will rush up, and will grow fat on it. And dozens of commissions, research institutes, committees, etc., will be created.

Now, I am certain, Comrade Salykov will respond like this: "But we are establishing, and have already established so-and-so-many commissions, and such-and-such an institute!"

They can establish all they want, but to this day no concept on the Aral has been adopted, and children are still dying in the Aral Basin... And there is still no realistic analysis of the state of water conservation.

The committee has not once sent any cases to court or to the procurator. Does that mean that everything is in order, and no crimes have been committed against the environment? But on the other hand, the idea has been submitted to establish a special ecological procuracy. What for? So that they can put their own people there too? (Whoever establishes a new organization becomes its master.) So that they can fragment the already existing procuracy, and take all the environmental protection cases away from it? Would it not be better to strengthen the procuracy which already exists, and not commence unjustified undertakings?

This is why I have expressed my lack of confidence in the chairman of the Committee on the Ecology. It seems that this is the first such instance in the history of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

And this is why even now I consider it necessary to appeal over and over to the USSR Supreme Soviet through the press, to pay attention to the water and land problem. We stand here on the brink of a national disaster, but because of political debates and ambitions, we are putting it off for the future.

I speak only about the problem of the land and the water because, nearly all significant life is connected with them; but I do not think things are any better in other ecological areas. If we do not do anything today, by tomorrow it will be too late. Even if we solve the problems of the market, the economy, and politics, nothing will help: it will be too late.

And one final question: To whom shall we entrust our future, and into whose hands has it fallen?

P.S. The "Ecology and World Association" requests that all those organizations which have filed (or are filing) lawsuits against Minvudkhov-Minvodstro, and Vodstro, to inform us of this.

Ecological Union Head Seeks Industrial Development Cooperation

91W N0334B Moscow, IRLD in Russian 26 Feb 91 p. 2

[Article by Doctor of Biological Sciences N. Reymer, president of the USSR Ecological Society and the Nature Use Federation: "Do the 'Greens' Want War?"]

[Text] It was quite acceptable to bring the indictment, and without a hearing. And it is not a question of, to quote Old Kiylov, "looking at yourself instead" [I. Kiylov, "The Mirror and the Monkey"—1816]. It is very convenient to cast one's own economic sins onto the "Greens." If there is a breakdown in the chemical industry, the Greens are to blame—and they close the enterprises. If there are neither woolen nor cotton fabrics, once again, the Greens are interfering—they are blocking the production of dyes. If there is a crash in agriculture, it's those Greens interfering again—they spoke out against the BVK [protein-vitamin concentrate], and are criticizing the use of mineral fertilizers and pesticides. And if they have difficulty heating buildings in Moscow, it's as plain as day: the Greens have blocked the construction of the Northern TEs [heat and power station]... They are extremists; they are ignoramuses. We, the industrialists, are doing such a great deal; we are working so zealously to improve the environment in which we live—and they—they just keep interfering. And is it not a shame that there are not even any plain, untinted fabrics; that BVK and agriculture are as alike as meters and pounds; that the power engineers are promising to freeze the Muscovites next winter, when at the very same time the Northern TEs should be built in only a few years.

But after all, the sensible Greens are not at all speaking out against industry *per se*, but are merely opposed to the harmful consequences of its activities. As world practice demonstrates, the consequences are altogether eradicable. If, of course, one has the will to do so. But that is precisely what is lacking among the "technocrats." Doubtless, there are extremists among the Greens. And scarcely all their proposals are acceptable. For example, there is no way one can grasp why all the dams at GES [hydroelectric power plants] along the Volga must be blown up, and that all AES [nuclear electric power plants] must be immediately shut down, without exception. Certain of their recommendations are useful, but it is not possible to implement them in the short run; for example, to halt the use of pesticides within a year, or two years. Quiet, businesslike dialogue is what is needed. But when on the one hand you have bottomless emotion, bordering on hysteria, and on the other, a wall of technocratic obtuseness—you will not get to the heart of the matter.

The USSR Ecological Society is an organization which has from the very beginning focused on positive solutions to the problems. Thus far it has not spoken out against any one project, except for those which are clearly destructive and extremely harmful—such as

water transfer canals and the production of protein-vitamin concentrates (BVK [belkovo-vitaminnye kontsentraty]). The nation's legislative authorities have spoken out unequivocally on both questions. In any rule-of-law state, the executive authorities are obliged to carry out the decisions of the parliament. And the fact that, after adoption of a decision, some of them continue to dally seems very, very strange. The law is strict, but it is the law. Failure to comply with it is a crime. The "technocrats" cannot seem to grasp this at all, being accustomed to a monopoly on the truth, were it only the "truth." The habit of, "I'll do what I like," prevents peaceful dialogue even with environmental protectionists like the USSR Ecological Society [Ekosoyuz], which firmly subscribes to the Golden Rule, "Do no harm."

One would think that the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes. But no, there is a problem between them. And the first question to the disputing sides arises automatically: who stands to gain? The Greens are accused of trying to reap political capital. You have to admit, it happens sometimes. But this capital is ephemeral. As far as tangible gains are concerned, as a rule the Greens only lose. They are not demanding bread, but health; not prizes and medals, but life for themselves and their children, and incidentally, the children of their opponents. The usual thesis of the "technocrats" is, if you do not let us build the canal—there will be no irrigated lands, and consequently no food; if you do not let us build the Northern TETs, you will not have any heat. It all seems very logical. But this logic is overwrought. It originates with the presumption of no other alternative. The "technocrat" thinks that one can do only that which he knows about and knows how to do. For him there is no other way.

The fact of the matter is, there may be various ways of reaching the goal. Free land reclamation is not the only method of increasing crop yield; and construction of a new TETs requires even more funds than energy-conserving modernization of industry and housing. If there is no soap, no dyes or other chemical products somewhere, it is not the Greens who are to blame, who insisted on shutting down the only monopoly enterprise in the country, which was, by the way—a dirty one. The guilty parties are the ones who have blown away huge sums for implementing unnecessary and even harmful projects; the ones who did not build a new "clean" chemical plant, and moreover not just one, but several thereby eliminating the monopoly.

Our ecological situation is among the worst. This cannot but have an effect on the economy and sociopolitical wellbeing. The agony of the Aral is followed by the ecological shock of the entire Aral Basin. And the situation is no better in the Azov-Black Sea Basin, in the White and Barents Seas, in the Volga-Caspian system, and in the rivers of Siberia and the Far East. Matters are poor with the living environment in the majority of the cities; the chernozems are being exhausted, and the forests used up; and the low technological standards have made the atomic power stations, petroleum refineries,

oil and gas pipelines, and even the railroads and Aero-flot—dangerous. Now put all this together—with the stresses of total lack of goods. The down-escalator of ecological disaster is descending even faster than we are able to climb it with our collapsing economy. According to estimates, the current ecological damage en total is almost equal to the gross national product.

It seems clear that we can no longer live this way. But just any confrontation is not the best way of solving the problem. And that includes war between the Greens and the "technocrats." In order to avoid it, good will is required on both sides, as well as the prerequisites for mutual understanding.

Specifically, an "ecological" market is required—extensive production and supply of environmental-protection technologies, instruments and equipment. The primary use would be to improve economic profits and expand the range of goods; the second is the renewal of capital and the rise of a new sphere of activity, which would forestall unemployment. But the main thing is the restoration of the environment and the people's health. After all, ecology is medicine for nature, and hygiene for man.

New generations of highly-productive and wholly competitive resource-conserving and environment-protecting equipment and technology, and "ecologized" economic complexes—these are the technical tasks for the "technocrats." They must create "ecological technology"—purification plants, control instruments, and the like. And you will see normal tractors going out into the fields, and not the monsters which burn vast amounts of fuel and crush the earth so badly that it ceases to produce. If one would just look, one would conclude that all our urban construction is murderous to man, and extravagantly wasteful. We have, you see, the most material-consuming and heavy, and the most crowded homes in Europe... But over there the by-products of the economy will be drawn into the production cycle, and will provide revenues. There is room here everywhere for entrepreneurial activity. We need only to make a beginning.

As a rule, there are always alternatives. The market assures them. Administrative regulation, if it is judicious, will speed up the course of the processes. However, we must not be passive. Otherwise, the phenomenon of "unrestrained capitalism" will overwhelm us. Above all, we need normatives—including ecological normatives. And these are virtually laws. Legal procedure strengthens the good normatives. But only if there are mechanisms of "introduction" for this. In the capitalist world, the administration sets the ecological task. The entrepreneur declares that it is impossible to fulfill, and...fulfills it. The legislators do not care where he gets the funds and the "brains" for this. If he does not fulfill it, he will bear strict responsibility: taxes, and fines, and even prison.

The cause of protecting the environment requires initiative. The USSR Ecological Society has tried to take the first step in this direction. Along with a group of ecologically-oriented enterprises and organizations, it has founded a commercial association called the Natural Resource Use (Prirodopolzovanie) Federation. Positive programs cannot be carried out alone: combined efforts are required. The federation plans to create a reliable system of multi-faceted ecological and ecological-commercial information—about clients, subcontractors, engineers, raw-material markets (especially—secondary) and sales, and about specialists. It also plans to organize,

in time, a commercial ecological bank and a special-purpose fund; and to carry out a number of top-priority projects, including education.

Our federation is merely the "null cycle." If the "technocrats" are genuinely interested in restoring the ecological health of their enterprises, they can take an active part in the federation's undertakings. The Greens do not want "war." We must work together for the sake of the country's wellbeing. Mutual understanding will help find the way to a decent and happy future. And there are no alternatives for this.

Pope Appoints USSR Bishops

91UN1329B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 91
Union Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Appointments of Six Bishops"]

[Text] Pope John Paul II has appointed six bishops and apostolic administrators in Russia, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. These appointments serve as the first step toward the formal establishment of a Roman Catholic diocese in those places where the new appointees are expected to perform.

Iadeush Kondrusevich, 45, born in Belorussia, was named archbishop of Moscow. The last apostolic administrator of the Moscow Roman Catholic diocese left Moscow in 1936. Kazimezh Svntek, a 77-year old Estonian, will be in charge of the future diocese of Minsk and Mogilev. Aleksandr Lashkevich is to become bishop of Grodno. K. Svntek will also serve as the apostolic administrator of the Pinsk diocese. The pope has also established a Roman Catholic administration in Novosibirsk. It will be headed by Jesuit Zhozef Vert, born in Germany. Yan Leng, a curate in Krasnoarmeyensk until now, will become the Catholic administrator in Kazakhstan.

Presumably, the Soviet leaders' agreement to the opening of new dioceses is connected with the expected visit of John Paul II to the USSR in 1992.

Patriarch on Relations With State, Conflict With Emigre Church

91UN12564 Moscow KOMSOMOLSK IY IPRH D1
in Russian 6 Apr 91 p 3

[Interview with Aleksiy II, patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, by S. Berestov, T. Khoroshilova and G. Rezanov: "Light in the Darkness," date and place not given]

[Text] *"And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not"—thus reads a key verse of the excerpt from the Gospel of John, which is read in Orthodox churches on the eve of Easter. The darkness "did not comprehend" the light—thus reads the Slavonic translated text of the Greek original, which its Latin colleague has translated differently: "The light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness received it not." The Russian translation is—optimistic; the Latin—tragic. But the Greek original embraces both meanings.*

Which reading do we prefer today? That there is light, and that means that it is confronting the darkness? This was the subject of our pre-Easter conversation with Aleksiy II, patriarch of Moscow and All Russia.

[Correspondent] Today our Fatherland is going through a time of troubles. Within the Church forces have become active, which are trying to impose their ideas on what the true path of the Church should be, and how it is to restructure and revitalize life. Your Holiness, what do you think about this?

[Aleksiy II] Unfortunately, it is often thought that the tasks of the Church are in the same context as the tasks of the political parties. Therefore, there is inevitably and continually conflict between the Church and the state, between the Church and the authorities. These things have always been so. From the very beginning the Church has had to pay with the blood of its martyrs for the right to live without a continual orientation "to the right" and "to the left." Nor was the conflict resolved when the state became Christian. Both in Byzantium and in Russia, the sovereigns continued to consider their own interests absolute interests, and their attitude toward the Church was as toward a kind of instrument of their state policy.

[Correspondent] A utilitarian attitude of the state toward the Church is noted even today. By the way, what is the Church's attitude toward the referendum? Would it be proper to think that the Patriarch's meeting in the Kremlin was a kind of blessing of the Union?

[Aleksiy II] In the first place, no one asked for a blessing. Thus, there is no question of that. Our country has evolved historically, with our own economic and spiritual ties. We are convinced that the year 1917 was neither the beginning nor the end of our historic path. But the ideological and political capital by which the state was ruled for all those years is exhausted. We hope, in the confrontation of the forces speaking for the dissolution of the country and the forces wishing to preserve the former political system practically unchanged, that other forces will declare themselves, forces which desire unity for our state, but on a principally new political basis. And the demand for an unequivocal "yes" or "no"—you see, that is bolshevik thinking.

[Correspondent] Why did the Patriarch go to the Kremlin on the eve of the referendum, and not the president to the Patriarch?

[Aleksiy II] Even Prince Vladimir, who caused Rus to be baptized, invited the clergymen to come to him. Christ did not disdain to go, not only to the powers that be, but also to the least of sinners.

[Correspondent] Was there not an attempt to involve the Church in the Baltic conflict?

[Aleksiy II] As early as last May, at the Conference of European Churches, of which I have been president for many years now, a statement was adopted which stated: "We pray that the peoples of the Baltic will achieve self-determination by peaceful and lawful means."

But the events of January forced me to clarify my position. In the 15 January issue of the newspaper IZVESTIYA I characterized the use of the armed forces as a sin.

[Correspondent] What is the essence of the conflict between the Russian Orthodox Church and the church abroad?

[Aleksiy II] For us these disagreements are sad, because they are of an exclusively political nature. For the Russian Orthodox Church, dividing the believers on a political basis is an unacceptable thing.

We are divided primarily by the fact that we who remained in Russia have had experiences which, fortunately, they have not had. That is—the experiences of the life of the Church under conditions of a repressive regime, which was established for an indefinite period. How can one live under conditions of totalitarianism, if one does not have hopes for its downfall? We recall that in the 1970's Solzhenitsyn was speaking of the fact that the western-democratic model of society would more likely disappear from the historical arena than the communist. It is easy to accuse us from a position of bookish moralism of the fact that we paid too much tribute to "Caesar." But how can one fail to understand that while we have indeed paid tribute, we have also endured incomparably more moral pain and suffering than our far-off judges.

After all, even for Patriarch Tikhon in the post-revolutionary period it was most difficult to understand, whether Bolshevik rule was a chance and temporary phenomenon, or whether it was for the long term. This was not a question of adaptation or one of the state of affairs. For the Church this question was very important and serious: we must discern the will of God for us. All power—if it is power and not a mirage—is from God.

In Christian, and also in Patriarchal sermons on those years, the idea is continually heard, that in the misfortunes which have befallen us, we ourselves are to blame "for we are receiving the due reward of our deeds" [Luke 23:41]. And we are indeed receiving them and not repudiating, or running away from them. This is the sphere of profound Christian experience.

In general, one may put it as follows: the spiritual maturity of a person determines his attitude toward those misfortunes which are befalling him personally, his people, and his Motherland. This maturity is measured by the degree to which we are prepared to accept, acknowledge, and if you will, justify the suffering which befalls all of us. We must recognize in them not some kind of random event, but a cross, a heavy cross, by means of which a person must be renewed, and come to salvation. The Christian path is a narrow path and straight, the path of bearing one's cross.

[Correspondent] What does the phrase, "narrow path" mean? And why, at the same time, is Christianity called a religion of freedom? Why did Christ say, "My burden is light" [Matt 11:30]?

[Aleksiy II] There is a broad way, a way without guideposts. A way on which a person is not compelled daily and hourly to spiritual efforts. This path does not promote a person's internal birth. But if that person overcomes his weakness, his mental and spiritual troubles, he is transformed. We have forgotten this at present. Love and suffering—that is the cross. Christ, even before his

Crucifixion, used to say: "Whosoever would be complete, let him take up his cross and follow me" [Sic; Cf. Matt 16:24, Mark 8:34, Luke 9:23].

The way of Christ is hard. It is continual improvement. But it is never easy for anyone who lives by his conscience. But spiritually—it is in truth a burden that is light and blessed. For obedience to one's conscience and obedience to love is a joy.

[Correspondent] What is your attitude toward the clergymen who have become deputies?

[Aleksiy II] A priest, a bishop—any Christian—has the right to participate in social activities. But they do not have the canonical right to identify their own position with the position of the entire Church.

[Correspondent] Is that—a sin?

[Aleksiy II] It is at the very least, imposture. For the Church, the main thing is to unite the people in the place where they may be united. It is precisely when political polarization is growing that it is most important for the Church to become a refuge, and salvation—for everyone. Ordinarily, a person comes to the Church and the priest asks him: how is your faith? But now the situation is reversed. A member of the congregation is inclined to interrogate the priest on his political views, and on the basis of his replies, decides whether he will pray with this Father or not.

[Correspondent] How should Russia be organized? Does Russia have its own spiritual mission?

[Aleksiy II] Russia has its own fate. And I am convinced that it is separate from the paths of other nations. But one cannot outwardly return to that which existed 70, or 300 years ago. That is utopia. One cannot return a political system. But one can change, and return to a lost system of values. When they used to say "Holy Rus," that did not mean that Rus considered itself holy. Rus strived for holiness, purity and sinlessness. If we want to resurrect Holy Rus, then we must resurrect that system, that hierarchy of values, to which we are indebted for the finest pages in our history.

[Correspondent] And what are these finest pages?

[Aleksiy II] These pages are associated with the conviction which Rus and Russia absorbed from Orthodoxy: that only sanctity is normal for man. And that sin, any sin, even the very smallest and most widespread, is abnormal and warps the nature of man.

The absolute, and striving for the absolute, is the national trait of Russia. It has revealed itself and is revealing itself in everything. And yes, even in the bolsheviks. Russia has, painfully, nevertheless endured a time of serving false gods. I fear, however, that it will not be able to endure a time when man refuses to serve anything at all, believing that its petty, present existence is altogether sufficient.

[Correspondent] The Church abroad has long since numbered Emperor Nicholas II and his family among the saints. But why has the Russian Orthodox Church not done so?

[Aleksiy II] Every week the Patriarchate receives letters on that account, both "for" and "against." Canonization does not signify anything in the fate of the person who is canonized. God's judgement on him has already taken place. Canonization makes sense as a kind of ecclesiastical-pedagogical act for the people who are still experiencing their earthly existence. At the present time the tendency to canonize all the acts in his life are too strong. Not for how he died, but for all of his policies and his life. Here the danger is not in canonizing, but in ideologizing. There are many disputed questions here. Until the people develop an orthodox attitude toward martyrdom, as to one who not so much completed his earthly journey, but who discovered a new life, until then these questions will continue to arise.

[Correspondent] Could this act cause conflict between the Church and the authorities?

[Aleksiy II] Right now at least, the Church is consciously concerned much more with keeping peace in the Church than with its relations with the authorities. There is no question that there is no urgency to number Nicholas II among the saints by virtue of his royal lineage. After all, even in the most terrible times we did not refrain from openly honoring Prince Vladimir or Aleksandr Nevskiy as saints.

[Correspondent] They say that the Russian Orthodox Church is a church closely associated with Soviet rule. They seek confirmation of this fact in the conflict with the Russian Church Abroad.

[Aleksiy II] It is easier to put labels on things than to seriously and weightily deal with the real situation, in history. It is of course, more convenient for man to cast off his responsibility before God, than to meditate

The pattern is completely standard. It is similar to the traditional subterfuge of the persecutors of the Church of old. To take a certain priest or monk and say, "Look what a bad person he is. And they are all like that."

[Correspondent] These are the words of Christ: "Nevertheless when the Son of Man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?" [Luke 18:8] How should one understand this?

[Aleksiy II] "The eyes are afraid [of what] the hands do." This is a Russian proverb about work. When one looks disdainfully at the neglect of religion in Russian society, it becomes terrible. But when one sees, how first in one and then in another the fires of faith and love and meekness and prayer are ignited, one's despair goes away.

We do not know what fate awaits Russia. But we must do our duty. We must bestow on as many people as possible the joy we have in the Risen Christ.

[Correspondent] What does it mean to a Russian to be a Christian in Russia?

[Aleksiy II] No doubt the very same thing that it means to a Jew. Remember what John the Baptist said to the Pharisees: "And do not presume to say to yourselves, 'We have Abraham as our father.'" [Matt 3:9] Even so I do not think it makes any sense for us to say, "We have Sergiy Radonezhskiy [1321-1391, founder of Troitskiy Monastery] as our father," if we merely swear by his name, but do not live his life of prayer.

[Correspondent] What is your attitude toward the patriotic movements?

[Aleksiy II] Our patriotic movements are of the extreme form, but there may be two things in them which provide hope that they may be reformed. The first is the fact that they are not indifferent about the fate of their country. And the second, is that they contain two services of which we are speaking. They truly want to serve an idea—perhaps somewhat incorrectly understood, or distorted, with incorrectly understood goals and tasks. But if the Church had an opportunity for serious education, it would be possible to correct this too. There is such a thing as religious wildness, but there is also such a thing as wildness of national consciousness. The principle of church life here, just as no doubt in all human life is as follows: One must not cut anything off; one must reform.

[Correspondent] Your first Patriarchal visit was to Israel. While you were there, did you discuss the question of antisemitism in Russia?

[Aleksiy II] I met with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, with Israeli President Chaim Herzog, and with the religious leaders of Jerusalem. I formed the impression that they understand that Christianity and Orthodoxy cannot be considered the source of antisemitism. It was exceptionally important and indicative, that the Israeli side expressed its readiness to assist our Church in solving our property problems in Palestine, as well as questions associated with the revival of pilgrimages to the Holy Land.

[Correspondent] Russia is under the patronage of the Mother of God... On the day when Emperor Nicholas II abdicated the throne, the icon of the Mother of God was displayed, on which the Virgin is depicted holding the scepter and the orb, the symbols of tsarist rule.

[Aleksiy II] In those days, with the help of the prelate Patriarch Tikhon, an acathistus [doxological prayer] was written to this icon, the Sovereign Icon of the Mother of God. It contains these words: "Our most merciful Lord and Creator has sent in these days of wrath a Visit by His Angel of Light, in the form of Thy Sovereignty." This Icon is not a warning; it is a comfort to us. Even in our sorrow, the Lord comes to us. In our tribulations, the Lord is close to us, and he does not abandon us. We have, apparently, gone far away from Him, and therefore we are experiencing pain. The very same thing can be said of the return of the relics of the Venerable Serafim.

which occurred two months ago. In the difficult and sorrowful days to come for our people and our country, we are also given this spiritual comfort.

[Correspondent] What will the sorrow of the days to come consist of?

[Aleksiy II] Why, in the fact that at the most varied levels, and in the most varied areas of the life of the people, a very sad unhealthy state [nezdorovye] will strike, starting at the level of the state, and the national way of life. Ideologization also starts in the hearts of man.

[Correspondent] It is as if the most difficult times for us are yet to come.

[Aleksiy II] I think that is so. We have no right to lull the people. At present, those groups, those parties, and those leaders who are saying, follow us and we will put everything in order in so-and-so many days or years, will bear very great and heavy responsibility, because it is very destructive for a person's consciousness to promise something and not carry it out. And after that, worse things will befall us, that is inevitable. It is necessary to honestly warn the people of the fact that the hard times are beginning. We must be internally prepared for them. In the final analysis, our tribulation may be cut short, depending upon our internal state.

If we come to true repentance, only then will improvement be possible. But repentance signifies a change of our very system of values. For what purpose are we living? Once again, that very same question: How much do we value our own souls, our own lives?

[Correspondent] What do you think? Is a monarchy the best political system for Russia?

[Aleksiy II] The fact of the matter is that the monarchy in Russia was of various kinds. For instance, the grand principality of the pre-Moscow period, the tsarist rule of the Moscow period, and the Peterburg emperorship—these were all different models of the structure of state. And chiefly, religious consciousness varied as well. For example, the Grand Princes of Kiev or Vladimir, or the Moscow Princes until Ivan the Terrible, felt that they were in the service of the Russian land. But beginning with Ivan the Terrible, they considered themselves the sovereigns. I do not think that this question can be put or resolved so unequivocally. One must not forget that for the Church, no such permanent and non-transitory national-state systems can exist. The human soul possesses immortality. But all the rest passes away. As we attempt to resolve the questions of the future of our country, we must look not so much into our past as much as we must listen to heed the voice of God, and those events which are now taking place.

[Correspondent] The acathistus of the icon of the Sovereign Mother of God has been forgotten by the official Russian Church and has been read only in the Catacomb

Church. Does that mean that the Russian Orthodox Church has resorted to theomachic rule?

[Aleksiy II] The Sovereign Icon has always been revered. It has been kept both in the churches and in the houses of the believers. The acathistus and the services have been copied and read. But in the words of the Apostle Paul: "Do not give cause to those who seek a cause." Insofar as the authorities saw in this acathistus the unmasking of their own evil and were therefore afraid, then why should one provoke them and call down upon the Church more misfortune and more persecution? In order to understand Christian policy it is extremely important to clarify that Christianity in general, is a hierarchical reality. There is a hierarchy of values: what is most important of all, what is the most necessary of all? For the Church the most important thing is to preserve itself, to preserve for the people the possibility of access to the chalice of Christ, to the Eucharistic chalice.

There is a rule, that a Christian has to take one sin on his soul in order to avoid the greater sin. If you will, a typical example is: war, the Church is not a willing partner in this. But it must minister to the soldiers who are defending the Motherland. Killing remains killing, even in war, and that is a sin. A soldier returning from the war must repent.

[Correspondent] But after all, to kill is not a soldier's wish, but his duty.

[Aleksiy II] Duty is duty, but any killing poisons the soul. In war a soldier hated someone. A wound has been dealt to the soul.

[Correspondent] And if a person does not go to war?

[Aleksiy II] It is still a great sin. But there are situations in which a person, a Christian, must sacrifice his personal chastity, his personal perfection, in order to defend something that is greater.

[Correspondent] The Fatherland?

[Aleksiy II] The Fatherland. And the Church, and in general, one's dear ones.

[Correspondent] Not wishing to serve in the army—is that a great sin?

[Aleksiy II] This is not in the tradition of the Russian Church. John the Baptist told the soldiers in the Roman army, which was in essence an army of occupation: "Do not offend the weak." He did not say, leave the army, turn your weapons against your exploiters; but, "Do not offend the weak."

Thus it is in the area of church policy. You see, the Sainted Ioann Iestvichnik said in the 7th Century in exhorting the pastors: "One may leave one good for the sake of another, greater good. That is what he did who escaped martyrdom, not out of fear, but for the good of those saved by his guidance."

Such was also the attitude of Metropolitan Sergiy, and the subsequent church leadership under Soviet rule. They were forced to speak untruth; they were forced to say that everything is normal with us. But you see, the Church was being persecuted. They made a statement of political loyalty. They abdicated the totality of church life; they relinquished good works and charity; they gave up the Sovereign Icon of the Mother of God as well. And they made compromises, for the sake of keeping the Church for the people, so that the Church would not retreat entirely into the catacombs. So that a person could find this church if he wanted to. So that at least he could receive the Eucharist and make his confession. Metropolitan Sergiy, when he signed the declaration, was himself in prison; but he did not sign in order to be released. There is information that they told him as follows: If you do not sign, all the priests who are in prison will be shot. And this was over 100 people. Here is the question: Can one purchase the cleanliness of one's own clothes at the cost of a hundred lives? It is well to make declarations about absolutist positions, when one is across the ocean. In such circumstances, I can say to Metropolitan Vitaliy, that if you are convinced that the Masons are ruling the world, they why do you not place the President of the USA under anathema?

[Correspondent] Could a Gaponovshchina happen again? [For Father Gapon; a movement of Russian pro-monarchy workers that culminated in the massacre of the workers at the Winter Palace in 1905.]

[Aleksiy II] It could, as long as we have priests who believe that their main task is not administering the Sacraments, and not carrying out their priestly duties—but politics.

Official Discusses Church-State Relations

91UN13294 Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 10, Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Yu. Khristoradnov, chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, by PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK correspondent V. Alekseyev; place and date not given "The State and the Church Have No Difference of Opinions"]

[Text] For a long time relations between church and state in our country were coldly noncommittal at best, though at times they grew into open confrontation. What are the principles for relations between church and state today? They are the subject of a conversation between our correspondent V. Alekseyev and the chairman of the Union state organ—the Council for Religious Affairs—Yu. Khristoradnov.

[Khristoradnov] The new USSR Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" that was passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet late last year represents an important event in the area of humanitarian cooperation and in the social life of our country. It reflects new approaches to relations between the state and the church; these approaches preserve the essence

and spirit of the perestroika that is going on in our country, they echo the renewal and democratization of our society. This legal act ensures wider and stronger guarantees of the constitutional rights of freedom of conscience and of religious beliefs for our citizens. It corresponds fully with international norms and standards with respect to human rights and freedoms.

The law extends equal rights to believers as compared with other citizens; it allows them to participate in the social life of our country. Religious organizations have the same right to employ the mass media as do public organizations. Students of specialized educational establishments which observe regulations common for students of state educational establishments enjoy the same rights and privileges with respect to deferment of military service, taxation, and inclusion of the period of study in their general work experience. Employees of religious organizations, including the clergy, are eligible for social security and social insurance benefits similar to blue- and white-collar workers of state and public organizations, institutions, and enterprises. So, it is quite natural that these provisions of the law are meeting with appreciation and wide support among the various strata of our people, believers as well as nonreligious people; these provisions are becoming the basis for legal relations.

Apart from various religious associations and societies, the new law also outlines the status of religious administrations, religious centers, lodges, monasteries, and missions as well as publishing, printing, industrial, restoration and construction, and other enterprises and charity organizations.

You know that only a few months have passed since the new law was adopted and became effective. Therefore, it is definitely too early to try to generalize and assess the effects brought by the law into such subtle, complex, and extensive public relations.

I would like to draw your attention to the following factor. The majority of our population displays goodwill and objectivity in its reaction to the renewal process taking place in the dialogue between the state and the church and to its immense possibilities for stabilizing the situation, settling interethnic relations and contacts, and bringing tolerance and kindness into relations among the people. In spite of all this we cannot ignore the fact that certain religious groups are attempting also to continue behave like parasites; they are trying to settle their political accounts and increase our social tensions, doing all this against the background of our new democratic processes, on the new surface and structure of our country, which is still insufficiently strong as it renews itself.

[Alekseyev] What concrete objects have been handed over and are already being used by religious organizations, in accordance with the new law?

[Khristoradnov] In recent years over 4,700 religious buildings have been handed over to believers' associations and plots of land have been assigned for constructing new premises. Forty-seven monasteries and architectural ensembles which are also historical monuments were given back. The same can be said about valuable artifacts and religious objects of great cultural and historical value. New ecclesiastical educational establishments have been opened.

We are bringing back the names of our compatriots who were undeservedly forgotten; among them were priests who became victims of the personality cult.

We need to do a lot more, of course, to renew relations between the state and the church completely. But within this framework, as we are guided by the new laws, we are listening attentively to every reasonable and well-balanced proposal and are trying to put it into practice.

[Alekseyev] After the adoption of the Union law on freedom of conscience our republics, including Russia, started passing similar laws of their own. Judging by the published materials, we are seeing a desire to compare the two laws, to try to find discrepancies, if not contradictions, between them. There is even an attempt to examine each one to see whether the degree of democracy in it is smaller or larger...

[Khristoradnov] Of course, it is all right to compare them, there is nothing wrong about it. But I must state right away that it is a very thankless task. The laws coincide in principle as they do in essence. Their general humane and democratic direction does not leave room for any doubts. There are some organizational subtleties where it concerns the application of certain provisions.

When the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] law was being drafted it was natural for them to use the experience gained in drafting the Union law. Moreover, it supplements the Union law by including, for instance, an article on declaring days of religious holidays as additional public holidays.

[Alekseyev] We heard more than once about the established business contacts between your council with the Russian Orthodox Church. What kind of relations do you have with representatives of other religions?

[Khristoradnov] I do not think that our relations with the Russian Orthodox Church are exclusive in any respect. The most important function of state employees is to protect the interests of believers of every faith and to help strengthen trust and mutual understanding between them and their followers. If the believers of one or another faith, inspired by all the changes in our country, suddenly run into a certain lack of understanding in their city or village they usually appeal to the central organs, to us primarily, as they are looking for empathy, help, and support.

What kind of feelings may believers experience, for instance, when they see decaying churches and mosques,

fallen-down roofs, warped crosses, desecrated tombs, perishing frescoes and icons? Or when they see religious buildings that were transferred into industrial shops, warehouses, saloons, swimming pools, or public bath-houses? What kind of emotions may be provoked among believers when they see a stuffed deer and a stuffed boar displayed on top of the altar in what used to be their Catholic church? Unfortunately, I am not exaggerating any of this. I can give you the exact address: the village of Polupanovka in Ternopol Oblast of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

Every time we manage to help people (not only Russian Orthodox believers) we naturally feel a certain satisfaction. Sometimes we can achieve things easily, but more often we have to spend a lot of time trying to persuade the local officials.

[Alekseyev] Islam is becoming an increasingly important factor in the sociopolitical life of the republics of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Volga region. Its values are well known. Meanwhile, a return to national traditions is being advertised under its banner; at times separatist tendencies or calls for the creation of a separate Muslim state on the territory of Central Asia hide under its cover, which creates splits in religious communities, and religious centers even fall apart. What is new today in the relations between our state and the followers of Islam?

[Khristoradnov] By the number of its followers, Islam is a major religious faith in the country. The problems that have been accumulating in it for years, similar to those of other religions, are now being resolved thanks to perestroika. The issue of registration for religious communities is not as pressing as it used to be. Compared to 1985 their total number has quadrupled, and there are now 1,590 of them. Mosques are being given back to believers, including those that are of great historical and architectural value. New mosques are being built. Education of clergy is being expanded. Supplies of religious literature to believers have been improved. Work is going on in connection with publishing the Koran, a book that is sacred for Muslims. It will be published in various local languages: Uzbek, Kazakh, Azeri, Tajik, Kirghiz, Tatar, etc.

International relations are developing further and further. Major events organized by the religious organizations of our country find a great response in the Muslim world. It has become the norm to receive foreign delegations with representatives of the same faith as participants in them. The same can be said about the participation of Soviet Muslims in various events abroad.

If we touch on the stance of Muslim priests concerning the preservation of unity in our country, the absolute majority of them want to preserve the Union, but in its new quality, of course.

[Alekseyev] All efforts to restore our ancient historical and cultural monuments, to awaken old indigenous traditions, customs, ethnic rites, and folk art in the

memory of the people are becoming very important. What part is the state organ for religious affairs playing in all of this?

[Khristoradnov] We cannot continue to watch impassively as Valaam, Solovki, Solotcha near Ryazan, the ancient monuments of Central Asia or the Ukraine, and other masterpieces of our national culture are dying. History will never forgive us for the irrevocable loss of these marvelous gems of our past. The church has never felt alien to the problems of ecology and environmental protection; it has always taken an active part in helping to form harmonious relations between nature and human beings. This set of problems is acquiring an especially critical character at present. Therefore, an entire sphere, unusually noble in its goals, is opening to the church in its work. In this respect the state and the church do not have any difference of opinions—they have to work together to try to revive the spiritual world of man. This is already being done, and our organ has been and will be an active helper in such an important undertaking.

[Alekseyev] The former Union Council for Religious Affairs existed under the USSR Council of Ministers. Now a new organ of the highest executive power is functioning under the USSR president. It is the Cabinet of Ministers, and its functions have been changed considerably. Will there be any room under the Cabinet of Ministers for a new state organ for religious affairs?

[Khristoradnov] The Union Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" says that a USSR state organ for religious affairs has to be established. What will it be like? Work is being done now to define and determine its future functions and powers, its position, and its main tasks. One thing is clear: The new organ has to become the center of information, consultations, and expert opinions, just as described in the Union law. It must be efficient and be of service to our renewing society.

Citizens Polled on Most Desirable Living Places

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Union Edition p 7

[Article by Aleksey Levinson: "A Poll: Where In The USSR Is It Good To Live?"]

[Text] Early this year, the VTsIOM [All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion] approached 4,850 respondents with the following question in the course of an all-Union survey: "In which republics and regions do the people live better at present than in others?" Subsequently, the question was asked: In which ones do they live worse?

The survey was taken throughout the territory of the Union. This made it possible to determine that the inhabitants of most parts of the Union take pride in the place in which they live, though they do give their due to other regions as well. The residents of the Baltic area,

Belorussia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan most frequently called their specific regions and republics the best, and called them the worst least frequently. For example, 80 percent of the respondents in Estonia picked the Baltic area from the list of the best, and not one respondent named it among the worst. However, the greatest number of those surveyed throughout the country consider living conditions in the Baltic area the best. In most regions, Central Asia was mentioned among the places in which life is the worst. However, for the residents of Central Asia themselves (as well as those of Moldova) their native parts are among the best.

This kind of patriotism appears natural. Responses by the residents of the Russian Federation appear to be a distressing exception against this background. They rank the European part of Russia, as well as the Urals with Siberia and the Far East in last places among the best, and in first places among the worst. The lands of the Russian Federation, especially Asian, got quite low marks in other regions as well. However, the judgment of the Russian residents themselves (and among them primarily Russians) turned out to be the harshest.

This condition of national self-awareness is both dangerous and deplorable; after all, this is where the wounded feelings of virtually one-quarter of the residents of the huge republic are concentrated. History indicates that a complex of national inferiority is not any better than a complex of superiority because it represents the reverse of the latter. The only hope for curing this is associated with Russia turning from the foundation of an empire into a country living as an equal among equals.

For now, one-fifth of the residents of Russia believe that the Baltic area is the best land, and another one-fifth believe that the Ukraine is. They rank Transcaucasia third, and Belorussia fourth. "The all-Union" public opinion also evaluated almost equally the advantages of life in the Baltic area and in the Ukraine. The admirers of the Baltic region dominate among people under 40, whereas "Ukrainophiles" dominate among older people.

We should say that the attitude toward living conditions in the Baltic area is much more contradictory than that toward conditions in the Ukraine which many believe to be the best, and few believe to be the worst (five percent). In that sense, the Baltic area got negative ratings three times more often.

Understandably, such data indicate the attitude of the people toward living conditions in various republics rather than living conditions themselves. To be sure, the attitude is partial. In Russia, they think better of living conditions in the Ukraine than the Ukrainians themselves do. In turn, the Ukrainians think better about life in Russia than the Russians do. In both republics, approximately 15 percent more people came up with an answer to the question "Where is it the worst?" than did to the question "Where is it better?" Such are the times—the bad is easier to see than the good. However, this will pass because, as a wise man said, "there is more good, even when there is less of it."

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